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1.1 Approach, problems and objectives
"I`he t heine of polit ical decision makiug has at t rari c~d scholars of various disciplines:
political scientists, psychologist.s, sociologists, philosophers, statisticians, historians and
recentlv, economist.s. This thesis considers sonx~ decision problems in politics from an
economic point of view.
Polit.ical decision making and decision making in economics have ~nan~. features in
coinmon. First of all, most of the time, decision makers have different interests. Sec-
ond, their decisions and payoffs depend on the decisions of the others involved. Third,
there exist constraints to behaviour (institut,ional rules, alt.ernatives available for choice,
budget constraints, to name a few ). In other words, in both t.he political and in the
economic sphere, decision making takes place in a strategic environment.
In the field of economica, t.he strategic behaviour of individuals is Lhe subjecl, rrtatter
of micro-economics and game t.hcory. The problem is to find the optimal decision,
for instance wit.h respect to consumpt,ion or production, given t.he constraints a-nd the
decisions of the others. The underlying assuitiption to this research is that, individuals
are 'rational,' in the sense t,hat thcy pursue their own interests.
Rational choice theories of politics adopt the economic and game theoretic approach
to analyse political decision problems such as the choice of a party platform, the voting
decision, the choice whether to rnn For election, aud so on. This thesis is in the tradition
of the rational choice approach, also refcrred t.o as 'public choice.'
Following Becker (1993), the economic approach in t.his thesis wil] be conceived in a
broad sense; as a method of analysis, not as t,he assurnption of self-interested behaviour
usually employed in econornics. "1'he rationality postnlatc that will be used can then be
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def~ined as the assurnpt ion ~ liat "indi~.iduals tnaximisr' wc~~lfare as thr y r~~nceire it. ~t~het her
thc~ bc selfislr, altruistic. lo~-al, spitr~ful or masoc~histic.'~ and that "thc~ir beha~~iour is
for~i-ard-looking and r~ousistc~nt o~~r~r tinir~" (lic~cker. 1993. E~p. 3~6).
This thesis addresses thrr~c~ issrres ( I 1 spatial electoral conrpetition. (~) coalitional insta-
bility and (:i) the int~~raclion of decision making in econotnics and politics. In addition,
the game theoretic mc~thodti used for solviug political gatnes will be~ cvaluated and a ncw
method for sol~-ing sonie specific coalitional games ~~-íll be developed.
1'hc tlif~sis is divirlr~d into t~~.o partti. Part I can bc~ s~en as an applica~ion oI non-
coopc~rati~~c~ game thr,or~~ to sorn~~ problc~nis in the Iield of clectoral conipc~titíori. It ,~~r~ks
lo detr`rtnine the optinial ~trategieti oI tl~e political agc~ntti irivol~-r~d. Part II i5 tnorr~
theoretical aud more cooEic~rati~-~~ iu charai~t~~r. It deals with ttie stabilitv of oritcomes of
coalit.ional garnes.
~l~he objc~ct,ivc of part. I is to deal ~-ith sonie of t he critic~isms raised to c~xisting rnodels in
thP arc~a of spatial elr~ctoral com~etition. 'I'hc startirtg poinl oI thesr~ tno~lc~ls is that ihere
is a conrpa.ct polic~. spacr~ that describi~~ all polic~- positions that a part~~ or a political
candidatc~ can takc. ti'oters ha~.e (concavc~l utilit~. frinctio~is dc(inErl on thc~ polic~- epace.
In some rnodels, only- thc~ distribution of iht~ idcal poinis of the~ ~otr~rs is gieen. 'I~he
question is w}rich polic~~ posit,ions c~lecloral conte~starits will tak~, given 5omc~ voting rirlc~
that detertni~es the outcome of the cl~~~~tíons. The maiu poiuts of criticisnr ] have lo all
of these nrodels is t hat t hc~ set of co~npet ing polit ic al agents is exogFnous and disjoint
froui tlie set of ~-oters aud t{iat compctitors are assunu~d to be commit~ed to thr~ polic~.
positions ihr~y. choose llence, voters do nol ha~r' activr~ voting rights and, conseyur~ntly,
these models {'ail to r~xplain electoral conipe~tition in d~~nioc-ratic couniries. Thc~ maiu
objecti~~c~ of the niodr'I in r~hapter '? is to ar~count for ~hesc criticisnis b~~ assuming ihat
polítical carididates stcm frorn the c~lectorate. Ever~. votcr con~ider~s the~ quc~stiou ~~-Irr~thc~r
to run for election or not. Hencc~. ~andiclat~s fiave polic~. preferences. ~~~hic h rxplains t heir
commitment, to a certain polic}~ potiition. "I~he consr~yuenc~es of this geueralisation are~
first studied under the assumption of sincere ~-oting. i.e.. the assumption that e~-er~y
~~ot.er votc~s for the candidatc shc prefc~rs. Latcr ou. ihe possibilit~ of strategic ~.oting is
cousidc~red.
Tl~ie tnain problem is to deterniin~~ tlu~ number of ~~andidates sc~c~kiug elc~c~tion and to
determine t}ie polic~~ positio~is the~. ~rill ~-hoose. The prohle~m becoines rnorc manageabl~~
once it is turucd into a t~~~o-stage~ ganx,. In the first ~tage, running decisions ar~~ made
and iu the scrond stagc~. ~~,t~,rs ~otF~. ~I~hr~ EiroblPm is sol~-ed b~ iii~oking some solutiun
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conccpts of non-coopcrati~e game theor~-. ~Co sol~r tliF problcm w.ith sincc~r~~ ~~ot.ing. 1
a}ipl~ the ~~oncept of ~ash eqiiilibriii~n an~1 sol~~~~ the~ game~ }~~- backwarcl indu~~tion. :~ sc~t
of ~andida~f~s is a sincPrF~ coting ~as}~i cyuilihriiiin if, giv~~n ihe since~re~ dc~cisionti of th~~
~~otcrs, no candidatc in thc sct wantti to withdraw and no pot~~ntial eandidai~~ ~~titside~
tkic set ~-ants to E~nCPr.
It turns out tflat with a coutinuuin of ~~olcrs, ih~~ sincc~rE~ ~-oting ~nodc~l gPncrates aii
infinite nuinber of ~ash eyuilibria. Hencc. iherF is a coordination prohlr~m: ~~.ithout
~~oordiuation of thc runnin~ dccisions equilibriurn ~.ill onl~~ bE~ rcachFd h~ acc~idc~nt. An-
other problFm is iliat with ~iratc~gic~ votii~g. the~ gamc í5 unsol~-ablc. Th~~ asstunption of
a continuurn of agPnts impli~~s that indivi~lu~l ~~otcrs lia~~~~ no in(lucncc~ ou th~~ outconiP
of ihe elections (e~-er~ ~oter has rneasur~ zero). ('onsc~yu~~niJt~. ~~~~~r~' pru(ili~ of ~otc~r
decisions is a lash eq~iilihriuni in thc: sc~cond stage of the game. Il~~nc~~~. ~~otcr~ ~~annu~
decide whether or nof to run For elect ion. ~tiincc t hi~ ou~cornF of tl~iP c~lections is coinplc~tel~-
undetermined.
('l~apters 3 and ~l uf part I appl}. a refiriFment of the concept of ~ash equili}~~riurn
in order t.o solve t~hese prc~blerns: perfeclly strorig Nash ~~yuilibrium (YSNE; Rtibinsicin.
19b0: Aumann, 1989). A ~~ector of voting decisions is a strong ~a5h eyuilibrium (SNl?)
if no coalition of ~~oters impcoves b~~ jointh- cha~igir~~ their ~~otirig dccisions. .~ titrateg~-
coinbinakioe of voting dccisions and rurining decisions is a I'SNF if it iti ~n S!~I~; an~I iF
no coalit~ion of ~-oTers irnpro~.es b~- jointJy c}iangin~ their riinning dc~isions. Siuce PSNF;
puts additional rest.rict.ions on the Nash equilibria, it can bc expected th~t the ~iurnbPr of
Nash equilibria declines. NIoreover. PS~E makes it possible to analyse strateóic voting
behaviour iu a game with a continuum of voters, since coalit.ions of voters may have a
positive measure and hence ma~~ inHiience thc outcome of thP elections.
The concept of PS1E has one drawback, how~ever. It implicitl~- assurncs that coa,li
tions are stable, i.e., that all members of a coalition deviating frorn a Nash equilibrium
do indeed carry out the intended change of strategies and tl1aC they will not dcviate anv
further w-ith subcoalitions or w-ith alternative coalitions (see also Bernhein. Neleg and
~~'hinst,on. 198 ~ ).
This problem of possible coalitional instabilit,y forrns one of ihe main t}iemea of part II
of this t,hesis. In conformity with the analysis in part [. ihe policy space is asstirne~l to
be compact. To keep the problem simple, only voting decisions are considered. Inst,ead
of vot~ing for a candidate, voters choose a point in the policy space. Voters are allowed
to organise coalitions in support of a certain policy. The question is which of these
coalitíons are stable, in the sense that no one wants to leave a coalition for auother one,
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supporting an alternativc~ pohc~.
Cooperative game theor~~ h~rti proposc~d various solut.ion concepis t~o answer t,his ques-
t.ion. None of them is complc~tely satisfactory, however. The rnain problem is that, the
set of stable coalitions may be emptti-, which may oecur when utilit~- funct.ions are not
concave or when the policy space is mult.i-dimensional.
The objective of chapter ~ of part II is to develop a new cooperative solut,ion concept
that overcomes this and other problems. Anot.her objective is t,o explain the outcotnes
of the cooperative game in terms of a non-cooperative bargaining process.
Finally, chapter 6 of pa,rt II applies t.he solution concept developed in chapter .5 to
a political-economic modeL This model deals with the rnutual iníjuence of political and
economic decisions. The objective of chapter 6 is to consistent,ly integratc an economic
and a political system in thc sense t,hat the decisions made in both s~rstems are based on
one and t,he same information set. This objective is met by assuming that individuals,
as economic actors, anticipate the decisions that rna5~ be made in t.he poliT.ical syst,em
and t.hat individuals ant,icipate the influence of their vot,ing decisions on their economic
well-being. To the economic decision problems what Io produce and what to consume
the theor~- of general eGuilibriurn is applied and ihc~ decision problems in the political
sphere are solved hy invoking the solution concept developed in chapter 5.
The remainder of this introductory chapt,er is organised as follows. Section l.'~ deals with
spatial models of elect,oral competition. In subsection 1.2.1, an overview of the literat~ure
on electoral competition is given to summa.rise the objections to earlier models in this
field. Subsect,ion I.?.2 discusses the electoral competition models of chapters `Z-4.
Sect,ion 1.3 deals with coalitional stability. Subsection 1.3.1 reviews the existing
solution concepts for coalitional games and the criticisms that. can be raised against
each of them. Subsection 1.3.2 discusses m}- own solution concept,, and subsection L3.:3
discusses t}ie application of this solution concept to a political-economic model.
The final section (1.4) concludes by discussing t}~ie contribution of this t,hesis.
1.2 Spatial electoral competition
1.2.1 Review of the literature
In this subsection the literature on spatial electoral competition will be discussed. Frorn
this, some suggestions for improvement will be made, which will be incorporated in the
model to be developed in chapter 2 of this thesis.
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Ke,carch on spatial polit.ical cornpetition can be t,raccd back to Downs' book "Eco-
nuiuir 'I'heor} of Democracy" ~ L95 ï). in whirh he develops a political analogon to
Ilut~~lliiigs~ (19'?9) spatial model of duopolistic comp~~fition between firrns. In this basic
niu~lrl. two votc~-maximising parties or candidates cornpet~~ for t.he favour of the votcrs
b~~ i~hosing a position in a left-right continuum over which t.he idealpoinis of t,hc~ voters
are uniformly distribut,ed. Voters are supposed to votc~ for the candidatc~ closest to their
ideal poinl. `I'he outcome is the well-knowu resiilt that both partics will locate in thc
middle oí t,he continuum.
However at.tract,ive and elegant this simple model may be, it covers only a small part
of the rich variet.y of real existing polit.ical systems. According to Cox (19hS1), an electoral
system is described by a five-t uple, (v, p, c, k, f), where v is the numhc~r of votes a
voter is allowed to cast, p refers to wl~iether abstent,ion is permitted. ~~ is a cumulation
rule prescribing whether voters,may cast more than one vote for thc~ samE~ candidate. l~
is the number of seats available and .( is the electoral formula. also called scoring rule
or voting rule. The most well-known scoring rules are the plurality rulc~ (the c-andidate
ranked first by ihc largest number of voters is declared the winner) and Lhe majority
rule (the candidat.e ranked first by more tha.n halF of the voters wins).
In addition to the different assumpt.ions a theoretical compet,ition niodel niakes concern-
ing the electoral system, the model rnay also employ di(ferent assumptions with respect
to the number of competit.ors, the policy space, Lhe dist.ributio~ of the voters, the be-
haviour of t,he voters, the instrumental object.ives of the cornpetitors, the cornmitrnent
to the policy position chosen and the conjectures of agents with respect to t.he behaviour
of others (see also S}iepsle, 1991).
Most authors assume that t.here are only two cornpetitors, corresponding to reality
in the United States. The development of multi-party tnodels is of a recent date.
The policy space concerns the set of alternatives. It. may be discrcte or continuous,
uni- or multi-dimensional, bounded or w~bounded.
The term 'voter distribution' refers to the distribution of the ideal points of the voters
over the policy space. This distribution may be uniform, non-uniform but symmetric,
non-symmetric or multi-modal.
With respect to vot.er behaviour, the most common assumption made is t,hat voters
vote sincere, i.e., they vote for the candidate or the party they most prefer. Applied
studies only recently assume that voters are strategic, i.e., that they choose a voting
strategy that maximises their expected utility.
The instrumental objectives of political contestants may vary from vote-maximisation,
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pluralit}~ maximisatio~ (maximis~ thF diíference~ in votes ~~-ith respect to thP best siip-
ported opponeut ), rank maxi~iiisation (rninimisP th~ nunihe~r of agcnis ~~.ith a larger sup-
port), io maximising utilit}~ (in cas~~ political conic~stanl5 have ideologicall~- moti~-at,c~d
polic~. prefcr~~nces).
Political contPStants nia~. oi~ ma~~ not bc ~orrunitt~~d ~u tl~ic~ po~itioti chosen in th~~
polic~ spacc~. If thc~~ arP not comrnitt~~d, thc~~ ma~ shift to another positiori to enhanre
perspecti~~c~s. "I'hi5 t~~picall~~ occiirs ~~.hcn thcrc~ ar~~ no rosts of relocation. ~lobilitv ~ria~.
ho~cPeer be inhiliite~d b~. reputation ~osts and crc~dihilitt. constraint,s.
.~g~nt c~onj~~c~turPS var~~ ~a.ith ih~~ assumption on ihe timing of thc, choi~~c~ of poli~~~
positions. In ih~~ ~~as~ of a sirruiltanr~ous choicc~. ihe ('ournot-~ash h~poth~~sis rna~ hc
emplo~-c~d. i.e., agents assume t hat t hc~ir choice ~~.ill ncit pro~.oke react ions from t he oth~~rti.
In the casP of a siibseque~~t choice~ of posit ions (for itist ancc~ ~ti-hen nc~t~. E~art i~~s choos~~
their position~ aftr~r thc~ choice of in~~innbent parties). tli~ Stackelberg h~-potlic~sis is mc~rr~
appropriatc. In chosing a posit,ion, iuc~umbcnts n-ill ant icip~~tr~ on t l~iE~ ~~hoia~s of t he ot.hr~rti
in reaction to tliFir~s. I~egarding th~~ ~~xpectations of agenis ~~ith rr~5p~~ct to t~he choic~~s
of the others agents ma~-. Ior cxarnple. assurn~~ that others will cl~ioosc~ a titratcgy that
causes them maxinwrn dama~e (niinirnax c~pe~~tatiuns).
Some of the mentioned ~.ariations on th~~ models of Ilotc~iling ancl Downs are discussPd b~-
1?aton and I,ipsey (19~5) in ihc~ir work on multi-tir~n roinp~tition. :lrnong oth~r ihin~s,
t he~. consider a~-ariable numb~r of firms. alteruati~~c~ clistribut ions of thc~ locat ion of firms.
minimax exp~ctations and a h1-o-diincnsior~al spac~,. Onc~ im~iortant rrsiilt is ihat if thc~
number of firms exceeds t~~~o. for alniost any distribiition of (irms. a ptire stratcg~~ ~ash
equilibrium does not Fxist.
Despile t~he fact that many of th~~ results on ~~ornp~~tition bet~~.er~n firrns carry ove~r
to electoral competition (see ('ox, 1987: Osborne 1993; Shepsle, 1991). 1,}i~re are t~ti.o
important differences I would like to highlight. as tl~c~s~ pla~~ an important role in thc~
competition models in this thcsis. First, as Shepsle (1991, pp.23) point,s ottt, thc~ insiru-
mE~ntal objecti~~es of political agcnts ~~.ill be linked up with the electoral system at hand.
In repr~sentative systcros, with more than on~~ sPat ~c~ divid~~. obj~ct,i~-~~s ~a-ill be ~~Pry
dif~erent from those in districL s~.st~~ms avhere~ onl~~ onc~ seat is at stak~~ (se~~ Du~~e~rgc~r,
19.~3). The yuestion of n.hich instrumental objectice Lo apply to ~~.liich ~~I~ctoral system
is not yet ans~~.ered in the literaturF (see S}iepsle. 1991. pp. 23-2L~). In addition. policy
preferences ma~. figure in the agents' objective function.
A second difierence between c~cotiornic and political competition becomes apparent if
t,he assurnption of a fixc~d set of agents is relaxed and c~nt ry is endogc~nised. ln an economic
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model thPre ma~~ arisP an eyuilibtintn in which sotnc~ firrn's tnarket sharr is srnaller tltan
anofher iirni's niarkPt share. In a political context. howecer, a party expecting less
support than its strongest opponent will withdraw frorn sPeking elcct.ion if therP is otily
one seat at stakP and if ntnning is costly.
In a I~iapt,r ht~ Palfrey (19H 1), t his last diff~rPncF bet tt-c~t~n ot~onomi~~ an~l pcilit ic al corn-
petition was not yct recogniscd. He analy5ed thc effect, of c~ntr~~ of a thirtl ~an~li~latc on
the locational choice of two est.ablished candidates. r1ll candicja.tes arc~ vot~, maxiini5ers.
but e~sta.blished candida,tes simultaneously choose positions, whil~~ th~~ ~~ntrant cliooses
contingent on t,he positious of thc forrner. Palfrey proves t.hat tli~~ t~ntrant ~ilw~iys Ititit~ti
in equilibriurn.
Creenberg and Shepsle (198i) criticised this model for being contrarti- to t.hc rnotivc
of the entrant of winning office. I~ue to the assumption that the tota,l nurnber of rw7ning
candidates, including the entrant. is o pr~iori fixed. the entrant is in fact forc~d to ent.er
~~-hile she has no chance of winning. Greenberg and Shepslc~ try to rnet~t tliis ol-~ject.ion
b~. endogenising entry. '1'heir model features a fixed number of k seats and cancíidate~s
st~rive to be among the fop k of candidates by maxirnising ranlc. The equilibrii,trn s~t of
candidates is defined such thaY, tlte entry- of losers is deterred. [t turned out., however,
that there exist vot.er distributions for which there is no equilibrium in case the nurnber
of seats is ]arger or equal to Ywo.
Anot~her thing that has been long overlooked in the literature is that~ voters will not
necessarily vote for tlte candidate or party they prefer tnost. For inst,ance, vot,ers mav
shift their votes to anot.her candidat.e if the candidat~e of t,heir first. preference has no
chance of winning. Work on what is called 'stra-tegic' or 'sophisticat.ed voting'~ has al-
ready been carried out br Farquharson in the sixt,ies (['arquharson, 1969). ~loreover,
iShepsle (1991, pp. 62n) makes a distinction between strategic and sophisticated voting. "Sophis-
ticated voting refers to the backward induction process engaged in by rational agents endowed with
foresight and perfect and complete inforrnation about the agenda of choices and the sequence in which
they are to be taken up. It is most appropriate for voting on bills and amendments in committee or
legislative proceedings which have well defined agenda rules.....Strategic voting, on the other hand, is
generally treated as an er ante decision rule employed by instrumentally oriented voters who lack per-
fect and complete information. In order to make best use of their resources, they compute expected
outcomes conditional on different dispositions of their vote, choosing the one that maximises their ex-
pected utility. It is most appropriate in mass elections where voters treat other agents parametrically.
not strategically." "hhis distinction may be useful wheo considering pure voting games. It is, however
not applicable to the two-stage games in chapters 2 and 3 oC this thesis. There, we have mass elections,
but voters also anticipate on the effect of their choice on the policy the elected officials will carry out,
hehaviour that can be termed as sophisticated. For my purpose, only the distinction between 'sincere'
and 'insincere' voting behaviour is relevant. Hence, I will use both of the terms, sophisticated as well
as strategtc, to denote that the strategy set of voters also contains 'insincere' strategies.
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from the theorems of Gibbard (19ï:3) and 5t,t l~~rt liwa,itc ( 197~~), we know that all met,hods
of preference aggregation arP vuhic~ral,l~~ tu ., n,isr~~v~~lation of preferenccs. ~nother in-
teresting objection to the assumption of ,inc~~m voting stents frorn :~lustc~n-Srnith (1987).
He argues t.hat voters tti~ill be less concerned wit h t he out conte of t he elcct íons t.han with
the policy making of the elected ofFicials. Hence, in casting their votes, they will antic-
ipate on thc implication for fïnal policy making. Austen-Smith shows tha-t. no electoral
structure (consisting of an elect,ion rule and a rule determining how the policy of elect.ors
is determined) guarant,ees that voters will vote sincere.
The issue of strategic voting has been t.aken up by I~'eddersen. Sened and Wright:
(FSw~, 1990). I will extensively discuss their model, siuce it. it is yuite similar to the
model of chapter 2. Their model, features a given and finite set of voters and a given
set of potential candidates (smaller t:han the number of vot:ers). First:, ant,icipat:ing
the strategic equilibrium reactions of the voters, all candidates simultaneously decide
whether to enter or not and if so, where to locate in the policy space X-[0, 1].
Candidates are committed t,o the st:rategy that they have chosen. The cont.est. is decided
by plurality rule (i.e., the candidate with the largest number of votes is declared the
winner) and if there is more than one undefeated candidate, all ca,ndidates have an equal
probabilit~~ of gaining office. It is assumed that candidates abstaining frorn entry receive
a payoff of zero and that defeated candidates lose some fixed amount of entry costa. Thc.
payoff of undefeated candidates equals the probability of gaining office, t.imes some fixed
benefits associated with office-holding, minus the entry costs. Obviously, this payoff
structure deters losing candidates, since they have entry costs to save. After the set of
candidates has formed, voters simult,aneously and independently make their decisions.
Since voters are strategic, they vot:e for the candidate who maximises their expected
payoff.
It turns out that, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, a,ll voters vote sincere, all entrants
adopt t:he position of the median voter's ideal point and the number of entering candi-
dates equals the largest int.eger that does not exceed the benefit-cost ratio. The result
that the position of candidates is centrist runs counter t:o the~ findings of Cox (1987):
"electoral competition under plurality rule acts ... to ensure or encourage the appear-
ance of non-centrist candída-tes in rnulti-candidate contests~." FSW think this conclusion
"a bit previous and due to assumptions like sincere voter behaviotu and a fixed set of
entering candidates.''
Unfortunately, the FSW model suffers frorn some coordination problems (see also
Shepsle, 1991). In equilibrium, all entering candidates must have the same number of
zBy multi-candidate contests, contests with at least three candidates are denoted.
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votes and they must choose the position of the median voter. Ilence, with strategic
voting, vot.ing stra.tegies have to be coordinatc~d to achic~ve~ t.his. Furthermore, after
the equilibrium number of candidates at t,he media.n is reached, furt.her entry, off the
median. is deterred onlv when voters coordinate to votc for one and the same median
candidate, since case, if the vote is divided. sorue candidate entering off the median
rnight: win. Conceivably. some refinernenl of Nash equilibrium might solve t,he second
problem, but t.he first seems t.o be problematic, since all equilibria. are payoff-equivalent.
to voters. Consider for inst.ance the a.pplicat.ion of the concept of coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium (CPNI?). C'P~IE requires the Nash ec{uilibrium to be proof against, deviations
of st,able coalitions. Clearly, with respect to thc first coordination problem mentioned, all
equilibrium voting strat.egies are coalition-proof, since all equilibria are payoff-eyuivalent
to voters. CPNE might, however, solve the second problem since the strict. concavity
of utility functions implies that. there altivays exists a majority of voters t:hat prefer a
median candidate to a candidate off the median.
Two other objections to the FSW model are that. the set, of candidates is exogenous
and disjoint: from the set of voters and t.hat: candidates just, care for being elect.ed. Hence,
voters do not have active voting rights, which rnakes t.he model unsuitable for studying
electoral competition in democracies. The assumption concerning the motives of candi-
dates implie~s that candidates must. be assumed to be committed t,o the policy position
chosen. This commit:ment remains unexplained by t,he model.
With respect to the electoral compet:ition model in chapter 2 of this t,hesis, the
following conclusions can be drawn from the anal,ysis above: t.he motives of the candidates
must be in conformity with their behaviour in equilibri~im, their instrument,a,l objectives
must be in conformit,v with the electoral system, a possible strategic behaviour of the
voters must be account:ed for and the set: of candidat:es must be a subset .of t,he set of
voters.
Clearly, the FSW model incorporates all of these reyuirements, except. for the last.
The objective of t.he model in chapter 2 is to improve upon t.he FSW model by including
active voting rights.
1.2.2 A model of electoral competition with active voting
rights
This subsection discusses the electoral competition model of Chapter 2 of this thesis.
The main purpose of this research is to generalise the FSW model by including active
voting rights. Instead of benefit-seeking candidates (dropped from the skies) I assume
that candidates stem from the electorate. Everyone in society considers the question
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~-hether to rnn for election or not. licncc. candidatcs have polic~~ pr~~ferenc~~s jiist lil:~~
e~~eryone else has (see also M'itiman. 197ï, 1933: ('al~-ert. 19ti:ï and .11~~tiina. 19,ti`~).
Due to ~he assurnptions of perf~~ct inforniation and norncornmitni~~ii1 i~~ tli~~ ~~~~li~~y
position chosen, the platforrn that candidates choose will coincid~~ ~~-ith thc,ir i~l~~.~l ~,uinl.
Voters would not believe that a candidatP would actuall}- impletnent a~~olir~. t liat ~liff~~rti
írom her ideal point- Consequentl~.. a can~iidate's location in the polic.~ spac~~ is no
strategic variable and all indi~~i~{uals have~ the same objecti~~e (to maximise utilit,}~) a,nd
the same set of strategies (seeking elcction or not and voting for one of the candidates).
For simplicit~~, 1 assuine that there are no direct benefits of office-holding.
The other model asstmiptions are as follo~as. "Che polic~~ space is [0, 1]; societ~-
consists of a continuum of indi~.iduals, eyual to [0. 1]: evereone votes sincere and agent
conjectures conforrn to the Conrnot-~ash h~.pothesis. ~1'ith respect to the electoral
system. I assume tha~ each ~-oter has only one ~.ote to cast, ~-oter abstention is not
allowed, there is onl~ onc seat, there are fixed costs of entrv and ihe elect,oral forrnula is
the pluralit~- rule.
These assumptions are taken as a starting poiiit and they are far from realistic.
Later on in chapter Z. I relax the assumptions of sincere ~.ot.ing and forced voting and iu
chapters 3 and 4 I allow for communication and coordination of strategies.
The game has two stages. In the first stage, voters decide whether the~- will iise t}ieir
active voting rights and in the second stage voting decisions are made. The main problem
is to determine the number of voters seeking election. The solution concept employed
is the concept of Nash equilibrium and the game is solved by back~vard induction (see
subsection 11 for the definition of Nash equilibriiirn).
:V'otwithstanding the similarities with the FS~' model. mt' model generates Guite
different results. The equilibritm~ numher of candidates is not larger than t.tti~o and there
is an infinite nnmber of one- and t.wo-candidatc~ equilibria that are not payo(I-equivalcnt.
Furthermore. if strategic voting is accounted for, it turns out that all ~.oting profiles can
be sustained as equilibria. Due to the assumption of a continutnn of voters, eaery voter
has measure zero and hence, the voting behaviour of the indi~.idual has no influence on
the outcome. H, however, a finite number of voters is assumed, a similar result as in
the FSW model can be derived: all ~~oters vote sincere. Ilence, the magnitude of the
electora,te has important conseyuences for voting behaviour. "I'his iniplies tha,t we have
to be carefiil in carrying over conclusions from models ~ti~ith a srnall number of voters
to models ~c.ith a large electorate. L-nfortunately~, equilibrium need not always exist.
Existence depends on the configuration and shape of utility functions and t.he costs of
entry. However, if utility functions are symmetric and identically shaped (an assumption
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often employed in the~ litrraturf~). rxiste~nct~ is guarant,eed. The last point to be tnent.ioned
is that there is a coordination prohlt~ni- If ~~andidates do iiot coordinate their strategies.
each spc~cific eyuilibrium ca.n only occur li~ ac~~idPnt tiince thc~re is an infinitc~ nu~nber of
equilibria. ('ontrary to the coordination proble~n in the FSW~-rnodel. in the model at.
hand therc: may- be some hope that soine refinement of :Vash equilibriutti ~~~ill solve it,
since the equilibria iu the model are not pay.o(f-equivalent for cancíidates.
In chapters 3 and 4 I take up the coordination problem in t,he model of chapter '?. [n
tl~te models of these chapters, indi~~iduals are permitted to communicate and coordinate
their strategies. Several equilibriurn concepts can be applied to build this assumption
into the modeL Strong Nash cyuili}~riuiu (SNE; Atunann. 198y), Perfect.ly Strong Nasli
Equilibrium (PSNE; Rubinstein, 1980), (Perfect,ly) Coalition-Proof :~ash 1';yuilibriuni,
((Y)CP~E: Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston. 19bi). ~
SNE requires the Nash equilibrium to be proof' against all deviations of coalitions of
indieiduals. PS-VE makes the idea of SNE suitable for models with more t,han one stage.
In addition, (P)CPNE requires deviating coalitions to be stable, i.e., to be proof against
deviat.ions of subcoalit.ions. All of these concepts refine the concept of ~Vash equilibrium
and their application might reduce the number of equilibria, since they put a,dditional
restrictions on the Nash eyuilibria.
It is not easy to choose between I'SNL and PCP~L;, since both ha~~e their own
advantages and disad~-antages ou which I will elahorate furt,l~ier belo~.v. In chapters 3
and 4, PSNE will be employed because it is possible to check later on whether deviating
coalitions are stable.
Cotnpared to Nash eyuilibrium, (P)SNE and (P)CPNE allow for the nice interpre-
tation of coalitions of vote~rs as political parties and of candidate positions as party
platforms (see also Feddersen, 1993). This makes an analysis of the forma,tion of politi-
cal parties possible and improves upon electoral competition rnodels in which parties are
sitnply associated with a point in t.he policy- space.
iVloreover, application of these concepts may give a theoret,ical basis to oné part of
Duverger's (1953) so-called 'sociological law.' Loosel~- formulated, this law asserts that
plurality rule favours two-party competition, while proportional representation systems
favour multi-party competition. lluverger rationalises this empirical fact by pointing
to three forces that reduce the number of contestants in case of plurality rule with one
seat at stake. First, no one pursues election if there is no chance of winning. Second..
people will join forces to enhance their chances. Third, voters will not support hopeless
candidacies. Application of one of the eyuilibrium refinements will shed some light on
14 Introduction
the effect of coalition formation on the number of competitors in eyuilibrium.
Chapters 3 and 4 differ with respect to the magnitude of the electorate, to account, for
a possible difference in behaviour that may arise, as the research in chapt,er 2 suggests.
Throughout these chapters, voters will be assumed to be strategic instead of sincere
and voter abstention is perrnitted. Furthermore, to prevent the possible non-existence
of Nash equilibrium, utility functions will be assumed to be symmetric and identically
shaped and the voter distribution is uniform (a result derived in chapter 2).
Chapter 3 defines PSNE for a large electorate. A strat.egy combination, consist,ing of
the candidate and voter decisions, is a PSNE if the voter decisions are an 5NE in the
subgame of the second stage and if, given these vot:er decisions, candidate decisions are
an 5NE in in the first stage.
The main results are, that in a PSNE, almost all voters vote sincere and the number of
equilibria with one candidate is still infinite (just like in chapter 2). In contrast with the
results of the model in chapter 2, for each value of the entry costs there is a unique two-
candidate equilibrium. Hence, application of PSNE reduces the number of two-candidate
equilibria considerably. Moreover, for suf~iciently small entry costs, equilibrium exists,
is unique and implies Black's (1958) median voter result: only the median voter runs for
election. Unfortunately, PSNE need not exist, for all values of t.he entry costs.
In first instance, one may be surprised that now, voter behaviour is determinate,
while in chapter two, the assumption of strat.egic voting leads to inconclusiveness. The
difference is due to the fact that the individual vote does not count when there is a
continuum of individuals, since then every voter has measure zero. On the contrary,
coalitions of voters may have a positive measure and may hence influence the result.
Chapter 4 repeats the analysis of chapter three for a srnall electorate, i.e., for a finite
number of voters. Most of t,he results are similar to those in chapt,er 3. The rnain dif-
ferences are as follows. In the case of an odd nurnber of voters and a, two-candidate
equilibrium, an indifferent voter will not vote sincerely or will abtain. Moreover, un-
der certain conditions, there exist two-candidate equilibria with losing candidates. In
fact, the number of losing candidates may be yuite large, a result that runs counter to
Duverger's law.
To conclude: PSNE only solves the coordination problem if the entry costs are very small
since, with larger entry costs, equilibrium is not unique. Furthermore. the concept of
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PS~~E has one important. drawback: it implicitly assumes that deviating coalitions are
,table whereas, possibly, a deviation may~ be followed by further de~viations of subcoali-
tions or of alternative coalitions.
This problern of coalitional inst:ability will be discussed in the next section and it. is oue of
the main themes of part II of this thesis. The rernainder of this subsection discusses sorne
alternative non-cooperative solution concepts: coalition-proof Nash equilibriurn (CPN}:;
Bernheim, Peleg and Whinst,on, 1987), contingent coalitional t,hreat equilibriurn (CC,TE;
Greenberg 1989. 1990) and universal coalition-proof eyuilibrium (UCPE: Chakravorti
and Kahn, 1993). "I'he discussion of these concepts provides some suggestions for t}re
developrnent of a new solution concept for coalit,ional games, which is the objective of
chapter i of part II.
With their concept of CPNE. Beruheirn, Peleg arrd ~Nhinston int.end to account for
part of the objections raised against YS~E:
"We believe, however, tlaat the Strony Nash concepl is actvally 'too stron.g'. Ira partic~lar,
coafitions nre allowed too rnuch freedom (i~n fact, cnnzplete freedona) ~in~ choosing their joirat
derríations: wlaile the whole set of p~o,yers nzust origi~ally be concer~n~ed with arriving rzt
an agreernent that is irnnzu~ae to devia~tions by any coalition, ~o deviating gro7lp of players
~includ~ing th~e coal~ition of thF u~holeJ faces a sz~nrilar restriclion. ln enuiro~zrraents u~~ith
unlimited private conim~u~nication, hoevever, rcn~ rneanin,gful agreerae~n.t to rlen~iate miisl
also be self-en,~orciny ~i.e., inarri~ne to derrin,tion.5~ by srlbcoalitr~onsJ."(see Bernheim, Peleg
and ~i~hinston. 198ï, pp. 3).
But CPNE can as well be criticised as is done by Kalai (quot.ation from Greenberg, 1989,
pp. 200):
"The concept of CPNE does not go far eno~ugh z~n its analysis of stabilzty. When co~síd-
eriag a deviaiing coalition, the validity of the deviation is ch.ec~ed only agairast further
deviations of subcoalitioins of the devia.ting coalition. Howeiier, rnernbers of the deviat~ing
coalitions could also dr,uiate by convínc~iny other players (front. the nondeviaGing codlition~J
to deviate proaided they improve thEir payoff."
FIence, CP~E employs a so called 'nestedness assumption': only deviations of subcoali-
tions of a deviating coalition are considered. Greenberg's concept of CCTE avoids this
assumption by considering deviations of subcoalitions as well as deviations of alternative
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coalitions. The idea behind ihe concept of C('TE is that coalitions can make contiugent
threats to a proposed vector of strategies. :1 coalition ma~- dFClarP that if all othc~r play-
ers stick to the proposecí ve~ctor of st rategie~s. then its rncmbc,rs will deviat.e. The~rc~after,
another coalition may~. in t,nrn. thrc~aten to dcviatc, and so on. The process contínues
until no coalition wants t.o utter a threat anvmore. :~ drawback of CC'I'E is. that it
assumes t,hat voters are myopic. Lct I-{ 1. ..., ra } bc~ a set of vot,ers and let S C I.
Let s-(ss, s-5) and s' -( ss. s-ti) be tw.o vectors of strategies, where ss -(s,),E,
and s-S -( s,),Er`ti. :~ow, ('C~TE onl~- consicíers deviations of coalitions .S C l. moving
from ss to ss, such that u,(s') ) u,(s) for all i E.5', where u; is player i's ntility fnnction.
Farsighted players, however, would ouly care for their utility associat,ed with s' if there
are no more deviations after s'.
The concept of Chakravorti and Kahn (UCPE) takes a different st.arting point to
avoid Kalai's critique to ('í'~E. Thc basic idc~a is that there is asymmetric inforrnation
with respect to deviations. lleviat ions arc not publicly- observable. Only those players
involved in a de~-iation know- ~~~het hc~r it actuallv took place. Subseyuent ly, some rnembers
of the dcviating coalition niay- devia,tc furthc,r with nun-~nembers if they are ablc~ to signal
that the deviation took place and that a fiirihcr devial,ion is profitable for non-rnembers.
L~nfortunat,ely. no general existence theoreni is availabl~ for }-CI'E.
In the next section, I will elaborate frn~t,her on thc, problein of coalitional inst,ability.
There, some solution concF~pis of cooperative gamc~ theor~- will be discussed and eval-
uated wit,h respect to the criticisins abovc, to repeat: the nestedness assumpt.ion, the
assumption of rnyopic votcrs and tl~ic non-c~xistencc of solutions.
1.3 Coalitional stability
1.3.1 Review of the literature: non-existence of solutions and
other drawbacks
Í'his section turns to the second subject rnatter of t.he thesis: coalitiona] stability. This
research is inspired by the problem of a conccptual (law. in the concept of PS~I?: the
implicit assumpt,ion that coalit,ions are stable. In ihis subsection, I will approach the
problern of coalitioual stability by means of cooperative game theory, which deals wit,}~i
the stability of outcomes in coalitional games. Five solution concepts of cooperat.ive
game theory will be discussed. It, turns out that, none of them rneets ail of the criticisms
mentioned in the former section and that additiona] problFms pop up.
The problem of coalitional instabilit~- is old. It was already recognised sorne two-
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hundred years ago by t.he ~Rarquis dr~ (bndorcet (1 ïh.5): pairwise votiug over alternatives
under majorit~~ rule ma~- generate a cy-clical social preferena~ relation~~ for som~~ inclividiial
preference orderings. :1s au example. let there be three voters arid let thc~ prefereuces
of voters ov~er t he alt ernat i~.es a. b and c be such t hat n}- ~ b~ i c. b~.z c~.z u and
c~;; n~.3 6. whe~re n ~, h nieans that voter i pref~~rs n to h. 'I'hen a majorit.y of voters
prefers a to h. anothc~r majority pre~fcrs b to ~~ and yc~t another ntajority prc~fers ~. to a.
Consequently, the collective dc~cision about ~chich alternat,ive to choose cannot be made.
.arrow ( 1951 ) hroves that, except for a dictat,orial voting rule. therc~ is no voting rul~~ that
guarantees the existence of a transitive social preference relat,ion. Ilence, d~~ ('ondorcet's
result is not due to some particular fcatur~~ of majority rule~, but it holds in gcncral. for
all non-dictatorial voting-rulc~s. I31ack ( 1958). Plott (196ï). 1)avis. de Groot and Ilinich
(19ï2) and Sloss ( 19ï3) hav~~ shown that. a stable outconie is guarantc~ed only under
some v~ery restrictive assumptions. ~ l~here miist bc~ a ~~~rt.ain symmetr~ in thc~ preference
distribution of ~.oters such that ther~~ e~xists a median votPr ( or a n~u~clian in all direetions
in casc~ of a multidirnensional issue apacc).
Various solutiou concepts for cooperative games havc been proposed: the core, the stable
set (von Neumann and ~lorgenstern, 1953), the bargaining set (Aumann and :~laschler.
1964), the competit,ive solution (Mcl~elvey, Ordeshook and Winer. 1978) and the largest
consist,ent set (LCS; C'h~ee. 1992), ~~-hich ~ti-ill be elaborated on belo~~. .~ll of tl~iese solution
coucepts are. howevc r. riddled wit h problems: existency probletns, t.oo many solut ious,
a lack of 'behavioural justification~ of the concept.~' failiu~e to pre~lict ~~.hich coalitions
vt~ill form, or they yield implau~ihlr~ ~~reclirt ioiis.
First., I will discuss the core. I will giv.e the strong clefinit~ion of thc~ core used in chapter
5 of this thesis. T'he core is the set of all undominated strategies in the strateg~~ space,
where a strat,egy s is undominatecí if there is no coalition S and no strategy s'(s~., s-.~)
such that to all members of t he coalit ion s' promises a, payoff at least, as high as t hat of
s and higher for at lcast one of the members. Clearl~-, in the exarnple giv~c~n to illustrate
the problet~i of de Condorcet, every strategy is domiuatecl and hence. thc core is emptr'.
Thc stable set vt-eakens t,he concept of th~~ core bv de(ining a wcakcr kincl of stabilit~~.
Elements of the stable set tieed not have stabilil~y properties of thcir own, but as a
set they satisfy some stability requirements. First, the set must be internally stable
3A social preference relation is a binary relation on the set of alternatives, describing how any two
alternatives are valuated with respect to each other from a group perspective
QAy the 'behavioural justification' of a solution concept I mean the justification of outcomes in terms
of a non-coopera[rve bargatning process
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(element,s of the set do not dorninat.e each ot.her) and second, the set. rnust be externally
stable (each element outside the set is dorninat,ed by at least one of the elements in the
set). However attractive this idea may seem, it has bee criticised frorn all sides. First,
domination is only defïned in terrns of utilit.y, and hence the stable set is not explicit
about which coalitions will form and it is not behaviourally motivated. Harsanyi (1971)
criticises the concept of dornination ernployed: although an imputations in the stable set
caunot be directly dominated by another imputation in the stable set, a deviation from
this imputat.ion may be followed by further cíeviations, ending up at another irnput,ation
in the stable set. that is preferred by cveryone involved in the deviat,ions. In short. tkte
stable set assumes that voters arc myopic. Moreover, the stable set need not exist or,
on the contrary, there might be many stable sets.
'I'he bargainiag set makes the bargaining process between coalitions over policy pro-
posals explicit. Loosely formulated, the bargaining set is the set of all proposals (C, ~),
where G is a coalition and .r is the policy proposal of C, such that for every objection
(C'. r') of a coalition C' against a coalition C, C has at least: one counter objection.
This concept can be generalised by reyuiring t,hat counter objections must be credible.
that is, thev inust be an element of t,he bargaining set. This device constitutes the strong
bargaining set (Wilson. 19ï1). "I'he bargaining set givcrs a behavioural justificat.ion of
outcomes in tcrms of an underlying bargaining process . However, the bargaining set
may not exist, it, makes no coalitional predictions (except for the strong bargaining set)
and it may yield implausible predictions. 1~Ioreover, like Lhe stable set, the bargaining
set assumes myopic voters. In an objection, all objectors must be strictly better off with
the new proposal and t,he others in the new coalition must be at least, as well off. Similar
reGuirements hold for counter objections.
The basic principle of the competitive solution (CS) is that coalitions havc to compete
with other coalitions. "I'herefore, thc~y have to ma.ke a sufTicient. offer to their pivotal
mernbers to prevent them from joining another coalition. The cent.ral concept. is viability.
A proposal (C, u), consisting of a coalition, C and an irnputation, u, is (strictly) viable
against another proposal (C', u') if at least one (all) of t,he pivotss (stric.tly) prefers
u to u'. The solution concept can be defined'` in terms of some internal and external
stability requirements that now concern viability: no proposal in CS is strictly viable
against any other proposal in CS and ií any proposal (C,, u) ~ CS is strictly viable
SThe term 'imputation' denotes a vector oC utilities (u~, ..., u„), where u; is thc payoff of individual
sA pivot is a voter in the intetsection of two coalitions
~Originally, CS is defined otherwise. 1 borrow the definition from Ordeshook (1987, pp. 420) since
this definition is comparable with the definition of the stable set
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against a proposal in CS, then there is some other proposal in CS that is st.rictly viable
against. (C, u). A favourable feature of the competitive solutiort is that it predicts which
coalit.ions will form. Unfortunately, CS need not, exist (Laing and Olmstead (1978).
Clearly, the concept also suffers from Harsanyi's critiyue t.o t he stable set: whereas a
proposal in CS is not strictly viable against any other proposal in (",S, it rnay be viable
in the same indirect manner as Harsanyi nreant in criticísing the stable set.
Chwe's concept of LCS meet.s t.he objection of myopic voters and in addition avoids
the nestedness assumption. LCS assumes that peoplc only care about. fina,l payoffs.
Ilence, a coalition may t.emporarilv move to an imputation that. is less prcferred by
sorne of its members, if this imputation is not sta,ble and leads to some end outcome
t,hat all mernbers prefer. This idea is incorporated in the definition LCS by means of
Harsanyi's concept of indirect domination. An imputation x is indirectly dominated by
another imputation y if there exists a chain of effectivit,y relat,ions from x to ,y and all
individuals involved in the chain want to move to ,y (an effertivity relation specifies the
direct, coalitiona] move from one irnptrt.at,ion t.o another). Chwe proves t.hat the LCS is
always non-ernpf,y. However, it does not predict which coalitions will forrn and it is not
applicable to games with a continuous policy space.
The main purposc of chapter 5 is to find a solution concept t,hat overcomes the problerns
mentioned above.
1.3.2 CCA: a proposed solution
Chapter 5 proposes a ne~~~ solution coucept, Coherent Coalitional ~1grc~etnr~nts (C(':1).
which applies to all strong simple games8 with non-transferable utility. 1'he concept
meets all objections mentioned in the foregoing section, i.e., it. circumvents t.he nested-
ness assumption, it accounts for farsighted players, it. is behaviourally justifiable by an
underlying non-cooperative bargaining process, it makes predictions with respect t:o the
coalitions that. will form and its non-emptiness is guarant.eed.
A coalitional agreement is defined as a pair ( C, a), where C is a coalition of voters
and ~ is a proposal in the policy space. Voters can freely communicate in order Io form
proposals and all proposals made are common knowledge. "I'his gives rise to a bargaining
aa game is simple if the decisive coalitions of voters associated with the voting rule are equivalent
with knowledge of the rule itself and it is strong if the complement of a decisive coalition is not decisive
(see Banks, 1994). A coalition of voters is decisive if for every preference profile and for every pair of
alternatives r and y it is the case that, if all members of the coalition prefer x to y, then x is preserved
in the social preference relation.
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garne in whicli ~~oters tr~~ to organise decisive~ c~oalitions in support of a certain policy
proposaL `I'hc~ bargaining process induced ht~ this is modelled by a garn~ in c~xtc~nsi~~e
form. For evc~ry~ votPr. thc~ rnain yu~stions are. ~ti-hich agrcements art' stahle and 4ahic}t of
the stable agreernents is t he best onc~ t,o support.. Since the only restriction put on ut,ilit-y
functions is continuitv. utilit~. functious ma~ not bP conca~.c and hence. the bargaining
process nta~~ bc~ c~-clic (i.e~.. F~~.er~~ agreernent nta~~ br' follot~~ed up 6~ another agrc~c~mPnt.
I show that for arbitrar~- continuous prc~ferc~nces and for an issur, Spa.ce of arty dimen-
sion. the batgaining process is fitiitc~ if th~ follo~ti-ing plausible restriction to lx~ha~-iour is
assumed: if a r.oter lea~.es a coalition. she canuot rPttn~rt to it unletis the coalition is pre-
pared to offer her a strictly. better payoff. Bv leaving a coalit.ion, a vot.r'r signals t,hat she
is unsatisfied with her pavoff associated wit}i the coalitional agreement. All the others in
the game ~i~ill conclude from this that thc coalition in yuestion can only be re-establishc~d
at a later stagc~ ~~.hen t,h~ pa~~ofi of t hc~ ntnawa~~ ~roter is increased. .1 coherent coalitional
agreement can then br~ defined as a coalitional agreemc~ttt a-(C'. :r) such that all other
agreements a' ~ a possible after a. gi~-e rise, to a bargaining procc~ss that alw.ays ends
~i~ith an agreemerit that is not anv better than a for at lcast one members of C.
"I'wo exatnpl~s of ('('~~1 follow. On~ has two agents wit.li opposed pref~erenccs and onc
has three voters and an cmpt~~ t~orc. I3~. rnc~ans of thesc~ examples. I cornpare the merits
of (.'C.a ~~-ith some other solution concPpts. It ttu~ns oui that CCA gives yuitc~ plausible
predict,ions in cases where other solution concepts fail to predict a,ny outcorne or, on t,he
contrary. genc~rate too man~- possiblF~ outcomes. 1?xccpt for thP possibilitti~ wht,rr ~.oters
arc~ indiffer~nt about some outcomes. t}~te ('('.1 of a c~oalitiou is uniyuc~. I also ~~rovc that,
if the core rxists, then tl~ic~ set of ('(':1s cotttaititi all c~lrtnc~nts of thc~ corc~.
1.3.3 Political-economic equilibrium: an application of CCA
Cl~apter 6 cíeals with an applicatiou of CC.1 lo a modc~l in which ecouomic auei l~olitical
decisious are closel~~ intert~~-ined. Rc~cr'ntlv, many at.tc~mpts have becn macic~ by. public
choice t,heorists to 'complete' various econom(etr)ic modcls with a politácal couuterpart
(Frey and Schneider, 1978: Alesina, 198ï; Ilil,ibs. 19t'i~; Rogof~, 1990; llrissen and van
~~'inden. 1991. Herings 1995). It iti beconting increasingl~~ recognised lhat c~conornic
policy making is a behavioural prou~ss of dc~cision rnaking and cannot be considered as
c~xogeneous to the economic system. ~loreove~r, to evade the Lucas critiyue' (19 ï9), tlte
effect of public policie~s on the bc~ha~~iour of pri~-ate sector agenis rnust be~ takc~n into
~Lucas criticised econometric models for neglecting the influence of government policies on the be-
haviour of consumers and producers. wfiich changes the structure of the model and the value o( the
parameters esumated.
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account .
The main pnrpose~of chapter (i is tu consistentl~. integrate an economic and a political
svstem, in the sense that the econoniic a.nd political decisions of ihe individual agents
are based on one and the same information set. The econornic svtitein wilf ronsist of the
:lrrow-Debreu model (Debreu, 1959) and ihe political system will be charactrrisi~d liy a
rnodel of coalition fortnation under majorit~~ rule. Interestinglv thc coalilion rnodel can
be interpreted as ihe formation of political parties.
In a set.ting with perfect information, voters are able to correctly' e~'aluatr all possibl~~
outcomes of ihe political process b~- iheir econo~nic conseyuences. "T}~ia~ is, for aiiy~ policy
t~~roposal, a conditional econoinic eyuilihriun~ can be derived. The political pr~ferenccs of
the voters then follow frorn the valuation of the conditional economic equilibria in ternis
of utilitv. "I'}~ie political issue at stake is a law- governing the maximum lcugih of the ~~.ork-
iugda~-. The exai7~ple is interesting bcca.use it demonstrates that even a one-dimensioual
issue ma~~ lead to multi-peaked political preferences. Unlike Ordeshook (19Sï, p. lfi.i)
and Muellcr (19à9, p. fi ï) argue, it is ynite likcl~~ tha,t a unidimensiorial issi-ie gives rise
to multi-peaked preferences. 'l~~his reveals ihat political-econornic rnodels, dcacribiiig the
political system by a median voter model, are of limited scope. T}iE~ c~~arnple also shows
that the results of a political-economic model rnav be different from the results of a pure
economic model, irnpl~~ing that. ueglecting political factors in economic modelling ma,~-
lead to wrong conclusions.
1.4 Contribution of the thesis
The thesis intends to contribute to applied research in the field of politics as w-ell as
t,o methods for solving polit.ica~l games. Thc uo~~el feat ur~s in the applied res~~arch in
chapters 2-4 are that candidates are policy interested and iha~ they- are chosen from the
electorate, that strategic behaviour of ~oters is accounted for and that coalition format ion
is allo~ced. In addit,ion, the concept of YSNE, applied in chapter 2, also contributes to the
methods for solvíng infinit,e games (the concept of strong ~ash equilibrium was originall~-
developed for application to games with a finitc number of agents only). Furtherrnore,
the concept of CC.A, developed in chapter 5, solves the problem of coalitional instabilit~~
in a large number of voting games. ~loreover. it provides a good basis for further
research. Finally, the model of chapter 6 adds to research of general eyuilibrium the~or~~




Electoral Competition in a Model
with Active Voting Rights
2.1 Introduction
The model on candidai~~ies under consideration here is in t h~~ research t,radit ion of anal~.sing
electoral compet.ition hy means of spat,ial modcls. Such models assume t.hat there ís a
policy space that describes all polic~- positions that a part.y or a caudidate can t.ake.
The first one to consider spatial ele~~toral c-ompetition was Downs (19:~ï). In his
model, two vote-maximisíng parties or candidate~s competi~r for the fa.vour of the voters
b}' chosing a position in a left-right contirtuum over which t.he ideal points of the voters
are uniformly distributed. Voters are supposed t.o vote 'sincere,' i.F., t hey vote for the
party closest, to their ideal point. The outcome is the well-known result. that both parties
will locate in the rniddle of the continuurn.
Down's model has been extended to include more than two parties and to account for
non-uniform voter distributions (see I;a.t,on and I,ipsey, 1975; Cox, 1987; Shepsle. 1991:
and Osborne, 1993). One important result is that if the number of parties or candidates
exceeds two, no pure st.rat,eg}~ :~ash equilibrium exists fnr almost an~~ distribution of
voters. Another interesting result is t:hat in a model with more than t.wo vote-rnaximising
parties, any. ~ash equilihrium has at least one party with a position off the middle of
the continuum (Cox, 1987).
In all of these models, the set of political contestants is a priori fixed. Palfrey (198-I)
generalises upon this by considering the efFect of the entry. of a third candidate on the
locational choice of two established candidates. All candidates are vote maximisers.
but established candidates simultaneously choose posit.ions. while the entrant chooses
contingent on the positions of the former. It is shown that the entrant always loses in
~
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eyuilibrium.
Greenberg and Shepsle (lySï) criticised ihis resull for being contrar~~ to the rnotive
of the entrant of winning office. Duc to the assumption t hat the total number of running
candidates (including t he entraut ) is fixed, the entrant is in fact forced to enter. regardless
of her chances of winning.
Another objection to the rnodcls abovc has been raised by :lusten-Smith (19tiï).
All models assume that, voters vote 'sincerely'. i.e., they vote for t,he candidate closest
t,o their ideal point. 1'he yuestion is. howe~.er. ~ti.hether ihis strateg~~ is optimal. For
instance. if a voter's favourite candidate is alrnost certain to lose, it rna~~ makc sense for
this voter t,o vote for another caudidate.
The issue of strategic voters has been taken up by Fedderscn, 5ened and ~Vright
( FS~1~ , 1990). They also seek to avoid the crit icism of Greenberg and Shepsle, by allowing
candidat~es to abstain from runniug.
The candidate model under consideration here is closelv related to ihat of FS~V. Both
models study electoral competition under plurality rrilc. "I'he objective of this chapter
is t,o impro~-e upon the FS~~' tnodrl on ihe following point.s. First, FS~~ assume t~hat.
the set of candidates is exogenous and disjoint from ihc set of votcrs. Hcncc, the model
does not explain how the set of candidates is formed and voters have no active ~-oting
rights. The last implication means that the model is not suitable to study electoral
competition in democratic count.ries. Second. (~'SW assume that. candidates do not ha~~e
policy preferences. They on1~- care for being elected, since this gives them some fixed
benefits of office-holding. This assumption implies that candidates can choose any point.
in t.he policy space as their policy position. Therefore, il must be assurncd that candidat,es
are committed to the platform chosen, since else, voters would not know what. happens
after the elections and consequentlv, they ~~~oulc} not be able to decide ~~.ho to vote for. In
reality, however, candidates have policy preferences and t,he public is more or less aware
of these.
The model in this chapter endogenises candidacies bv assuming that voters have
active voting rights: everyone in society is allowed to stand as a candidate. This implies
that candidates have polic~- preferences (see also Wittman, 1977, 1983: Calvert, 198~;
and Alesina. 1988). l;nder the simplifying assumption of perfect information. this also
implies t,hat candidates cannot choose any position in the policy space, sínc:e the public
knows that, after the elections. an elected official will implement her own ideal point as
a policy. 50, we do not need the assurnption of candidate commit.ment to t.he platform
chosen.
Furthermore, two different models are considered, one with a large electorate such as
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in national elect.ions, modellcd b~- a continuum of voters and one with a small electorate
such as in commit.tees (FSVb' assume a finit.e set of voters). "fhis dist.inction is crueial
because. in large electoratc~s, voters will not p~rc~~ivc~ t.hc~ir votes as be~ing of decisive
import,ance to the outcome and, l~ience. this perception may influence their behaviour.
'I'he assumption of a contiuuum reflccts this idea of voters. T~he rnodel also ernploys
different assumptions about vott~r behaviour. :~t first,, that voters honcstly reveal their
preferences at t he ballot-box. Later on, this assumpt,ion is relax~~~d to accoum, for strategic
voter behaviour.
llowever minor these rnodificat,ions from the l~~S~~1' modc~l may seem, the result,s they
induce are remarkahly different from those in the l~SW' model. "1'he la,ige elect,orate model
fc~atures sincere voting ~a,sh equilibria such that non-median voters rrm for elect.ion. On
ihe cont.rary. in t.he FSW model all candidates adopt the position of the rnedian voter.
~otc that these results of FSW' also contrasts with that of Cox (1987), who found
equilibrium positions off the median. FSW criticise the result of Cox by pointing out. its
de~pendence on assumpt,ions such as sincere ~rot~ing and a fixed set of entering caudidat,es.
'I'he model of this chapter shows, however. t.hat the median result of FSW' depends on
their assumption on candidate behaviour. As anot,her result, the nurnber of entrants in
equilibrium is not larger than two, while the FSW' model rnay feature rnany entrants.
Moreover, if strategic voting is accounted for, it, turns out that all vot.ing profiles can be
sustained as equilibria (FSW found that all voters vote sincere). In the small electorate
model however, sincere voting appears to be the optimal strategy. This reveals that
conclusions with respect to small electorates do uot automatically carry~ over to large
~,Ir~~~torates and ~~ice versa.
L;nfortunately, there exists a counter example to the general existence of equilibrium.
Existence depends on the configuration and shape of the utility functions and the costs
of entry. If, however, utility functions are symmetric and identically shaped, existence
is guaranteed.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 explains the large electorate model.
Sect,ion 2.3 derives t.he conditíons for equilibrium in this model and section 2.4 gives a
counter example to existence. Sectíon 2.5 deals with existence for some specific types of
utility frmctions. Section 2.6 deals with strategic voting and voter abstention. Finally,
section 2. ï con~ lu~lr~s.
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2.2 The basic model: a large electorate
2.2.1 Preliminaries
Soc~ietc c~on~i~ts of a c~ontinuum of indi~-iduals l-[0,1], which also reprc~sents the pol-
icy- space. Each individual i E l lias a concave utility function zi; : 1 -~ ~2 and
argmax~E~ v,(j) -{i} is the ideal point of i. Ctility functions are not nec~essarily svm-
metric and the~. need neither be idcnticall~. shaped nor need iheir concavity be strict.
Furt.hermorc, the ideal points are uniforml~~ distributerl.
2.2.2 The game
Envisage an electoral game ~cith two stages.
In the first st.age, all individuals simultaneousl~- choose an action s; E-S, -{i} U{A},
where A refers to abstention. That is. cither one ent~~rs as a candidate with a platform
restricted to one's ideal point or one refrains froili seekiiig election. Supposing that ca~i-
didates cannot commit to a platforrn and that utilit~- fimctions am cornmon knowledge,
the restriction on indicidual st.rategies can be interpreted as a credibility constraint.
~'oters will immediatel~~ see through a candidate ~~hose plat.form and idc~al point differ
and they will not believe that the candidate, if elected, would a,ctually iniplement this
platform. Therefore, it makes no sense for candidat,es to announce a plat form ot her than
their ideal point. The set of candidates ma~~ then be expressed as
C-{kEI ~sk-k}.
where C may bc: any conceivable subset, of 1. 13v assiunption, there are fixed costs of
entry K 1 0, which are cotnmon to all candidates.
The second stage involves t.he decision who to vot,e for. ~~~e assumF t ha,t each indi-
vidual only has a single vote to cast and that voting bcars no costs. In addition. we
provisionall~~ assume that voters vote sincerel~~. That is. a voter ~rotes for the candidate
closest to her ideal ~oint. If a voter is not able to discern a closest candidate, i.e., if a
voter is indifferent or if C is an open set,, then by assumption, this voter abstains. But in
all other cases, voters vot.e. Given the set of candidates C, regarding the entry decisions
in the first stage, voting behaviour ma~~ be formulated as
tli E 1: j
i votes for k if ~k E C: ~ i- k IG~ i- j ~, `dj ~ k E C
(2.2.1)
I i absta~ns othc~r~~~ise
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SPCtion l.6 will reconsider the siinplifying assumptions on ~~oter behaviour to account
for the possibility- of strategic vot,ing and for 5trategic voter abstention.
The corttest is decided b~~ plurality rule. That is, the candidate wit.h the largest
support is declarc~d the winner.
Subsequently, consider the different possibilities for ~': ~ C' I- 0. 0 G~ (' IG oc and
~ (.' ~- oc.
First, let ~ C ~- 0. Then. by assumption. the polic~~ iniplemented is a raudom choice
froni I. where each policy is chosen w~ith the same probability.
If ~ C ~- 1 then, by ( 2.2.1 ), the candidate in C is chosen.
Next, suppose 1 C~ C ~G oo. For thc sake of conveuience, ihe candi~lates in C will be
ordered according to the position of their ideal point.s such that C- { 1. ..., p} implies
x~ C... C xp. ~chere xz ís the ideal point of candidat,e i. Since individua,ls are uniforrnly-
distribut.ed, the assumptions on voter behaviotn~ imply that t.he boundary [ï; between
t,he support of candiclate i and i f I is equal to the midpoint between the positions of
these candidates:
x; f .r;t~
N~ - L , i- 1, .. , p- l, whcrc p~ l.
Clearly, under the assumptions mentioned, Lhe. set of supNorters of candidate k in
a given set C, denoted by V(k ~ C), is an iuterval on 1. i~ience, V(k ~ C) is Lebesgue
measurable. Define .~V(k ~ C) as the Lebesgue rneasure of 1''(k ~ G). `I'he support of k




In case plurality rule is the prevailing voting procedure, the set of undefeat,ed candidates
becomes
W(C) -{k E C ~ u(k ~ C) - max;Ew(i ~ C)}. (2.2.2)
If ~ I~V(C) ~- q and q 1 1, every candidate wins with probability q. bi~(C) will be written
as Y[~'. whenever no confusion can result.
Finally, suppose ~ C ~- x. Then V(k ~ C') is st.ill measurable, since V(k j C) is an
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interval~. YV, however, need not be measurable. To account for this situation. instead
of W, take sotne measurable set F~ti C I that includes W'.
2.2.3 Payofis
The expected utility of individual i, given the set of candidates C, can now be writt,en
as
fr rz~d~ 'f ~ ~ ~- 0
q~ u,(k) if ~ W' ~C oc
kE W
inf { fF~; u; d.~ ~ Frti C I is measurable and Yi' C Fry} if ~ W' ~- x.
~ ~ (2.2.3)
For notational simplicity, write E, instead of ~~kEW vc;(k). Sirnilarly, writ.e E; to denote
f~ u;d~.
Let ~r;(C) denote i~s payoff. given that C is the set, of candidates. Then,
~ C ~ (',(C)-K ifi.EC
Z.2.4~( ) - U,(C') if i ~ ~'.
~ )
The next. definition fínes up ihe conditions for a~ash cquilibrium of thr~ two stage gaine.
Definition 2.2.1
A sincere votirzg Na-sh eqztilibriuna (heraceforth SNF) to this game is a seG of candidrztes
C such that, giverz the assrzmptions on i~oGer behaviour ir~ the second stage of the ga~ne
giverz by (2.2.1), `di E I:
(i~ if E C then a;(C ~{i}) C n;(C) arzd
1To prove this. define the left and right support of k respectively as V~(k ~ C) - {i E V(k ~ C) : i G k}
and V(k ~ C) -{i E V(k ~ C) : i 1 k}. Either (1) V~(k ~ C) - Y~(k ~ C) - 0 or (2) V~(k ~ C) ~ 0 or
V(k ~ C) ~ 0. Assume (1). Then, by (2.2.1). V(k ~ C) -[k]. Assume ( 2) and without loss of generality
suppose V~(k ~ C) ~ 0. By (2.2.1) , di C k: if i E V~(k ~ C) then Hj E(i, k) : j E l'í(k ~ C), and if
i~ V~(k ~ C) then b'j C i: j~ Vi(k ~ C). Consequently, 3i G k such that Vj E(i, k) : j E Vi(k ~ C)
and b'j G í: j~ i[(k ~ C). Hence, Vi(k ~ C) -(i, k) or V'~(k ~ C) -[i. k). By the same argument.
V,(k ~ C) ~ 0 tnust be an interval. By (2.2.1) , k E V(k ~ C) and hence, V(k ~ C) is an intc,rval.
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(iiJ if i~(' then ~r;(C U{ }) C r;(C).
2.3 Equilibrium results of the sincere voting model
'1'he conditions for a sincere votiug Nash eyuilibrium will be derived from a nurnber of
lemmas. According to the first lemma, the set of candidat,es cannot be infinite in eyuilib-
rium. The intuition for this is that in the case of an infinite set. of candidates, there must
be a candidate with such a small support that the set of undefeated candidates would
not change when this candidate withdraws. Hence, this candidat.e is strictly better oíf
bv withdrawal since she saves entrv cost,s.
Lemma 2.3.1
If ~ C ~- oc. then~ C~is n.ot a~a SNE.
Proof:
5ee Appendix. ~
Next, it, will be proved that t,he equilibrium number of candidates cannot exceed two.
First a lemma and a corollary are shown. `I'he lemma states that a necessary condition
for equilibrium is that extremist candidates, i.e., the "leftest'~ and '~rightest'' candidates
in C, are not defeated by any other candidate. A losing extremist would be strictly
bet,ter off by refraining from running for two reasons. First, the candidate is excluded
from W, so that entry does not affect her expected utility. Gonseyuently, the candi-
date does better to save entrv costs and to shift to withdrawal. Second. because voters
vote sincerely, refrainrrient would enlarge the support of the candidate's direct neigh-
bour candidate, while that of all others remains the same. This might irnprove the set
of undefeated candidates írorn the extremist. candidate's perspective. If not,, such as in
the case the neighbour loses anyway or just magnifies an already ensurecí victory, the
candidate would still refrain due to the first. reason given.
Lemma 2.3.2
If C~ 0 is an S.VE and k E C is an eatremist candidate, then Vi E C: v(k ~ C) ~
v(a ~ C').
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Proof:
Assu~ne C is an S~}~.. If ~ C' ~- 1, the implication in the lemrna is trivial. Suppose
~ C ~~ 1 and let l. r be respectively the leftest and rightest candidates in C. Similarly,
let l' and r' be respectivel~~ the closest neighbour candidat,es of 1 anc! r. w'ithout loss of
generality assume ~i E C: e~(I ~ C`) G z~(r~ ~ C). 7'hen l~ W'. It will be shown that l
strictly prefers to abst,ain from running. If l would withdraw, then by the assurnptions
of sincere voting, l' would receive al] of l's support, while the support of a,ll others would
be unchanged. Call W' the set, of undefeated candidates induced by C~{f}. To confirm
that abstention is optimal for l, two cases must be considered: Li~" - W' and W' ~ l~['.
If Yt~'' - YL', then the expected utility of l Fvould not cha.nge if l abstains. Hc~nce, l
abstains to save eniry costs. If l~l'' ~ li'. then 6I~' - {l'} or W' - I~l~ U{l'}. Suppose
first W' -{l'}. Then by ( 2.2.-1 j;~i(C) -[q ~~;Ew'v.l(r)] - l~ C ut(l~) - ~n(C~ ~{1})
and hence. 1 strictly prefers to w-ithdraw. Suppose W' - bb' U{l'}. "I'hen, by (2.2.:3) and
('?.2.4), candidate l withdraws if
~~ ~ ~,Í~i,~ - h c 1 ~ u,(z,.
Q ~Erti' q ~ 1 ~EWU{!'}
~Iultiplying both sides b~- q i- 1:
1
(1 -I- -) ~ v~~a) - (4 ~ 1 )It C ti~(l') f ~ u~(i).
~ ~EW ~EW
and this inequality is satisfied, since Q~~Ei,r, u~(i) C rci(l'). O
It is not possible to prove a similar lemma for interior candidates. "1'o see this, consider
t.he following exaniple. Suppose C-{1, 2, 3}, v(1 ~ C) - v(3 ~ C) ]~c~(2 ~ C) and
assume 1 is closer to Z than :3. In addit ion, suppose thP utility function of 'Z is asymtnetric
and such that i~z(1) G~2(3). Now-, if'? withdraws, then 1 would rece~i~~e thc largest share
of 2's support and hence, 1 w~ill win the elections. Consequentl~~, '? w~ould w~it}~idraw
only if 2[u2(1) f u2(3)] - It C uz(I). Because of the assunicd asymmetricit}~ of uz, this
inequality will be satisfied only when lí is sufliciently large.
From lemma 2.3.2 it follo~tis immediately that, in equilibriurn, extremist candidates must
have the same percentage of t.he vote.
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Corollary 2.3.3
Lrl (~ bc an .5:1'1~. a~td let 1 and r br~ rrtre~ni.~~l candedutes ~irt ('. 7'h-en v(l ~ C') - t~(r ~ C).
The next proposition confirrns that in equilibriurn the nu~nber of candidates cannot ex-
ceed iwo. The proposition is provc~n by showing Ihat. in case of niore than two candidates.
for at least one extremist candidat.e it is profit.ablF~ to abstain. Lemma Z.:3.2 ancl corol-
larv 2.3.3 indicate t.hat both rxtre~rnist candidates must, be unclcfeated in ~~yuilibrium.
So, the~. have the power to unilaterally pro~'oke the victory~ of their closest neighbour
candidate by refraining frorn candidacy. Ilence, an extremist candidate refrains if she
likes the policy that would result from her neighbour's vict.orv better than t.hc, policy
t,hat would be implemented otherwíse. By using a property of concave utility functions,
it can be shown that this will alwavs be the case.
Proposition 2.3.4
lf ~ C ~~ 2, thr~t (` i.5 ianl an .5'~1'f~,'.
Proof:
Suppose I L' I] 2 and suppose C is an S~E. It, will be shown t.hat at least oue of
the extremist candidates, l or r. prefers not to run. By le~nuna 2.3.2 and corollary
2. 3. 3, b'i~~ l, r E C': v( i ~ C' ) G i~ ( l ~ C' )- u(r ~ C). So, 1. r E W a nd b y th e
assumption of sincere voting, a unilatera] refrainment of l (or r) ~1.ould inducc a new
set of undefeated candidates Yb" - {1'} ( or fb" -{r'}). w-here l' and r' are respecti~-ely
the closest neighbour candidates of l and l'. If t.here are y candidates in i~', then the
expected policy from W is .~ - q ~kEw k. Recall that. we defined q~kEw u,(k) as Ek.
By concavity of utility functions. E~ G ui(~) and E~~ G u,(~). Cocnbined with (2.2.3)
and (2.2.4), for C to be a S~E. we must have
u~(l')G Li-KGut(.r.)-lí
and
ur(r') G H'~ - Ií C u, (x) - lí. (2)
~o~ti-, (1) is clearly ~~iolated if x) l', while (2) is violated if .r G r'. Since l' G r'. at least
ocie of the conditions is violated and hence. C is not an S~I~;. t]
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The following lemma claíms that a set of Lwo candidates is an S1h: only if t,he leftest.
candidate is equally. far from t}te lower bound of the policy space as t he right.est candi-
date is away from the upper bound.
Lemma 2.3.5
If (" -{k, 1}, k c l as rln S.~'L, th~~~~~ (- 1- k.
Proof:
~~ssurne C-{k, l} is an SVE. Then by corollary 2.3.:3, v(k ~ C) - v(l ~ C). Hence, by
(2.2.1 ).1-1-k. o
The next three proposit.ions state all conditions for C, with ~ C ~C 2, to bc an S~I;.
Since the entry costs lí affect the entry decisions, it turns out that an S`~1;; puts sorne
restrictions on lí . Proposition 2.3.6 confirms t,hat C, - 0 can only be an equilibrium
if the entry cost~s given are high enough to guarantee t.hat there is no agent for whorn
entr~. conveys better perspectives than the random choice de~~ic.e. Recall that we defined
f~ u,d.1 as E~.
Proposition 2.3.6 (~ecessary and sufiicient conditions for ~ C ~- 0)
I C' ~- 0 rs a~i .S-VE ifjlí ~ m.a.r~{u,(i) - F,,,},Ei.
Proof:
Follows direct lv from the definition of SNF. ~
Proposition 2.3.7 states that. contingent on the costs of entry, a single candidate equilib-
rium need not merelv concern the candidate in the cent:re of the continuum. Of course
for both, centrist and non-centrist cquilibria, the entry costs must bc sufficiently small
for the candidate in yuestion to enter. But in the non-centrist case. more than half of
the vote is on one side of the candidat.e in quest.ion and sorne other potential candidate
can catch enough of thc vote to win and will do so if not hampered by the entrv costs.
Thus, in the non-centrist case, entrp costs also hace to be sufficient.ly large to deter the
entry of a second candidate.
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Proposition 2.3.7 (~ecessarv and suflicient conditions for ~(' ~- 1)
ThFre e.czsts aii .S.ti'E.S~uch th.a~ ~ C ~- l, mith C-{k} and k~ i, iff
(2) ÍS C 2Lk(k) - H~k llnd
(iiJ lí ) naa.c ~i~~~ - ui~~`~~~iE~k.l-k)' l l~'tli~8~ - 21i~~~~~i-1-k~,
and th.rr~ ezist.~ an SNE u~ith, k- i iff (iJ is sntis~ird.
Proof:
I~ollo~~-s directly from the definition of S1'1:;. ~ote that voters in [0. k) U(1 - k, 1] nev~~r
eiiter, since they would be defeated kiv k. Condition (ii) prevents the entry of all voters
dcfeating k or tying with k, i.e., all voters in (k, 1-k]. ~
Utility functions may be such that condition (i) for an S1iE with k- z running, and
conditions ( i) and (ii) for an SNE witb k~ z rnnning, are simult,aneously met,. Hence,
for a given value of ]í , t,here may exist centrist as well as non-centrist equilibria.
Yroposition 2.3.8 claimes tbat, contingent on !í, all kinds of equilibria with two can-
didates are possible, provided that t.hesF~ candidates are ~quidist,ant from thc eent.re of
the continuum. r1s long as the candidates are located so close to one another that every
entrant locating in between them would be defeated, the only equilibrium condition for
lí is that It does not deter the entrance of the two candidates in question. i.e., K must
be sufficiently small. If, however, t,wo candidates are located so distantly from each other
that not all entrants in between tbem wotild be defeated then. for equilibrium, an addi-
tional condition on lí is needed. Nainely, lí has t.o be sufficiently largc to deter these
possible entrants.
Proposition 2.3.8 (iVecessary and sufficient conditions for ~ C ~- 2)
There eTists an S:~-E such that ~ C ~- 2, uiith C-{k, l} and k G l iff 1- 1- k aad
K C rnira { i~uk(k) - uk(l)~~ z[ui(l) - u~(k)]} arad in addition,
(iJ if k E ( 0, s), the~z
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Ií ] ina.~ [{ 2 [u;(i) - u;(k)]}i-:3k .
{ili(7~~ - 2[us~k) ~ ui(l)] ~:E~:ik.l-:ik),
{z[7~i(t) - ui(l)]}i-1-1k, ~
(iiJ if k- b. then Ií ?{su;(1) - ~[u~(k) f tl;(()]};-! .-2
(ii~i) rf k- 0. thrn lí ~ nzar {u;(~i) - 2[v.~(k) -f ec,(l)]}~E(u. 1~.
Proof:
Follows directlv from the definition of S~IJ.
Note t6at if k E(~. z). then c very~ ~ntrant. ~i ~ k, l E I w-ould be defeatcd.
If k E(0, s), then no 7 E[0, k) U(k, 3k) U( 1- 3k, l) U(l, 1] enters as a third
candidate becautie thi5 ~~ould lead io the~ victory of i's rnost rcmote oppon~~nt. This
would be ~eorse for i than allowiog k and 1 t,o tie. However. contingent on the ent,ry
costs, an i E[3k. 1- 3k] mat- have an incentive to enter since such i do not lose t}tc~
electiorls. In particular. if i- 3k, then i~t~ (C U {i}) -{á~, l}. if i E(3k, 1- 3k), then
Ll~'(CU{i}) -{i} and ifi - 1-3k. then W'(('U{i}) -{i, k}. Therestrictionon lí under
(i). however. prevents the en~r~- of all i E[3k. 1-3k], since for i -:3k : z[u;(k)-} u,(l)] 1
z[u;(z) -I- u,(l)] - K and for all i E(3k, 1- 3k) : 2[u,(k) ~ zi;(l)] ~ u,(i) - lí and for
i- 1- 3k : z[u;(k) f u;(l)] ~ 2[u;(z) -~ u;(k)] - lí . ~
If k- t';, thcn all voters i E ~~{k, i. !} would be dc,fcated and h~~nce, thc~. titiould
not. enter. On the contrary. the entrv of i- 1 would result in Lt~'(C U {i }) -{i. k, !}.
If t}le restriction oli lí under (ii) is satisfied, ho~~-ever, then 2[u;(k) ~ u,(l)] ~ 3[u,(i) ~
u;(k) f ti,(1)1 - ~í.
If k- 0. then all possible entrants i E(0, 1) would win the elections, but they
have no incentive to enter when the restriction on lí ]]nder (iii) is satisf~ied, since then,
2[u,(k) -{- u;(l)] ) u;(i) - lí. ~
Note that for a give~n lí , the cases ín proposition 2.3.8 need not exclude eac}~1 ottle~r.
Hence. for a sperific ~~alue of Ií iherc~ ]na~- be more than onc~ S~I~. ~t-ith t~~.o caudidatc~s.
2.4 A counter example to general existence
I;nfortunately, an S~F: rleed not al~a.ay.s exist. Ob~.ious]}, non-existence may. occul- if
utility functions are such tllat tht' conditiolls for somc~ C to be an S~E cannot be satisfic~d
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because the lower bound restriction on IC exceeds the upper bound restriction. `I'hen.
for a particular value of K. equilibriurn exists onl}~ iC the conditions for some other C to
be an SNE are satisfied for this ~i". This will all become clear by the proof of tl~re next
proposítion, which gives a coirnter exarnple to existence. To demonstrate propositions
2.3.6-2.3.~, tlre counter example is illust.rated b~. some figures.
"I'he intuition for the non-existence result goes as follows (see also figures 2.4.1-2.4.2
below). The ut~ility functions in the counter exarnple are chosen such that. on the ooe
hand, l.he median voter has a large incentive to enter. which means ihat. tl~iere will onlv
be PSNEs with a posit~.ive number of candidates for relativelV small ~~alues of the entry
costs. On the other hand, also voters at the extremes have a large inc~~ntive to eut~~r.
which means that there onlv exists a PSIvI? with zero candidates for relativelv large val-
ues of the entrv costs. In beiween falls a gap of entry costs for which there is no PSNE.
L~tility functions are chosen symmetric, and the median voter and both of the voters at
the extremes are giver. a relatieel}~ steep utility function in comparison with the other
voters. This means that the median is prepared to ent,er in addition t.o sorne established
candidate(s) for relativel~~ high values of the entry costs. ~;'ote that the threat of the
median voter's threat to enter is larger ihe further already est.ablis}~ied candidates are
removed from her. Note also, that voters at the ext.remes will enter lor relativelv high
values of the ent.ry costs, since the random choice device works relativeh~ unfavourable
for them and in case of ttiro-caudidat~e entry, their opposition candidate will be relatively
far removed from them. In addition, a voter sufficiently close to one of the extrernes,
relatively dislikes the position of her opposition candidate in comparison with a random
choice. Consequently, compared with single-candidate entry, two-candidate entry will
appear for relatively high values of the entry cost.s. Now, the threat, of the median voter
destrovs some of these potential two-candidate equilibria for higher values of the entry
costs. Furthermore, due to t,he relat,ive steepness of t,he utilit,y funct.ions of the voters at.
the extremes, these voters are more eager to enter than any of the other candidat,es; the
ra.ndom choice device works relat,ively unfavourable for t.hem in comparison with entry
as a single candidate. This implies that t,heir valuation of the randorn choice device
determines the value of the entry costs for which no one wants t,o run. 5ince these vot.ers
have received a relatively steep utility function; their large inclinatíon to enter destroys
potentential equilibria with zero candidates for lower values of the entr}- costs.
Proposition 2.4.1 (Non-existence)
"lhere a~re configurrztions of utility functions 2nd valves of ~í such~ t~hn~t no C' as a~ S!~'F,.
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Proof:
('ountc,r exampl~~:
b'k E(0. i) U ( z. 11 : uk(il --(k - i)~
fork-i: rik(i1--jk-i~-
for k- 0, 1 : u~(z) --q ~ k- i ~
and
li E1~, ~-l,l. ('?.~I.~~)
It ~aill be shown that this case simriltaneously violates all conditions of propositions
2.3.f-'?.3.h. First of all, ~ C ~- 0 cannot be an S~rE, since by }~roposit.ion 2.3.Fi. lí must
bc larger than ~ to prevent all i E ~ from running. ~ext. C' -{k~} -{2} cannot be an
S~E. since b~- proposition 2.3.7. ; onl~- wants to run if K is srnaller or equal to ~. 'l~hird,
C-{k} ~{z} is not an Stil'„ becausc~ according to proposition 2.3.ï. k - 0 and k- 1
only want to run if lí C 8 and t hc entr~ of other candidates is only prevented if ]í ) I-c
(where c] 0 is arbitrarily small). Furt,hermore, k E(0, z) U(i, 1) only- wants t.o run if
It c{k~ - k-f ,~-r}~E~o ~~ and t:he entry of ot.hers is prevented íf lti ){(2k - 1)~}kE~o z~
and this is only satisfied if k E[3, z) U(z, 3]; that is, lí E[0, g], which contradict,s
( 2.4.~ ). Finally, also C-{k, l}, k c l cannot be an SNE. since by proposition 2.3.8,
k~ E(s, z) only wants t.o rrrn if !í c 2(2k - 1)~}~;E~~ ~~, that is, 1~ E(0. ~~ aud ihis- F, z
corrtradict,s (2.4.Fi) . 13csides, k E(0, ;) onl1. ~ti-ants to run if It C i- k and thc entrance
of others is preventFd if Ií ~ 2(2k - I)~. Rut then ihe lower bound for I~ c~xceeds the
upper bound for all k-(0. ~). Símilarly. if k- ~, t}ren I~ C~ and lí 1 s, tiehich
violat-es (2.4.5) and if k- 0, ihen 1~ c~ au~l lí ) i which is irnpossible. ~
In figure 2.4.1, the vertically hatched area shows all values of lí for which ~ C ~- 0 is an
S:~ E.
The horizontally shaded area in figure 2.4.2. including the closed interval for k-
z. shows all combinations of k and !í that can be characterised as single candidate
equilibria.
'I'he shaded area in figurr~ 2.4.3 and t he closed inter~-als for k- ~ and k- ~ gi~.e all
the two-candidate StiI'.s ir the game.
'Thc: last figure is composed of all S:~E areas in figrrres 2.-1.1-2.4.3. From this, it is
easy to see that the counter example violates al] equilibrium conditions in proposit.ions
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I'he analysis in this section leads to the conclnsion tha.t in societies where (symmctric)
utilit~~ functions get more flatter the filrther one moves from the ext remes to the median,
existence will not be mnch of a prohle~~rn. Perhaps it is also realistic to assume that
extremist voters have a more radical attitude towards policy positions remo~~ed írom
their own than centrist voters have. The next sectious shows that existence is already
guaranteed under weaker assumption5.
2.5 An existence result
The negat ive result of the previous section is caused by the particular shape and ]ocation
of utilit}~ fnnctions. The next proposition sho~es that, in the case of concave, s}~mmetric
and identically shaped utility functions, existence is guaranteed for all values of lí.
A utility function is symmetric if for any e) 0 such that i~-e, i~-~c E [0. 1] : u;(i-c) -
u~(i~-F). The identical shape assumption says that for all i, j E 1: u;(i~,r) - u~(j~-.z),
where i~- r, j f.r E [0, 1]. For simplicit~-, normalise all ideal points to zero. i.e., for all
i E 1: u,(i) - 0 and hence, for all j ~ i E 1: u;(j) C 0. Dtle to the s~-mmetricit~~ and
identical shape of ntilit~- fnnctions. for all i. j E 1: u,(j) - u~(i).
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Figure 2.~1.4: Non-existenc~ of SNI?.
The following exarnple will give some idea of how t.hc~ proof proceeds. Let ut.ility
fnnctions be as follo~ti~s:
dh. E J: 2lk(2~ --(~ï - 2~~.
For these utilitt. funct~ions, propositions 2.3.6-2.3.8 generate S~Es as depicted in figure
'2.5.1.
The vertically shaded area gives all S~l~a with ~ C ~- 0, the slanted hatched area
gives a11 SNEs with ~ C ~- 1, and the horizontally shaded area gives all SNEs with
~C~-2.
Clearly, for all !í C Ií', there exists an S~~E with two candidates and for all h) Ií`.
there exists an S~E with ~ C ~- 0. ~
Proposition 2.5.1 (F;xistence)
If ut~ility fu~ctions arc concave. symmetric and identicall,y shaped, then there ezists an
SNE Jor all r~alues of 1~ .
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Figur~~ 2.~.1: F:xistence of S~I: ~~~ith synimetric and identicalh- shaped utilit~- functions.
Proof:
Let ~í' --zuo(1). It ~a~ill be sho~~-n that (1) for all !~ G K', there exists a t~ao-candidate
S~E G-{k. 1} and (2) for all lí 1 lí `, there exists an Sti'E ~ C ~- 0.
First, (1) will be shown. Suppose lí G-zuo(1). Then, by the assumptions on utilitv
functions, for all k, l E I, k C l such that~ (- 1- k:
1
~1 C -.~71k~~). (2.5.6)
Hence, for arbitrary lí C-2t~o(1), the upperbound restriction on Ií, formulated in
proposition 2.3.~. is met.
Next, it must be shown t,hat for arbitrary lí G-zuo(1), t.here exist,s a pair of candidates
C-{k, l}, such that the lowerbound restriction on K is met as well. That is, it must
be shown that, for all pairs {k, l} such that k E [0, 2) and l- 1- k, thc lowc:rbound
restriction on lí never exceeds the upperbound rest,riction.
First. consider k E(~, 2). By proposition 2.3.5. the only restricLion on lí for
C-{k, l} to be an S:~'E is ( 2.5.6 ), and this is sat.isfied.
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Consider k E(0. ~). Then~b~~ proposition 2.3.8(i), the lowerbound restrictions on
lí are I~ )-zu,(k), ~.here i. - 3k; !í ]-z[u;(k.) ~ u,(l)]. where i E(3k. 1- 3k)
and lí )-zu,((), where i- 1- 3k. I)ne t.o the assumptions on utility functions,
the first and the last conditions arc~ cqui~.ale~nt and hence. thc~ last ma~- be omitted.
It musl be shown that -ztl,(k~) C -za~k(l) and -z[~a~,(k) f u,(l)~ c-zuk(l). Since
k E (0. ~), for i - 3k we must }~~ave, k G i G 2 C l and hence, u,(k) 7 u~;(l). Since for all
z E(3k. l-3k:) : u.;(k) ] uk(l) attd tr~,(l) )~tak(l), wc also tnust havc~ [ti,(k)fu,(l)~ ) uk(l).
Similarly, if k-~, b~- proposition 2 3.8(ii) and ( 2.~.6 ). we rnust have -sw;(k) ~-
u~(l)] C-2uk(l), where i- 2. This condition can be re~aritten as ~(u;(k) - uk(f)~ ~-
e[u;(l)-ei.k(l)~ ~ suk(l). Since k- e we have k C z- 1 C l and hence-~, ii;(k)-v.k(l) ) 0
and u,(l) - uk(l) ) 0. Since u.~,(l) G 0, t,he last ineyuality is satisficd.
Finally, if k~ - 0. then by~ proposit.ion 23.b(iii) and ( 2.~i.6 ), -2[u;(k) -~ v.,(l)~ C
-2u~,(l), where i E(0, 1). ~~o~a-, for all i E(0. 1) : u;(k.) 1 v.k(l) and u;(l) ) uk(l).
Hence, [~u~(k) f u;(1)~ ] uk(l).
From Lhe above it follows that for al] lí C K` therc exists a two-candidate SNE C-
{k, l}.
It is left to show that for all lí ] lí`, there exists an S~E ~-ith G- 0. Suppose
1~ ~ lí `. i.e., suppose lí )- 2 u.~(1 ). By concavity of utilit~~ funct ions, -!:~ G- iu~~(1)
and hence. !í )-Fo. By~ the assumptions on utilitv functions. this implics that for all
i E 1: lí )-E,. Consequently, by proposition Z.3.6, t.here c~xists an SNE with ~ C ~- 0.
O
2.6 Voter abstention and strategic voting in large
and small electorates
So far we have assurned that voters sincerely reveal their preferences at t.he ballot,-box.
However, it may be questioned if this is optimal in terms of expected payoff. To answer
this question, we need a definit,ion of equilibrium for the second stage of t,he game.
Let e,(C) be the voting decision of voter i, given that the set of candidates is C. Let
e;(C) E C U{A}, where A refers to voter abstention, and let e(C) - (e;(C));E~ denote a
voting profile. Assume that if the support of some candidate unmeasurable, it. is given
rneasure zero. Then the set of undefeated candidates under profile e(C) is
[~Y(e(C)) -{k E C ~ v(k ~ e(C)) - max;ECV(z ~ e(C))}. (2.6.7)
44 Electoral Competition in a Model with Active Voting Rights
:~ote that by the~ proof of lemma 2.3.1 . I l~Y~(r(~`1) ~G x
Definition 2.6.1
A r~otiay profile e'(C) is a .~nsh rquilibriuna z.f for nll T E l o~nd for all c,(C') ~ c-~ (C):
f-,(c,(~). c~,~C)) C l:'~(T~'(~~l).
where e` ~~~') - ~É~~C))iEi~{
According to the next proposition. indi~~idual voting decisions do not influence the ont-
come of the elections.
Proposition 2.6.2
GinF~i rz.4~rt of candidates C, ever~ vot~ny profílr e(C) r~.v a:~~cash eqv~zlz~ót~~ivrra zn thr
Sll~l(jQT17(~. Of ihE SECOR(Í .ti~R9C.
Proof:
E~-erv voter i has measnre zero on 1. ~
Consequently, the entry problem in the first stage cannot be solved. as any given entry
decision may lead to victory for some vot,ing profiles, while other profiles result. in a
loss. This negative result ~ti~ith respect to sophisticated voting seems to be due Lo t.he
assumpt,ion of a continuum of voters, and we may expect anot her resrilt if the set of
voters is finite. Hence, suppose the sc~1, of vot,ers is finite. The following proposit,ion, due
to Feddersen, Sened and ~w'right (1990), claims that in the c,ase of at least iwo undefeat,ed
candidates, every voter votes for the winning candidat,e closest to her idea,l poínt.
Proposition 2.6.3
Let ~ 1 ~G x. Suppose c'(C) is an eqililibrium ~in the subgame of the second stage
and ~ YL'(e`(C)) ~? 2. ~f i E!, k E tit'(c`(C)) are svch th.nf u,(k) ) u;(1) for all
l E[~'(e'(C)), (~ k, the~z eti (C) - k.
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Proof:
Assurne r'((') ~ k. E3y ( 2.6.7 ), all candidates in !~V(e'(C)) must have the same nurnber
of votes. Hcnce, by deviating to k. i could guarant.ee that. ~ is the only winner. I3ut
then, e`(C) is not a Nash equilibrium. ~
Hence, whereas voting behaviour in a largc elect.orate, modelled by a continuum of vot~~rs,
is indeterminate, voting behaviour in a srnall electorate is determinate. Votcrs will not
~-ote for candidates that are expected to lose and they will cast a sincere vote on one of
thc winning candidates.
2.7 Conclusions
From the comparison ot the model in this chapter with that of FS~I', the conclusion
can be drawn that, in the modelling of polit,ical competit,ion, a distinction mu5t be made
between large and small electorates, because the rnagnitude of the clect.orate has serious
consequences for voter behaviour in eyuilibrium.
The modcl of this chapter extends that, of Eéddersen et al. in T,he sense that, it. incor-
porates candidates objectives in a more na.tural way. The assumption that candidates
have policy preferences would have lead t,o the existence of non-cent rist equilibria in the
FSW model as well. To see this, note that, including some fixed and direct benefits of
office-holding à la FSW in our model just increases the net benefits of entry. Since the
payoff of every entrant is affected bv this in the same amount, entry decisions will not be
any different. Hence, the conclusion of~ FSW that plurality rule leads to a convergence
of platforrns is not robust. since we showed the possibilit~~ of divergent platforms.
The model above a.nd the FSW rnodel have in common that thev suffer from a
coordination problem. In the FSW model, all entering candidates have equa,lly large
levels of support and they all choose the position of the median voter in eyuilibriurn.
As the authors note, with strate~gic voting; voting strategies have to be coordinated to
obtain this result. '1'he model does not explain how this coordinat.ion can be achieved.
It does not seem to be possible to appl~- some refinement of :~'ash equilibrium in order
t.o solve the problem, since the positions t.hat the candidates take in equilibriurn are all
payoff-equivalent to voters. In the large electorate model above, we rnay be confronted
with an infinite set of equilibria. Hence, for a specific equilibrium to result, candidates
must coordinate strategies. T'here may be some hope, however, that some refinement of
tiash equilibrium reduces the number of equilibria, since in our model. the eyuilibria are
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not payoff-equivalent.
Two more suggestions for ti~ie research agenda are first, to extend t,he model to a mrilt.i-
dimensional issue space and second, to study the model under different, vot.ing procedures.
Concerning the latt.er. for rrrost European democracies it would be interesting to study
the consequences of the assumption that candidates or parties need to have rnore than
fifty percent of the vote and hence the~y may have t,o Iorm coalitions to achieve t.his.
Appendix
Proof of lemma 2.3.1:
Assurne ~ ( ' ~- oo. By ( 2.2.2 ). F1k, l E W: v(k ~ C) - v(l ~ C) - rr, where 0 C a C 1.
Either I fl~~ I- x or ~ YI'' ~C oc. Suppose ~ W ~- oc. Then ~ht~' C W and bi~" is
denumFrable and




~ t'(k ~ C) -
kEty, 0 if a- 0 (A.3)
Obviously. (A.1) implies (A.3). Consequent.ly, dk E C: v(k ~ C) - 0 and therefore,
W - C.
Let k be an arbit,rary candidat,e in C and supposc k withdraws. '1'hen, by ( 2.2.1 ),
k's support will be distributed among k's direct neighbour candidates. Call lV' the set
of undefeated candidates induced bv C~{k}. Since i~(k ~ C) - 0, the withdrawal of k
would not affect the support of any other candidate and hence, W' - W'. Consequently,
by (2.2.3) and (2.2.4),
7fk(C~ - Uk(C~) - Jl C (ik(C ) - ~k~C ~ lk~). (f~.4~
So, k stríctly prefers to withdraw.
Finally, 5uppose ~ W ~C oc. Then ~k E C: v(k ~ C) 1 0. Consider C~ W. Since
~ C`W ~- oc, there exists a I, C C` W' and I, is denrnnerable. Since ~kEt, v(k ~ C) G 1.
there exist k - 1, k, k~ 1 in L ~~~ith such small support that k- 1 and k~ 1 ~i~ould
still be losing after k withdraws, despite of the fact that k's withdrawal enlarges their
ifa)0 (A.2)
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support. Consequc~nlly, the set of undefeatPd caudidates would not be changed by k's
wit.hdrawal. which implies (A.4).
He~ncc, if ~(' ~- oc, there always exists a k E C wtio strictly prefers to withdraw.
Conseyuont I~~. (' is not an Sti F. 0
Chapter 3
Perfectly Strong Nash Equilibrium
in the Case of a Large Electorate
3.1 Introduction
This chapter takes up the coordination problem encountered in the model of chapter '?.
This model features two st.ages. In thc first stage, every individual in socicty decides
whether to run for election and in the second st,age, voters vote for one of the candidates.
This implies policy-interested candidates (see also ~~Vittman, 1J~7. 192i3; Calvert, 19a;i.
and Alesina, 1988). It is assumed that, rtmning is costly, while vot,ing is free. 'Che contest
is decided by plurality rule, i.e., the candidate with the largest support wins. I'he basic
model assumes that voters vote sincere. That is, every voter votes for the candidate
closest to her ideal point.
It t,urns out that, for given entrv costs, there may be an infinite number of one-
and two-candidate Nash equilibria. Hence, in order to attain a specific. equilibrium.
candidates rnust coordinate their strategies. !lnalysing coordination is done by applying
t,he concept of perfectly strong ~iash equilibrium (PS~~E: Rubinsteiu, 19ti0: ~~umann.
1989) to the model.
A:~'ash equilibrium is strong if no coalitions of players can deviate froni the lash
equilibrium in a way profitable to all rnembers (Aurnann. 1989). PS~ ]? requires the ~ash
equilibria in every stage of a game to be proof against coalitional deviations (see also
Rubinstein. 1980). For instance, in the game above. an equilibrium is perfectly strong
if in every deviating coalition of voters or candidates, there is a member for who the
deviation does not pa~y.
Since PS~F puts an additional restriction to :~ash equilibria, it, can be expected that
the number of equilibria declines. Ideally, only one equilibrium rernains, since ihen the
I~)
50 Perfectly Strong Nash Equilibrium in the Case of a Large Electorate
coordinat,ion problem would be solved. Furt:hermore, we expect t,hat all two-candidate
equilibria ~sill vanish. Vamely, in t.he casc~ of strict concave utility functions, as will be
assumed herc, ever~~ pair of candidates prefers the victory of the rnedian voter to a tie
bct~~~cc,n t hrniselves.
In addition to a possibly favourable influence on the number of eyuilibria, the appli-
cation of PS~'E also has a nice interpretation. Since PSNE allows voters to romtnunicate
and to coordinate their strategies, coalitions of vot.ers can be interpreted as polit,ical par-
ties and candidate positions can be seen as party platforms (see also Feddersen. 1993).
~Ioreover, coalition forrnation of candidates can be interpreted as party fusions.
'I'he communication and coordination features of PSNE make the model suitable to
study~ part of lluvergcr's empirical la~ti-, ~~~hich states that under, plurality~ rule. only t~ti~o
part.ies will run for election. The other part of the law says that proportional repre-
sentation systems favour multi-party competit.ion (Duverger, 1953). PSNE incorporates
all forces Duverger held responsible for the small number of contestants under plura,lity
rule: (1) no one pursues election if there are no chances of winning, (2) people will join
forces to enhance their chances and (3) vot.crs will not support hopeless candidacies. The
theoretical model of this chapter will shoev that. the ~t-orking of these forces is so strong
that there may even be only one candidate running for election.
NSNE also solves another problem in the niodel of chapter 2. Due to the assurnption of
a large electorat.e, modelled by a continuum of voters, every individual vote has measure
zero. Hence, the individual vote does not count. This induces a}~~roblem when voters are
allowed to vote strategically, since then, every voting pro(ile~ is a vash eyuilibrium in the
second stage. (~onsequently~, candidates }lave no idea of ho~~~ voters will vote and hence,
they cannot make the entry~ decision on the basis of the eoncept of ~ash equilibrium. In
contrast, PSNC allows voters to fonn coalit.ions of rueasurable sire i~i order to let their
voice be heard. Hence, PS1E makes possible an analysis of strategic voter behaviour.
'The main results of the model are that (1) in a PSNI? alrnost all voters~vote sincere,
(2) for sufficiently small entry costs, t,here exists a uniquc~ PSNE, feat.ured by t.he running
of the median voter. (1) The t~~o-candidatc equilibriurn, if it exists, is uniyue and (5)
PSNF.s do not al~ti-ay~s cxist.
'The chapter is ordered in the follo~.ing way. Sect,ion 3.2 describes the model and
the concept of PS1'E. In section 3.3, the model will be solved. Section 3.4 provides
an example and comparisc~s it with the model of chapter 2. Section 3.5 deals with the
problem of non-existence of PS~ I', and sect ion :3.fi concluclc~,.
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3.2 The Model: Electoral competition in a large
electorate
3.2.1 Preliminaries
Let (I -[0. 1], B. ~) be a measure space, where 1-[0, 1] represents the set of voters
and the polic~ spac~~. B is the family of Rorcl subsets of l, and .~ is t.he Lebesyue rneasure.
~assume that voters are uniformlv distribiited.
),;ach i E ~ has a continuous and strictly concave utilitv function v; : I -~ ?R, which is
strictly single-peaked at {z}. Furihermore, ~u, is strictly monotonc~ incrcasing on [0, ~i),
strictly monot,one dccreasing on (z, 1] and symt~ietric around {i}. ~I'hc~ last conditioii
says that for any ~~ 0 such t,hat i -~, i~ e E [0, I], u;(~i - e) - u;(e: ~- e). Finally,
utility functions arc identically shaped, i.e., tli, j E ~: u~;(~i~ f 1~) - u~(j f.r), for all r
such that á-f x, j f a E[0, 1]. Yroposit,ion 2.5.1 of chapter 2 guarantees t.hat, uiidcr
these assumptions on utility functions, a Nash equilibrium exists.
3.2.2 Two-stage game
First, each voter d~~cides whet,her t,o run for election (H) or not (N). Let s denote the
vector of running decisions. "I'hen s: I~{R, :1~ }. Assume that running is costly and
that candidates have to pay an equal amount of entry costs Ií ) 0. ~Vrite s; for voter
i's decision. The set of candidates then becomes
C(s) -{i E 1: s, - R}.
For simplicity, denote C(s) by C. By assumption, candidates cannot commit to any
policy position. Consequently, s; - R implies that i chooses hcr own ideal point as her
polic}~ position since, with perfect, informat~ion, voters will identify every position of a
candidate with her ideal point.
In the second stage, each i E I chooses one of the candidat,es in C or abstains. `I'here
are no costs for casting a vote.
Voters have a real choice only if ~ C, ~~ 2. If ~ C' ~- 0, thc~ policy chosen is assumed
to be a random draw from the uniform distribut,ion on [0, 1]. If ~ C ~- I, then i E C is
chosen a~d i's ideal point is implemented.
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First., let 2 C~ C' ~C x and let, e(('), or sirnply c., be a voting profile given that the
set of candidates is C'. i.e., e(C') is the vector of all individual voting, decisions. `I'hen
e(C1 : ~ -. C` u {A}
where A refers t.o abstention. 4~~'rite e;(C), or e;, for i's voting decision.
Let V(k ~ e) - {i~ E I: e,(C) - k} denote t,he set of supporters of candidate k and let
.~[V(k ~ e)~ be k's share of the vote. 5ince vot.ers vote strat,egically, V(k ~ e) nc:ed not, be
measurable. In order to cornpare supports, unrneasurable supports will be approached
by their upper rneasure:
Assumption 3.2.1
!(4'(1' ~ e) ~ B. then ~[V(k ~ c)] :- aryinf {~[Vk] : Lk E B and V(k ~ e) C Vk}.
The set of undefeated candidatF~s now becomes
6[- (e(C)) -{k E G: ~[t' (k ~ e(C))] - max,,EC,~[l'-( ~ e(C'))~}.
If ~ W'(e(C)) ~1 2, then each candidate in W(e(C)) wins with equa] probability. For
simplicity, W(e(C)) will be written as Lt' or [~'(e), whenever no confusion can result.
h'inally, suppose ~ C ~- oc. "I'his might result in problems with t,he measurability of Yf`.
This problem will be solved in a similar way as in chapter 2, by approaching 6t' bv some
measurable set Fw- E B such that [l' C f'r~r~.
In order to guarantee the finiteness of bl' in equilibrium ( see lernrna 3.31 below), the
following plausible assumption wil] be made:
Assumption 3.2.2 (Consistency)
Get c(C), e(C') E{e(C)}~EC, where C- {C C I: ~ C' ~]}. If e(C) is such lhat
~[V(k ~ e(C))] - 0 for sonte k E C and if C' - C~{k}, then for all r~ E C':
a[v(~ ~ e(c~)1- ~~v(, I e(~~)1.
This assumption says that the withdrawal of a candidate with a support of rneasurc -r,ero
does not change the set of undefeated candidates.
3.2 The Model: Electoral competition in a large electorate 53
3.2.3 Strategies and payoffs
LPt a bP a strate~;ti- cornbination:
~ - ~.5. ~F(~)~C'ECÍ-
w-}tere.s-~{f~, ,~'}.C-{('CI:IC'~~2}ande~(('). I~G'U{A}.
Gi~~en the set of ca,ndidates C`. indi~-idual i~s r~apc~cfc~d utilit~ is ~~qual to
fl~uid~ if IC"I-~
U~~e) - ~iv~ ~tiErvvi(~) ;f ~ LY' ~~ x
i.n f{ frW uid.~ I Frti~ E B and IY' C L:'rv} if~ ~ 6i~ ~- x~
In the following, let E; and F; respectively denote ~y~-y,~ ~kE~i, u;(k) and fFw u; d~. Denot,e
i's payoff, given Q, by ~r,;(Q), then
L~i~F)-lí ifiEC"
~;(~) - ( ,(e) . . ~ C.~f ~
3.2.4 Perfectly strong Nash equilibrium
We suppose t.hat, individuals act stra,tegicall~~, i.e.. they maximise their pavofES. For
voters, this implies that for a candidat~ate other than the one closest to one's own ideal
point may be strictly preferred to sincere voting. Moreover, vot.ers and candidates are
allowed to form coalitions to further their interests. A suitable solution concept that
incorporates coalition formation is perfectly strong ;Vash equílibriurn as defined next
(see also Rubinstein, 1980. and Aumann, 1989).
Take a sCrategy combination o` -(s', {e:(C)}~EC. "Take any set C E C and consider
the subgame I'(C), starting with the set of candidates C.
Definition 3.2.3
e` is a~ strong .~~ash equilibrium (SNE) in I'(C) iff for a.ny coal~ition. S C 1 tFaere r~~ ~no
es : S-~ C U{A} such that for all i E.S:
Ui~es, e-s) ) ~~i(~~~),
where es - ~ei)iES ~n~ ei s - ~E, )iEl`S.
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Definition 3.2.4
o' i.: a peifect~l7~ slron~ .ti`ash eqt~ilibr'rttni (PS':~~1~1 ~f~
(i) for all C E C, e`(C) }s a~n .S:1rE in 1'(C) anrl
(ii) for any S C ~ there is no .SS : S~{R. :~~} sTrch titat for nll i
~2((ss. .'.til. {I~`(C'I)}c~Fc) ~ ~,(o~).
u~hPrF ss -(~s, )~ES a~rtd s` ti - Í.`, )~Er~s.
3.3 Solution of the game
E ~' :
The game w~il] be solved by back~ti-ard induct~ion. Section 3.~~.1 derives the strong :Vash
equilibria of the second stage of ihe game. Subsequently, section 3.3.2 deals with the
solution of the whole game. Before turning to section 3.3.1. the follo~n-ing lemma is
shown. which states that in a PSNF. the set. of undefeated candidates is finite.
Lemma 3.3.1
!rQ' -(s`. {e`(C)}~EC) i~~ n P.S:~'F. thcn ~ Lb'(e'(C'(s'))) ~C x.
Proof:
By invoking assurnption 3.2.2, the proof is similar to the first part of ilie proof of lemma
2.3.1 in chapter 2.
3.3.1 Second stage: Strong Nash voting decisions
This subsection considers ~~oting behaviour for any possible set of candidates given.
Reca}1 that, for ~ C' ~- 1, we assumed that the candidate in G is chosen. Hence, onl~~
larger sets of candidates have to be considered. So. take C E C. Assume t,hat: e`(C) is
an SNE in the subgame of I'(C) and that ~ l~t~(e`(C)) ~G x.
According to the next lernrna. almost all ~-oters ~-ote 'sincerely,' in the sense t}iat they all
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vote for the undefeated candidat.e closest to their ideal point. The proof of this lemma
runs as follows. All undefeated candidates have a support of equal measure. which ís
larger t,han that of any defea.ted candidate. Henc~~. if there exist.s a coalition of ~-oters.
whose members all prefer some candidate to all t.he others while none of thern voted sin-
cere, then all coalition rnembers improve b~~,joint.l}. shifting their votes to the undefeated
candidate the~~ all like the best, since then th~~ latter will win.
Lemma 3.3.2
Lrt I YV(e'~ ~~ 2 aad tnkF a,~~,y k E l~1'(e')). Gel
Tk -{r~ E I: u,(k) ) u;(lj, bl ~ k~ E W},
and
Tk-{i ETk:
The~ ~(T~) - 0.
Proof:
Suppose .~(Tk) 1 0 for some k and suppose all voters in Tk joint,ly shift their vot,es to k.
Then k wins the elections and hence, all i E T~ are strictly better off. 0
The following corollary follows easily from the lemma. It says that the support oF losiug
candidates must ha,ve measure zero.
Corollary 3.3.3
f,or at~ ~ E c~ w(~") :~[v(k I ~')l - o.
The next lemma claims that t.here cannot be more than two tmdefeated candidates in
equilibrium. By lemma 3.3.2, all voters vote for the undefeated candidate closest to their
ideal point. Since al] undefeated candidates have equally large supports, every coalition
of voters can guarantee the victory of some less preferred candidate by. jointly shifting
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their votes to her. It will be shown that if the number of undefeated candidates is la,rger
than t.wo, there exists at least one coalition of voters such that all of its members profit
from jointly- votin~ for ihe undefeated candidate of their second choice.
Lemma 3.3.4
~ I~'(E-1 I~ 2.
Proof:
.assume ~ W(e') ~) 2. Let l(r) be thc left.est (rightest) candidate in W(e'). Clearlv, the
expect,ed policy .r` - ~~,y~e,~~ ~kEw~e.t k E(l, r). R}~ lemrna 3.3.2, for all r~ G l: e, - l
and for all i) r: e~ - r. Since all candida,tes in I~'(c`) have an equal share of the vote,
all z C l can guarantee the victory of 1's closest neighbour l' E u'(e") by jointly shifting
their votes to l'. Similarl~~, all i 1 r would ensure the winning of r's closest neighbour
r' E 6V(e') bv colluding to vote for r'. By strict concavity of utility functions:
if a' E [l'. r) t~hen t1i G l: u;(l') ~ u;(,x') ] Ui(e') a,nd
if .~' E(l. r~'] then t1i ~ r: u;(r') 1 e~;(x') ] I:',(e').
Hence, wha,tever x` rna~~ be, there always exists a coalit,ion of voters such that all members
of the coalition strictly improve by a joined deviation from c'. Consequent.y. e` is not a
PSNE. o
Proposit,ion 3.3.5 gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for an SNE with one
winning candidate. If there are at least two candidates, then the winning candidate
must be the one closest to the centre of the policy space.
Throughout t~he rest of t:he chapter. let m- 2 denote the centre of t.he policy
space. Furthermore, observe that with s~~mmetric and identical shaped utility func-
tions, ~ k- l ~c~ k- c ~~ uk(l) C uk(c). To avoid additional notation, the remainder
of this chapter uses the latter expression instead of the former. Note that this notat,ion
does not imply a,n interpersonal comparison of ut.ilities.
Proposition 3.3.5 (Nec~essary and sufficient conditions for ~ W(e`) ~- 1)
Let ~ C ~1 2 ~nd let k E C. There exists an S!~'E e` such that W(e') - {Ir} ~~ff
uk(rn) ] u~(m). flc E C, c~ k.
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Proof:
:1~eces,,ity: .~ssume ~ C I~ 2. bt''(e`) -{k} and ~c E C' : u~(m) ~ rik(rrr). ~~'ithout
loss of generalit~- assurne 1~- G m. "I'hen eit her (1 j k G r G rrr or (2) nr G c G l, where
ui(rn) - uk(rn). Suppose (I1. Then all z ? c ~~.ould strictly impro~~e b~. jointl~. ~~oting for
c, since t,hen c wins. Suppose (2). "I'hen all a) ki` strictly~ prefer c to t,~ and as thc~~. forn~
a majority, the~. can guarantee the ~~ictory of c. ~ext, assurne r~~(rra) -~uk(m). 'I'hen.
h~. jointl~~ ~.oting for c, all i] m can realise a Iie hetween k and r, whic~h they strictl~~
prefer to the victory of k. P'rom this. ~~.e may conclude that r` is not an 5:~1?.
Suf~ic~iency: Assurne uk(rn) ) u~(m), b'r E C, c~ k. ~ti'ithout loss of generatity
assunle k G m. ~~~-e will prove that e` such t.hat EJi E 1: c; - k is an SNF: by showing
that a majority of the electorate has no incentiv~~ to deviate frorn r'. Define W as the
set of undefeated candidates induced ha a de~-iation of sorne coalit,ion of votE:rs .S to rs.
Let r, -(es, e's) and Ict .r - ~iv~ ~,~~En; t~~ be the associatr~d exp~~c~tc~d ~ioli~~~-. l~~i~ ha~-c~
to show that for a majority of voters i E l.
I-~(r') - ri.,(k) ) L',(e).
Suppose :r c k. Then, by the strict concavity of ut.ility functions, for all i] k: ir;(k) ~
u;(x) 1 U,(e). Suppose ,r ] k and take c E C such that v.k(~m) ~ v~(m.). W'e will
prove that for all i G `2k : u;(k) ) C~(e), that is, the inequa.lit.y is sat,isfied for a
majoríty of ~~oters, since `2k 1 m. If ~ 1 k, then for all i c k~ : vi(k) ~ u;(ar) 1 U~(e).
Hence it is left to show, that also for all i such that k C i G ~2k : u,(k) ) Ii;(e).
"Take l E l such that ui(m) - uk(m). Then for all w E w: w C k or u~ 1 l. since
we assumed that iik(m) ) u~(m), ~dc ~ k E C~. Hence, for all i such that Ic G i G
z̀k : ~w,~ ~u~Ew~u;(k) - r~;(u)] ~ 0~, v,(k) ) ~~,~ ~,,,Ew u;(rL') - ~';(e). O
Yroposition 3.3.6 states the conditions for an S~F with two winning candidat,es: the
~~~inners must. be the candidates closest to and equidistant frorn the median voter, rn.
Proposition 3.3.6 (~ecessary and sufTcient condit,ions for ~ W(e") ~- 2)
Lrt k. l E C. T~here exists an ,SIV'E e` svch lhat hV(e') -{k, l} iff uk(m) - u~(m) 1
u~(m), Hc E C, c~ k, l.
Proof:
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Necessity: Assume W(e`) -{k, l} and uk(m) ~ ui(m). Without loss of generality
k C 1 and uk(rn) G u~(rrr). 'I`hen either (1) k G nz C I or (2) k G l G m. Suppose
(1). Then b~. lemma 3.3.2. all i~ k2~ vote for l. Since k3~ G na, it, follows that
k~ W(e`): a contradiction. Similarly. (2) leads to a contradiction. Next, assume
u~(m) - u~(rn) and 3c E C such that, c E (k. 1). We will show that in that case
W(e`) -{c}, which contradicts ii'(e`) -{k, I}. W~ithout loss of generality assume
c G m. We prove that all i. G`:z~ like the victory of c strictly bctter than the t,ie
between k and l, which would imply that c wins, since `2r ) m. By sirict, concavity of
utility functions, for all i G c: ~ii;(c) ) u;(m) ] 2[u;(k) f u,(l)] and for all i such that
c G i G `z~ : ut(c) ~ z~u;~c) f~u;~~)~ ~ z~u;~k) ~ ut~~)~~
Sufficiency: Assume uk(m) - i~i(rn) 1 u~(rn). ~Ic E C, c~ k, l. Without loss
of generality assume k G l. We will prove that e` such that tíi G rn : e; - k and
`di 1 m: e; - l is an S~'E. Define l-{~ as the set of undefeated candidates after a
deviation of some coalition .ti from e`. Let e-(es, c' s) and let. ,r - ~w,~ ~wE~y w be
the associated expected polic~-. ~Vithout loss of generality assume :r C rn. Note~ that for
all w E l~' : Ti' G k or w 1 l. Then by the strict concavity of utility functions, for all
i) m: L';(e') - 2[u;(k) f u,(l)] 1 C~,(e). Conseyuentl~~. no i) m wants to deviate from
e'. Hence. W- {1} or LL' - {w, l}. where u~ E YL'. Since a G r~z, i~' cannot be equal to
{l}. Hence, we must have W' -{w, l}. Observe that :r G rn implies u; G k. But then,
by the necessit,y of proposition 3.3.6, w~ W: a contradiction. ~
Propositions 3.3.~ and 3.3.6 exhaust all possible distributions of candidates: either there
is a candidate closest to m or there are two candidates equidistant from m. ~Ve have
shown that for both of these possibilities there exists an S~'E. So, the following corollar~~
directly follows from the proposit.ions mentioned.
Corollary 3.3.7
For a-ll C E C there exists an .5'~~L~.
3.3.2 First stage: candidate decisions
l~~e no~a turn to the ~ti~hole two-stagc~ game. In the follo~~.ing the conditions for a perfectl~.
strong ~ash equilibrium in the subgame of the first stage will be derived, given the strong
~iash voting decisions in the second stage.
The next proposition claims that there cannot be any losing candidate in a PStiE.
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Proposition 3.3.8
If o' is n PS.tiE. then C(s') - YI~'(e`).
Proof:
Suppose C(s') ) W(e'). By corollary 3.3.3, for all k E C(s`) ~ W(e') : ~[V(k ~~e')~ - 0.
Hence, losing candidates 5trictly improve by a joiut withdrawal: they all save ent,ry costs
while the outcome of the electious remains t,he same. ~
F'rom lemma 3.3.4 and proposition 3.3.8, we obtain the next corollary, which st,at.es that
in a PSNE, the number of candidates cannot, exceed two.
Corollary 3.3.9
If Q' is a PSNE, th.en ~ C(s') ~G 2.
The following proposition gives the binding condition for a PSNE with zero candidates.
Proposition 3.3.10
There e~ists a PSNE ~` such, ihat ~ C(s') ~- 0 iff lï ) uo(0) - Eo.
Proof:
Necessity: Suppose Ií G ua(0) - Eo. Then voter 0 strictly improves by entry, since
uo(0) - Ii ) Eo.
Suf,~iciency: Suppose ~ C(s) ~- 0 and I~ ~ uo(0) - Eo. We will prove that s is
an SNE in the subgame of the first stage. Let S C I be a set of candidates after
a deviation from s took place. According to definition 3.2.2, we have to show that
at least one of the members of S does not improve from the deviation. By lemma
3.3.4, ~ W(e`(S)) ~c 2. Suppose ~ W(e`(S)) ~- 1. Since lí ] uo(0) - Eo, we must
have that `dk E 1: Ií G uk(k) - Ek, since uo(0) - uk(k) and Ek 1 Eo. So, for
all k E I: Ek ~ uk(k) - Ií and consequently, the winner in S does not improve
by deviating from s. Suppose ~ W(e`(.5)) ~- 2 and W(e"(S)) -{k, l}. Since for all
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~ E 1: F,k 1 uk(k)-F~;. wea]somu5t ha~cthat forall ~~ E I: Ek ) 2(u~(k)fuk(l)]-lí.
HPnce. thF~ candidates in L1'(c~'(5')) do not irnprovc b~- t.he ~iP~~iat,ion. 0
The follow.ing proposition gives thP binding conditions for a PS~I~; with one ~andidalF.
Proposition 3.3.11
l~hrr~ r.ri.a.ti n PS.~'l:' ~" .~~irh Ihat ~ C`(.ti'~I ~- L C'(.ti') -{k}, k~ m r,fj
K C uk(k:) - L~k nrrd h) ut(() - ul(k),
iuhere iit(rn) - eik(rn).
Proof:
~"~rr.~~.5ity: Suppose C(s`) -{k~} and lí 1~ik(k-) - E~. Then candidate k strictl~~
impro~-cs by ~~.ithdra~ti.al. since Ek ] uk(k1 - lí.
5uppose lí c zi~(l) - u~(k) and ~a.l.ag assume ~- G n~. Then there exists a~.oter 1'(G l)
sufficiently close to l and lí G ui-(l') - u~~(k), sir~ce v~(l) - u~~(l) and u~(k) G u~~(k).
Hence, u~~(l') - h 1 ui~(k) so Y,hat 1' stricl.ly prefers to enter.
Suf~iciency: Suppose C(s) - {k}, Ií C u~k(k) - Ek and li ) u~(l) - ui(k). ~~~'ithout
loss of generality assume k C m. ~~-e will show that s is an S~E in tlie subgame of the
first stage. Let S C I be a set of candidates de~~íatinp from s and classify all possible
deviating coalitions int,o t.hree t,ypcs: ( I) S- {l~}, (2) k- E.~ and ~i E I~{k} and r. E~'
and (3) ,S C I ~ {k}.
Suppose (1). Thcn k does not ímprove from thP deviation, since ~ik(k) - Ii ] Ek.
Suppose (2). By lemma 3.3.4, ~ 6[~(e`(S ~{k}) ~G 2, where S~{k} is the set of
candidates after ,S deviates. First, assume ~ Lt'(e'(.ti ~{k}) ~- 1 and ~ 6I~'(e`(S ~{k}) ~-
{i}. Then, k and i must: both be better off. i.e., uk(i) ) uk(k) - lí and u;(i) - K~
uk(i) must hold. These inequalities contradict each other, however, since uk(k) - v;(i)
and u;(k) - uk(i). Assume ~ YV(e`(.S ~{k}) - 2 and ~ lt~(e`(S ~{k}) ~- {i, j}. If
i C k or r~ 1 1 then, by strict concavity of utility functions. bot.h i and j are w.orse
off by devia,ting. Suppose ~i E (l~, f]. From lí 1~i~~(l) - u~(k), it. follows that for x11
i E(~, l] : !í ] u;(i) - u;(k~). siace v~(1) - u;(i) and Ti~~(k) C u;(h~). "This implies that
for all i E (k. l] : lí 7 2[u;(z) f u;(J)] - u,(k~) and hence, u;(k) ~ ?[u,(i) ~- u~;(~)~ - l~.
So, i is worse off by deviating.
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Suppose ( 3). By 1Pmma 3.3.4. ~ W(e`~{k} U.5')) ~G 2, where {k} U~ is the set of
candidates after S deviates. Suppose ~ W(F'({k} U S)) ~- L If k is thc winner. then no
member of S improves by deviating, since k also was the winner unde s. If some i in
S wins then, by propositio~i 3.3.5. i E (k, l). where uA(m) - uk(I). We already showed
for case (2) that for all i E (k, l) : lí 1 u;(i) - i~;(k~), which iinplies u;(h) ~ v,(a) - k.
Hence, i is worse off by deviating. Suppose ~ W(e"({k} US)) ~- 2. Then, by proposition
3.3.6, the undefeated candidates, say i and j, must be in [k, l~. w'e already showed for
case ( 2) that for all i E (k, l] : u;(k) ] 2[zl;(í) ~- u,( j)~ - lí , implying that i is worse off
by de~iati~~g. 0
From proposition 3.3.ll, the conditions for a PSNE in which onfy the median voter runs
for election, follow immediatelv.
Corollary 3.3.12
There e.rists a PS.~"E Q' si~.ch. fhizl~ C(s') -{m.} ifj~ ]i C ~u,,,(rn) - E~.
The uext proposition establishes the bindirig conditions for a PSNE with two candidatFS.
Proposition 3.3.13
There exists o. PS'.NE Q' svch that ~ C(s') ~- 2, C(s`) -{~, l} r;ff uk(m) - ui(rn) and
~1 C n2271{~~2Lk~~C~ ~ uk~l~l - Fk, ~LUklk~ - uk~~~l~l (l7t(~ ~l i~~1Lkl~~ - u k~~~l-
Proof:
,Necessity: Suppose C(s') -{k, l} and K C 2[u~(k) - uk(l)~. Without loss of
generality assume k c ra. Then for a voter k~'( ] k-) sufficiently close to k: Ií G z[uk~(k')-
uk~(1)]. By rewriting this inequalit}~, we obtain uk~(k') - li ~ 2[u~~(k) f uk~(l)] and hence
k' would strictly improve by entrance.
SllPpOSe 2~21k~k~ ~ uk~~~~ - Ek C Z~~k~~~ -~tik~l~~ aIld Í1 7 2~tbk~k~ ~ uk~~~~ - Ek. T11eII~
both candidates k and l strictly improve by wit,hdrawal, since Ek ~ 2[uk(k)-~uk(l)]-Ií -
Z~ut~~) ~ ut~~)~ - Iti.
Suppose 2[uk(k) - uk(l)] C z[uk(k) ~ z~k(l)] and Ií ~ 2[uk(k) - uk(l). Then candidate k
strictly improves by withdrawal, since wk(l) 1 z[~k(k) -F uk(l)] - Ií.
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Su,~iciency: SupposeC(s) -{k, l} and Ií 1 z[uk(k)-uk(l)] and K C min{z[uk(k)-f
uk(l)] - Ek, z[uk(k) - uk(l)]}. We will show that s is an SNE in the subgame of the
first stage. Such as in the proof of proposition 3.3.11. we classify all possible deviating
coalitions S C I into three types: (1) S C{k, l}, (2) ~i E{k, l} and ~j E I~{k, l},
such that i, j E S and (3) S C I~{k, 1}.
Suppose (1) and first, suppose k, l E S. Then k does not improve, since Ií C
2[uk(k) ~- uk(1)] - Eh-, which implies z[uk(k) ~ uk(l)] - Ií ] Eh-. Suppose k E S, l~ S.
Then k does not improve, sinc.e Ií c 2[uk(k)-u~(l)], which implies 2[uk(k)fuk(l)]-Ií )
uk(l). By the symmetricity and identical shape of utility functions, a similar argument.
shows that also l does not profit from a unilateral deviation.
Suppose (2). Let T-(C U S) ~(C fl S) denote the set of candidates after deviation of
coalition S, where Cfl S is the set. of all candidates in {k, l} who deviate to withdrawal.
By lemma 3.3.4, ~ W(e`(T) ~C 2.
Assume first that both k and l deviate to withdrawal. Then all i E T are also in S.
Suppose ~ W(e'(T)) ~- 1 and W(e'(T)) -{i}. If i G k(i ] l), then, clearly, l(k) is
worse off by deviating. Suppose i E(k, l). We have, K) 2[uk(k) -{- -uk(l) and hence,
z[uk(k) ~- uk(l)] 1 uk(k) - Ií. This implies that for all i E (k, m] : 2[u;(k) ~- u,(l)] )
u~(i)-Ií, since uk(k) - u;(i) and uk(k)-~u~;(l) G u~(k)~u~(l). Bv the symmetricity and
identical shape of utility functions, the last inequality also holds for all i. E(m., l). Heuce,
i is worse off by deviating. Suppose ~ hL'(e'(T)) ~- 2 and W(e'(T)) -{i, j}. Then, by
proposition 3.3.6. u;(m) - u~(m). If i C k or i 1 l then, by strict concavity of utility func-
tions, i is worse off by deviating. Suppose i E(k, l). We already showed that for such is:
2[u~(k)fu;(1)] ~ u;(i)-Ií. Hence, wealsomust have z[u;(k)~u;(l)] ] z[u;(i)-~u;(j)]-K
and consequently, i is worse off by deviating.
Suppose k is the only candidate in C(s) who does not deviate to withdrawal. Suppose
~ W(e`(T)) ~- 1 then, by proposition 3.3.5, the winner must be in (k, l). Suppose k is
the winner. Then all deviators in 1`{k, 1} are worse off. Suppose sorne i E(k, l) is the
winner. We already showed above that i is worse off. Suppose ~ W(e"(T)) ~- 2. Then,
by proposition 3.3.6, the winners must be in (k, l) and we already showed that. deviating
makes one of them worse off. By the same argument, if l is the only candidate in C(s)
who does not deviate, someone in S is worse off by deviating.
Finally, suppose (3). Now, k, l E T and hence, if ~ W(e`(T)) ~- 1 then, by proposition
3.3.5, the winner is in (k, l). 4~~e already showed for case (2) that such a winner is worse
off. If ~ W(e`(T)) ~- 2 then, by proposition 3.3.6, the winners must be in (k, l), and
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from case (2), we already know that, both of the winners are worse off. 0
The following theorem states one of our rnain results. If the ent.ry cost,s are sutficiently
small, then there exists a unique PSNE featuring the median voter as the only running
candidate.
Theorem 3.3.14
lf lí is su~ciertGl~ sma,ll. thrn, l~here exists a v.n~r~quc P.S.~VE: C(s`) -{m~}.
Proof:
5uppose lí is very snrall. By corollary 3.3.12, there exists a PS:~'E ~` with C(s') - {rn}.
Suppose there exists another PS~T: ~ti~ith Q with C(s) ~{m}. First, suppose ~ C(s) ~- 0.
This contradicts proposition 3.3.10. Next, suppose ~ G(s) ~1 1. If m E C(s) then, by
proposition 3.3.5, W(e(C(s))) -{m}. But then, losing candidates would improve upon
s by a joint withdrawal. Suppose m~ ~ C,'(s): then, by lemrna 3.3.4. LV(e(C(s))) -
{k}, k~ m or W(e(C(s))) -{k, l} and uk(m) - u~(rn). 1ow, if in enters then, by
propositions 3.3.5 and "3.3.6, Yi~(e(C(s) U{nt})) -{m}. Since ~~ is sufficie~ntly small,
um(m) - Iti ~ um(k) and um(m) - Ií ~ 2[um(k) ~ um(l)] and hence, rra improves by
entry. ~
The following result say-s that if for a certain value of the entry costs there exists a PSNE
with two candidates, then t:here is no other equilibrium with t,wo candidates.
Theorem 3.3.15
There ezists a un~ique two-candidate PS.~'EQ` u;ith C(s`) -{l~, l} iff k- z[uk(k)-uk(l)],
uk(m) - u~(rn) and F,r~ G u~,(l).
Proof
.Vece.~stity: Suppose Q' with C(s') - {lr, l} is a PSNE. Then, the conditions in
proposition 3.3.13 must be satisfied, i.e., (1) lí C z[uk(k) f uk(1)] - Ek, (2) Ií C
i [uk(k) f uk(l)] - uk(1) and (3) K 1 z[uk(k) ~ uk(1)] - uk(1). From (I ) and (2) we obtain
that (1) is strictly binding if Ek ) uk(1) and (2) is strictly binding if Ek C uk(1). Suppose
(1) is strictly binding. Then by (1) and (3), z[uk(k)-~uk(1)]-uk(l) G z[uk(k)fuk(l)]-Ek,
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which contradicts Ek ~~~(1). Hence we must have that (2)is binding. From (2) and (3)
it follows that !í - z[uk(k) - vk(l)] and Gk C uk(l).
Svf~iciency: Suppose k- 2[uk(k) - uk(!) and Ek G uk(l). Then, the conditions in
proposition 3.3.1'3 hold and hence Iherc exists a PS~~F, v` with C(s') - {l~, l}. This
PSNE is the unique tw.o-candidate PS1~E. since only one pair of candidates {k, !} can
satisfy the conditions vk(rn) - u~(m) and li - 2[uk(k) - uk(l)] simultaneously. O.
By the next theorem, a PSNE with a positive number of candidates only exist.s if the
candidate(s) is (are) sufFicient,ly close t,o the median.
Theorem 3.3.16
If therc e:zist.. ~i PSa~E~` ~cith C`(s') - {k} orC(s`) - {k, 1}, then k m.~usl. be suf~ji~cienlly
~~losr to ~n.
Proof:
By theorem 3.3.15, if a' with C(s' )- { k; l} is a PSNE, then Ek G vk(l), i.e., k and 1
must be sufiicient,ly close to each other. Since uk(m) - ui(m) must hold. k and l must,
be suf~iciently close to m. By proposition 3.3.11, if C(.ti') -{k}, then K G uk(k) - F,k
and Iti 1 u~(l) - u~(k), where uk(Tn) - u~(m). Hence, u~(l) - ui(k) C u~(k) - Ek and
therefore, again, Ek c vk(I). O
3.4 Example
This section provides an example to illustrate what YS~Es might look like. The example
also shows that PSNEs need not. always exist. To be able to compare the PS1'F.,s in this
example with figure 2.5.1 in chapter 2, we will assurne the same utility functions here.
Hence, let
b'k E 1: ii~,(i) --( k - i)~.









Figure 3.4.1: Example of PSNEs in the large electorate model.
The vert,ically hat:ched area gives all PShEs with ~ C ~- 0, the horizontally hatched area
gives all PSIVEs with ~ C ~- 1, and the curve gives a11 PSNEs with ~ C ~- 2.
Compared with figure 2.5.1 in chapter 2, the number of two-candidat,e equilibria is dra-
matically inclined. Two-candidate equilibria are now inclined to the centre of the policy
space. Due to the fact that, everyone is bett,er off with a more centrist policy, the
two-candidate Nash equilibria with relatively extremist candidates in figure 2.5.1, are
destroyed by the entry of less extremist pairs of candidates.
In contrast with our expectation, mentioned in the introduction, two-candidate eyui-
libria do not vanish completely. The intuition is as follows: the more centrist pairs
of candidates are, the less favourable the trade-off between entrv costs and a better
expected policy for potential entrants in between the pair of candidates.
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Interestingly, there is no decline in one-candidate equilibria. The intuition for this is
that the trade-off is already exhausted by individual deviations. If the entry of all voters
who defeat (or tie with) the established candidate is inhibited by the entry costs, then
the entry of a larger coalition of voters is prevented as well.
From this, we may conclude that the decline in two-candidate equilibria is completely
due to the entry of two-person coalitions between the two established candidates.
3.5 Non-existence
This section proves that PSNEs do not exist for all values of the entry costs. Accord-
ing to the next lemma, if Iï is so large that single-candidate PSNEs do not exist, then
two-candidate PSNF,s do not exist either. Subsequently, theorem 3.5.2 shows that t.here
always exists values of I~ large enough to prevent any PSNE with one candidate and
small enough to prevent a PSNE with zero candidates. We first prove the lemma.
Lemma 3.5.1
For any k E I, the upper bound on IS for a PSNE with C(s`) -{k, 1} is lower than the
upper bouud o~a Ií for o PSNE with C(s') -{k}.
Proof:
By proposition 3.3.11 and corollary 3.3.12, if C(s') - {k}, t,hen K G uk(k) - F,k. By
theorem 3.3.15, if C(s') - {k, l}, then Ií - 2[uk(k) f uk(l)] - uk(l) and Ek C uk(l).
Since u)k(k) 1 2[uk(k) f uk(1)] and Ek c uk(l), we must have uk(k) - Ek ] 2[uk(k) ~-
uk(l)~ - uk(l). ~
Theorem 3.5.2
There always e~ist values of Ií such tha~t there is no PSNE.
Proof:
Take 1~ E(u,(i) - E;, uo(0) - Eo), where i. is suffïciently close to 0. ~ote that t,here
exists such a Ií, since u;(i) - uo(0) and E; ) Er. Since Ií c uo(0) - Eo, by proposition
3.3.10, s such that ~ C(s) ~- 0 is not. an SNE. Since K 1 u;(i) - E;, we must have
that for all k E[i, n- i] : 1~ ~ uk(k) - Ek, because u,(i) - uk(k) and ET G Ek.
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Hence, by proposition 3.3.11 and corollary 3.3.12, for all k E [i, n- i], s such that
C(s) -{k} is not an SNE. Next, we have to prove that s such that C(s) -{k}, where
k E [0, i) U (n~ - i, 1] is not an SNF,. Suppose the reverse aad let there be an SNE
with some k E [0, i) as the only one running for elect.ion. Then, by proposition 3.3.11,
we must have K C uk(k) - Ek and It )~u~(l) - ui(k), where uk(m) - u~(rn). Hence,
u~(l)-u~(k) C uk(k)-Eh must hold. Since ui(l) - uk(k), we have u~(k) ) Ek. But then,
k must be sufficiently close to m, which contradicts the assumption that i is sufficiently
close to 0. By the symmetricity of the problem, a similar argument shows that there
cannot be an SNE with some k E[n - i, 1~ running. From the above, it follows that
there exists no SNE s with ~ C(s) ~- 1. By lemma 3.5.1, this implies that, there does not
exist, an SNE s with ~ C, (s) ~- 2 eit.her. ~
3.6 Conclusions
PSNE is not capable of solving the coordination problem rnentioned in the introduct.ion.
For small values of the entry costs, there is still an infinite nurnber of one-candidate
PSNEs and PSNE does not tell which one of them is the most likely outcome. Another
non-cooperative solution concept we could have applied is coalition-proof Nash equilib-
rium (CPNE; Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987). CPNE requires Nash equilibrium
to be proof against deviations of all stable coalitions, i.e., deviating coalitions must be
proof against further deviations of subcoalitions. Hence, compared to PSNE, CPNE
allows less (or an equal number of) coalitions to deviate. This implies that under CPNE
there will be at least, as many equilibria as under PSNE. This may have a favourable
effect on t,he problem of existence of equilibrium, but the coordination problem is at least
as severe. From a perspective of complexity, application of CPNE seems unattractive.
In the proofs even more cases would have to be considered, since in addition, deviations
of subcoalitions must be considered and checked for stability.
We could also have allowed for inter-stage coalition formation, i.e., coalition forma-
tion between voters and candidates. Then, however, we would have to assume that
commitment to strategies is possible, since ot,herwise, the basis for strategy decisions
would be unclear. The assumption of commitment would also complicate analysis, since
then, candidates can choose a platform ot,her t,han their ideal point. This would probably
lead to even more equilibria.
A promising option would be to allow for side-payments, i.e., to allow for the possi-
bility that voters finance the entry costs of a candidate. This probably leads to Black's
(1958) median voter result, since, by the strict concavity of utility functions, a major-
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ity of voters prefers the victory of the median candidate to any othe configuration of
undefeated candidates. Hence, they will be prepared to pay the median voter's entry
costs.
With respect to Duverger's law, we may conclude that joint actions do not tend to
reduce the nurnber of contestants under plurality rule any nrore t,han individual actions.
In chapter 2, joining forces was not allowed and nevertheless the number of contestants
was not larger than two. The small number of contestants seerns rather due to the other
two forces mentioned by Duverger, i.e., t.hat. hopeless candidacies will not be pursued
and that voters avoid voting for candidates that are ccrtain to lose.
Chapter 4
Perfectly Strong Nash Equilibrium
in the Case of a Small Electorate
4.1 Introduction
Early models of electora,l compet,ition take the number of running incumbent parties and
the number of new entrants as fixed. Besides, they assume that voters vote sincerely
for the party closest to t,heir own ideal point. (See Shepsle, 1991. for an over~iew). By~
t~he first assumption, entrants alwa.vs enter, whet-her they lose or not, likc in the 'entrant
alwa,vs loses corollary of Palfrey (1984). As a.rgued by Greenberg and Shepsle (1987).
this contradicts the objective of winning offiice. "I'he second assumption neglects possible
strat.egic behaviour of voters (Austen-5mith, 1987).
Feddersen, Sened aud Wright (FS~~~ , 1990) seek to relax these two assumptions. "l he}~
characterise subgame perfect equilibriurn in a two-sta~ge game of candidate eutry. In the
first stage, each candidate in a given, finite set, of pot,ent,ial candidat~es decides whether to
seek election or not. Entry involves the choice of a platfortn in the policy space ~~C -[0, 1]
a,nd the payment, of entry costs, Ii . Candidates are cornmitted to the platform chosen.
In the second stage, voters make up t,heir minds. It is assumed that. the set of eoters is
finite a-nd disjoint from the set of candidates. Voting bears no costs. Vot~ers are assumed
rational and hence, they care only about expected utility a-s det.ermined by the outcorne
of the elections.
The contest is decided by plurality rule, i.e., the candidate with the largest, support
is declared the winner. Possibly, plurality rule is not decisive, as when there is more
than one undefeated candidate. Then, by assumption, all undefeated candidat.es have
equal probability of winning office and receive a payoff á B- Ií . where ~ is the number
of undefeated candidates and B 1 0 are the benefits of holding office. The payoffs of
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losing and abstaining candidates are equal to -K a,nd 0 respectively.
The game is solved by backward induction. 'I'he most ímportant features of the
subgame perfect equilibrium are, that all candidates adopt the position of t.he median
voter's ideal point, the number of entering candidates is eyual t.o the largest int.eger
t.hat does not exceed ti and each vot,er vot,es for her most favourite amoug the winning
candidates. Hence, in equilibríum t.here is policy converge.nce and equilibrium is not
unique because the number of candidates is not uniquely determined.
As the authors note, the model suffers from a coordination problem. All entering
candidates must have the same number of vot.es in equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium
set. of candidates depends on implicit coordination among vot,ers, which remains unex-
plained by the model. Refinements of Vash equilibriurn, like. strong i1'ash equilibrium
(SNE; Aumann. 1989) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CP:VE: Bernheim, Peleg
and VVhinston. 1987) cannot be applied to reduce the nurrrber of equilibria. S~E reyuires
the Nash equilibrium to be proof against deviations of coalitions and CYNE ernploys the
additional restriction that deviating coalitions must be proof against: deviations of sub-
coalitions. In the FSW model, all equilibria are strong and coalition-proof, because all
candidates choose the same platform and hence, voters are not able to distinguish these.
An important, and unrealistic, assumption of the FSW model is that candidates lack
policy preferences. They just care about being elected. In this chapter, a generalised
version of the FSW model is used, such as the model in chapter 2, that incorporates
the idea of policy interested candidates (See also Wittman, 1977; 1983; Calvert, 198,5
and Alesina, 1988). In this model, the set of potential candidates coincides with the set
of voters. Candidates are simply voters who choose to run for election and there is no
distinction in objective functions. For simplicity, it, will be assu~ned that there are no
direct benefits of holding office, since t.his would not affect the results: a. fixed benefit
would only change the level of an entrant's expected utility and since every entrant is
affected by this in the same amount, entry decisions would not change.
The analysis in chapter 2 showed that there is again a coordination problem. Since
equilibrium is not unique, candidates must coordinate their st,rategies in order to obt,ain a
specific equilibrium. The previous chapter already considered t,his coordination problem
in the case of a large electorate, modelled by a continuum of voters. There, the concept of
perfectly strong Nash equilibrium (PSNE; Rubinstein, 1980; Aumann, 1989) was applied,
that allows for coalition formation of candidates and of voters. This chapter perforrns
the same analysis for a small electorate, to account for a possible difference in voting
behaviour that rnay arise. In chapter 2 it has been shown that if voting behaviour is
assumed to be strategic, in a large electorate voting behaviour is indeterminate, while
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in a small electorate every vot.er votes sincere. This chapter shows that there are again
differences with the large electorate case: (1) indifferent voters need not vote sincere and
(2) there exist P5NEs witl~i losing candidates.
Except for a decline in the number of equilibria, PSNE also allows for the nice
interpreta,t.ion of coalitions of voters as parties (see also Feddersen, 1993) and of the
position of candidates as t.he party position. 'I'l~iis providcs a new theoretical basis for
Duverger's (1953) so called 'sociological law.' Loosely formulat~ed, this law asserts t.hat
plurality rule favours two-party competition, while proportional representation systems
favour multi-part.y competition. Duverger rationalises this empirical law by pointing at
three forces that reduce t,he number of contestants in case of plurality rule with one
seat at stake. First, no one pursues election if there are no perspectives of winning and
second, people will join forces to enhance perspectives. Finally, voters will not, support
hopeless candidacies. Hence, application of PSNE makes it possible to study t.he effect
of joining forces on the number of contestants in equilibrium.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explains the rnodel and the equi-
librium concept. In section 4.3 the game will be solved. ]t is shown t,hat, in an PSNF,.
almost all voters vote sincere, that there are at most two winning candidates and that
the winners are the candidates closest to the centre of the policy space. Furthermore,
the presence of losing candidates in an PS~1E is possible. Section 4.4 gives an example
and section 4.5 deals with existence. The existence of PSNE depends on the value of
the entry costs and given the entry costs, PSVE need not be unique: F'or sufficientily
small entry costs, we show that there exist,s a unique PSNE. If the number of voters is
odd, only the median vot,er runs for election, while in the even case, only the two middle
voters run. Fina,lly, section 4.6 concludes. ~
4.2 The model: electoral competition in the case
of a small electorate
4.2.1 Preliminaries
Throughout the chapter, the policy space is uni-dimensional and denoted by X-(0, 1].
The set of voters I- { 1, ..., n} is equal to the set of possible candidates. Each i E I has
a bliss point b; on X, where 0 G b~ G... C bn G 1, and a ut,ility function u; : X~?R.
We assume that u; is (i) continuous and strictly concave, (ii) strictly single-peaked at 6;
and (iii) symmetric around b;. Conditions ( i) and (ii) imply that v; is strictly monotone
increasing on [0, b;) and strictly monotone decreasing on (b;, 1]. Condition (iii) means
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that for any~ e 1 0 such that b; -" 6; f t E[0. 1], u;(b, - e) - lc,(b; ~ e).
For simplicit~~ assume tliat (iv) voters are uniformly distributed on X, i.e. b~ - 0. h2 -
1~(n - 1),.... 6„-i -(n - 2)~(n - 1), b„ - I and (~-) utility functions arc idPnticallv
shaped. i.e. t1i, j E 1: z~,(6; f.r) - z~~~(bJ ~,r) for all ~~ such that b; ~- a~. 6, ~- .r E [0, 1].
In order to simplifv notation, idcntify voters with ihPir bliss point,s. i.e.. ~a~rife i~;(j)
instead of ii;(6,) to denote i's utilit~. if thc ideal point of j is implc~mentecl.
4.2.2 Two-stage game
In the first stage, cach i E 1 chooscs .5, E{R, .N }, w~here t he choice of R mean5 t hat
the indi~~idual decides to run for elect~ion, whereas .'V means t.he decision not to run. ~~'e
writP .5 -(s;),E~ for the vector of candidate decisions. F3y assumption, there are fixed
costs Lí 1 0 associated with running. The set of candidates then becomes
C(s) - {~ E 1 - .ti, - R}.
For simplicity, denote C(s) by C, ~ti~henever no conftision can result. We asstime t,hat
candidates cannot commit to a platform in the polic}~ space. As a consequence, s; - R
implies that the polic~~ position of ca,ndidate i is equal to her ideal point.
Wit.h respect to the relationship between t,he number of candidates a,nd the policy to be
implemented, three cases will be distinguished. If I C ~- 0, then the policy impleme~ted
is a random choice from {1, .. ., n}. ~ahere each policy has the same probabilit.~~ of being
i~nplemented. In case ~ C ~- 1, then ~ E C is elected and i is implemented. Finally, if
~ C ~] 2, the policy depends on voters' choice in the second stage of the game. as will
be explained next.
In the second stage, each i E I either chooses one of the candidates in C or abstains
from voting. Voting bears no costs. Write e~(C), or simply e;, for z's decision when the
set of candidates is C. Let f1 refer to abstention. Then,
e; E C U {A}.
The vector of al] voter decisions is denoted by E(C) -(e;(C));F~ or simply by e.
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For each candidate j E C fet
V(.7l e)-{iE1: F,- }
be the support of j and let v(j ~ e) -~ V(j ~ e) ~. Under plurality rule, the candidate
with t,he largest number of votes is declared the winner. ~~e define the set of undefeated
candidates as
Li'(e) -{j E C: i~(J ~ e) - rnaxkE~,[-'(k ~ e)}. (4.2.1)
and we assume that each candidate in 4I~'(e} is chosen wit.h equal probability.
Individua] i's expc~,cted utility from a given vect,or of voter decisions, e, is equal to
C~;(e) - ~ ~( ) ~ ~
tix(7).41~ e ,Ewre)
4.2.3 Strategies and payoffs
Each i E I has a strategy
~~ - (~i, ~E2~~~~CEC~i
where C-{C C I: ~ C ~1 2}. For the vector of strategies we will write Q-(Q,)
Denote i's payoff under Q by nz(Q). T'he payoffs under the three distinguished possibilities
for ~ C ~ are given by:
ji~ ~~Ei ~t(.7) if ~ c ~- ~
~a(~)- Uti(e)-Ií if ~C~1landiEG'
U,(e) if ~ C ~) 1 and i~ C.
4.2.4 Perfectly strong Nash equilibrium
Such as in chapter 3, individuals act strategicall}~, i.e., they rnaximise their payoffs and
they are allowed to form coalitions to further their interests. To solve the game, the
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concept of perfectl~~ strong ~ash equilibrium is invoked (see also Rubinstein. 1980. and
.Aumann, 1959). This concept is defined as follo~~-s.
Take anv set C E C and consider the subgame I'(C), starting with the set of candidates
c.
Definition 4.2.1
e' is a strong :Va.sh. eqzlilibrium ~SNEJ in ['(C) if~ for all coalitions S C I therc is no
es -(et),ES svch that for all i E S:
~'~(es, c's) ~ ~'~(c').
where es -(e~)tES and e' , - Íe; ),Er~s-
Definition 4.2.2
~' - (~i )2Ei - (s; , {e; (C) }c C)~E[ ~s a perfectl,y strong .~~osh eq~uilibrivrn (PStti"E~ iff
(i) for all C E C, e'(C) is an SNE ia l'(C) and
~ii) for all S C I there is no ss such t.hat for a.11 z E S:
~i~~ss, s~S~~ ~~e~~C~)~CEC~ ~ ~i~~~~~
where ss - (s~);ES and s's - ( s~ );Er`s.
4.3 Solution of the game
The game is solved by backward induction. Sect.ion 4.3.1 characterises strong Nash
equilibria in the second stage of the game, for all possible sets of candidates given.
Section 4.3.2 derives perfectly strong Nash equilibria for the whole two-stage game.
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4.3.1 Second stage: voting behaviour and sets of winning
candidates
I'his subsection derives the properties of voting behaviour e' in the second st,age of the
game. We only have to consider cases where ~ C ~? 2, because we assumed that. if
~ C` ~- 1, then the policy of the candidate in C is implemented. For this subsection, take
C E C aud assume that e'(C') is an SNE in the subgamc of I'(C).
By lemma 4.3.1, if there are at, least. two candidates, t,hen overall voter abst.ention is not.
an S:~'E.
Lemma 4.3.1
If C E C then~ there e.r~ists so~me i E 1 with e; ~ A.
Proof:
Assume e; - A for all i E ~. Then, by (4.2.1), W'(e') - C, which itnplies, U~(e") -
~~~ ~~E~ u;(j). Hence, i E C improves by deviating to e, - i, since then, W(ee, e~~{t}) -
{i}. O
Lemma 4.3.2 states t.hat voters will vote for their favourite candidate among the unde-
feated candidates (see also lemma 1 of Feddersen. Sened and Wright, 1990).
Lemma 4.3.2
S7ip~ose ~ W(e') ~? 2. If i E ~. k E W(e`) are s~uch that u;(k) 1 v.~(l) ~or all l E
W(e"), l~ k, the~n, e; - k.
Proof:
By ( 4.2.1 ), all candidates in W(e') have the same number of votes. Hence, if e,` ~ k
then b}~ deviating to k, i guarantees that k is the only winner, an outcome that she
stríctly prefers. But then, e` is not a Nash equilibrium and therefore it is not an SNE
either. ~
Note that this lemma does not imply that all voters honestly reveal their preferences,
which is also called 'sincere voting.' In particular, the lemma does not state anything
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about the heha~~iour of inditferent votPrs. ~~~-e postpone the discussion on the behaviour
of the laticr to lemma 1.:3.-1.
The next lemma clairns that in an S`1~~. thc~ number of undefeated candidates cannot.
exceed t~~.o. ~I`he irttuition for this result is as follow~s. B~~ lemma -1.:3.2, in a,n 5:~1?,
all undefeated candidates ~-ote for themsel~-es. Each of them can, ho4ve~-er. guarantee
the ~-ictorc of the undefeated candidate right next to her b~~ shifting her ~-otc to thi5
candidatP. ~~~-c sho~r t hat , if t liE~re are at least three undefeated candidates, for at least
one of the exireme candidates amongst them, this is a sound move.
Lemma 4.3.3
~ 4I~(E') ~C '?.
Proof:
.~ssn~ue bii(r') 1 2. I,et l(r) be the leftest (rightest) candidate in I~f"(c`). Oh~~iously,
t.he ezpected policy a' - ~[vt ,~~ ~~Ew(~,.t j must be in (1, r). B.~~ lemrna 1.3.2, c~ - l
and er - r. Since all candida.tes in l~V(c`) have the sarne nurnber of votes. I(r) could
guarantee the winning of the closest neighbour in }~'(e'), say l' (r'), by~ de~-iat.ing to
ei - l' (e, - r'). B~- strict concavity of utility~ functions:
(1) if r` E[l', r) then u~(l') j u~(.r') ~('~(~~') and
(2) if .r` E ( l. r'] t,hcn r~,(r') 7 vt,(:r-) 1 Cr(c').
Hence. for all possible a~', at least one of the extreme candidates in L('(c') has an incentive
to de~-iate from e'. So. c' is not a~ash equilibrium and hence. it is not an S1G. O
tiext. we show t.hat if t,here are two undefeated candidates, an indifferent. voter abstains
or votes for a losing candidatE~ if the number of voters is odd. ' In contrast, if the number
oí voters i~ c~~en. an indifferent ~~oter ~.otes for onP of the undefeated candidates.
~Th~ 'sinc~~rr votin};~ l~~tnrna of F~rtit~~rsen c~t riL (1990) neglects thi~ ca~P- HFn~F~ ih~ir If~mnia i~ onl}~
partiall~ true
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Lemma 4.3.4
Ass~~n~-e ~ l~I'(r') I- Z. W(e') -{k, l} and ~~i E 1 such that u,(k-) -~~;(l) ) u;(c). flc E
C, c~ k, l. If~n is odd, then e; ~{k, l}. Lf n ~is even, then e~ E {k, l}.
Proof:
Without ]oss of generality assurne k G i G l. By lernma 4.3.2, `dj G i: e~ - k and
t1j ) i: e~ - l. Suppose e,-̀ - k. Since k and l have the same rtumber of votes, it must
be the case that ~{j E 1: j G i} ~-~ {j E I: j ) i} ~. But then, n must be even. By
the same argument,. e; ~ l. Suppose e, ~{k, l}. Then ~{j E I: j C i} ~ must be equal
to ~{ j E 1: j] i} ~. But then, n must be odd. O
Note that the Nash equilibrium property of e` is suf~icient to prove lemmas 4.3.1-4.3.4.
The remaining statements in this subsect.ion however, depend on cooperation among
voters.
Proposition 4.3.5 shows that if t,here are at least two candidates arid only- one of them
wins, then the winner must be at least as close to the centre of the policy space as any
other candidate. In the following. let rn - z be the centre of the policy space. Then, if
~n is odd, m. is (the ideal point of) the median voter. 1'o economise on notation, write
v.k(l) ~ uk(c) instead of ~ k - l IC~ k- c ~, which is possible since utility functions are
symmetric and identically shaped.
Proposition 4.3.5 (Necessary condition for ~ W(e') ~- 1)
Let ~ C ~) 2 a.nd W(e') -{k}. Then uk(rn) ) u~(~m), Hc E C.
Proof:
Suppose c E C is such that u~(rn) 1~ i~k(~rn). ~V'it}iout loss of generalit.y, suppose c G m.
Then (1) k G c G m. or (2) c G m G k. and `2k ] rn. Suppose ( 1). Then all i E 1 with
i) c strictly prefer c to k and, as they form a majority, the~ can guarantee the victory
of c. Suppose ( 2). Then all i G `2k strictly prefer c to k. Hence, if a is odd, then all
i G m can cooperate to bring about the victory of c. If n is even, then all i G m are able
to realise at least a tie between c and k. ~
Proposition 4.3.6 deals wit.h the case of two undefeat.ed candidates. If the number of
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voters is odd, then the undefeated candidates must be equidistant from, and be the
candidates closest to. the median voter. If the number of voters is even, the undefeat.ed
candidates must be equidistant from the centre of the policy space or they must be
equidistant from the candidate immediately to the left (or to the right) oí the centre.
Let m- and mt be (the ideal points of) the voters immediately to the left and right of m.
Proposition 4.3.6 (Necessary condit,ions for ~ W(e`) ~- 2)
Assume W(e`) -{k, l}, k G l.
(i) If n is odd, then vk(rn) - ui(m
(ii) If n is even, then
(a) uk(m-) - u~(rn-) or
(b) uk(m-) - u~(mt) or
(c) ukÍm}) - u~(mt)
1 u~ m). dcEC, c~k, l.
andtícEC, c~l, k: cGkorcll.
Proof:
(~) Suppose uk(m) ~ u!(m) and without, loss of generality assume uk(m) G u~(m). If
k G m C l, then by lemma 4.3.2, for all i 1 m: e~ - l. Hence, k: ~ W(e'): a
contradiction. In a similar way the assumption k G l G m lea,ds to a eontradiction.
Assume uk(m) - u~(m) and ~c E C, c~ k, l located in between k and (. If
c G m (c ~ m), then by the strict concavity of utility functions, all i G m(all
i 1 m) strictly prefer the victory of e to the tie between k and l. Consequently,
W(e') - {c}: contradiction.
(ii) see Appendix. o
Next, we prove that the necessary conditions of propositions 4.3.5 and 4.3.6 are also
sufiicient.
Proposition 4.3.7 (Sufficient. conditions for W(e") to be a winning set from C)
Let C E C avd W C C. Under the followiv.y conditions, there exists an SNE e` of I'(C)
svch that W(e') - W:
4.3 Solution of the game
i~i n is odd ~n~d W' - {k} and ic is such that
uk(m) ~ u~,(m.). b'c E C.
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(ii~ n i.s odd and W - {k, l} and ~, l are svch t{aat
uk(rrt) - ut(m) 1 u~(nz), b'c E C, c~ k. (.
(iii) n is even aad W - {k~} a~r,~l k is s~ch that
v,k(711.~ i 7L~(77L), dC E C.
(i~v) n is even and W-{k, 1} and k, l are such that
tl~(m-) - ir~(ni.-) or
~k(m ) - ul~mt) or
uk(mt) - ~i(~~})
andtJcEC, c~k, l: cG k orcll.
Proof:
(~) Suppose n. is odd and uk(m) ~ u~(m), tíc E C. Without loss of generality assume
k G m. Denote by l E 1 a voter such that uk(m) -~t(m). We prove that e" such
that b'i E 1: e; - k is an SIVE, by showing that the ma,jority of the electorate
has no incentive to deviate from e'. Define W as the set of winning candidates
after a deviation from e' took place. We have to show t.hat, for the rnajority of the
electorate,
v~(k) ] f ~ v.;(w) ( ~). (4.3.2)
~w ~~Ew
Note that for all w E YV : u; C k or w~ l. The expected policy can be written
as ~- ~~,~ ~wE~;y w. Suppose first .r G k. Then by strict concavity of utility
functions, for all i 1 k: uz(k) 1 v;(~) 1 Ij;i,l ~wF~i, u;(w), which implies that
( 4.3.2 ) is satisfied for a majority of voters. Next, suppose ~] k. Then, by the
same argument, ( 4.3.2 ) is satisfied for all i c k. Since for all w E W: w C k or
u~ ] l, for all i such that k C i c m: ~~,~ ~wEH,[u;(k) - u;(w)] ~ 0, which implies
( 4.3.2 ). So, ( 4.3.2~ is satisfied for all i C m. Hence, a majority of voters does
not want to deviate from e'.
(ii) Suppose uk(m) - ui(rrz) ~ u~(rr~), f1c E C, c~ k, l and without loss of generality
assume k C l. We will show that e' such that fli c ~~a : e; - k, Vi ) m: e; - l
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and e;~ - A is an SNE. We prove this by showing that no coalition has an incentive
to deviate from c'. Let a and W` have the same interpretat.ion as in (i). Vb'ithout
loss of generality assume ~ C rn. 7'hen, since utility functions are strictly concave
and since Hw E W: w G k or w) l. we have that for all i ) rn : z[u;(k)-~ v;(1)] ]
IWI ~wEW u;(w). So, all i) rrz do not want to deviate from e`. Conseyuently, l has
at least ~z' votes and hence there are at most n2~ votes left. But then, W-{l}
or W-{w, l}, where w E W. Since .r C~m, we must have W- {u,~, l} and
w G k. But, by proposition 4.3.6, w G k implies w~ W: a contradiction.
(iii) See Appendix.
(iv) See Appendix. ~
From proposition 4.3.7, it: follows immediat,ely that there always exist.s at least one S~E,
since this proposition covers a11 possible distributions of candidates: either there is a
candidate closest t,o the centre of the policy space or there are two candidates equidis-
tant from the centre.
Corollary 4.3.8
For all C E C there exists a~ 5'iVE.
4.3.2 First stage: candidate decisions
We now consider the whole two-stage game. In the following propositions the necessary
and sufficient conditions for a strong Nash equilibrium in the first stage subgame are
derived, given the strong I~ash voting decisions in t.he second stage.
Proposition 4.3.9 claims that if there are at least two candidates in eyuilibrium, only two
of them are unde~feated. Recall the assurnption that if there is only one candidate, this
candidate is elected.
Proposition 4.3.9
Let ~' be an PS.ti'E such that Cís`) ~~ 2. Then~ ~ w( E'(C~s'))) ~- ?.
Proof:
4.3 Solution of the game 81
Suppose ~ C(s') ~? 2. B~~ lernma L'3.3, ~ W'(e`(C(s"))) ~c 2. Suppose ~ I~I-'(e'(C(s`))) ~-
1, then losing candidate(s) strictly improve by a joiut withdrawal. ~
Proposition 4.3.10 states that under certain conditions, there exists an equilibrium with
losing candidates. By proposition 4.3.9, this will happen only if there are more than two
candidates, since t.hen at. least one of thenr is defeated. Furthermore, the entry costs
must be sufficiently small so tliat the undefeated candidates are not. prevented frorn
entry, and they must be sufficiently large to prevent the entry uf any addit,ional coalition
of candidates. Now, losing candidates will not withdraw if this would lead to a shíft in
the vote of the eoter indifferent. between the indefeated ca,ndidates, such that their less
preferred candidate wins.
To simplify notation, we will writ.e E; instead of ~~~ ~~E~u~(j) to denote i's payoff
when the set of candidates is empty.
Proposition 4.3.10
Let r2 be odd arad let C- CL U{k, l}, uiherc k G l, uk(m) -
I: iGk}. LetCR-{iEl: iCk} a.ndlet
u~( m ~lnd C~ - {~i E
~1 G T77,tn { 2~21k(~) ~ ïLk(Z)~ - ~:k, Z~t~k(ÍC) - 2Lk(Z)~} ll7lll
~1 i~21kt~({~ -f 1) - 2~2Ik}I(~ï) ~ ilktl(l)~'
lf VCL C CL : em(C ~ C~) - l and t1CR C CR : e;n(C U CR) - k~, l~tae~n. there e.~ists urz
r~s:vE ~x u~~ch c(.s-) - c.
Proof:
See appendix.
For n is even, a similar proposition can be shown. "The result in proposition 4.3.10
is not robust, however. If we introduce a srnall cost. of voting, then indifferent voters
would alwavs abstain frorn voting and as a conseyuence, there would not be any losing
candidates in an PSNF.. In the rest of t,he chapt,er, we will assume that. voting is costly.
First, we adapt propositions 4.3.5. 4.3.6 and 4.:3.9 to this assumption.
Proposition 4.3.5'
Let Ií - E denote the costs of voting, where e 1 0 is very small. Then for all C E C: if
~ W(e'(C)) ~- 1 and W(e`(C)) - {k}, then uk(m) 1 u~(rn) for all c E C, c~ k.




[f there are cosls [í associated with ~~otiny, then for all C E C: if ~ U~(e'(C)) ~- 2 and




Lf thFre are costs Ií assoczaled with i~oting, then Q, svch th~t C(s) ] 2 is not a~a f'S':VE.
Proof:
Trivial.
The next proposition gives the binding condition for an PS1VE ~~ith zero candidates.
Proposition 4.3.11
Tlaere exists a.n PS?VE ~' such ttaat I C( 5`) ~- 0 z~ Ií 1 u~ (1) - E~ .
Proof:
.A'ecessity: Suppose I C(s') ~- 0 and lí C ui(1) - E~. Then voter 1 strictly improves
by entry, since u~(1) - K 1 E~: contradiction with ~ C(s') ~- 0.
S~f~iciency: Suppose ~ C(s) ~- 0 and Ií 1 ui(1) - Fi. We will prove Lhat s is an
SNE in the first stage. .According to definition 4.2.2, we have to show t.hat, for any
deviat.ing coalition S C I, at least one individual in S does not improve upon s. By
lemrna 4.3.3, ~ W(e`(S)) ~G 2. Suppose ~ W(e'(S)) ~- 1. We have, I2 1 uk(k) -~k for
all k E I, since uk(k) - ui(1) and Ei, ~ E~. Hence, for all k E 1: Ek ~ uk(k) - Ii,
which implies that for all S C I, the candidate in W(e'(S)) does not improve upon s.
Suppose ~ W(e'(S)) ~- 2 and W(e`(S)) -{k, l}. Since for all k E I: E~, ~ uk(k)- Ek,
we also have that for all k E I: Ek ~ 2[vk(k) -~ uk(l)] - lí . This implies that for all
S C 1, the deviation is not profitable for the candidates in l~'(e'(S)). ~
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The following proposition gives the binding conditions for an PSN~ with one candidate.
Proposition 4.3.12
There exists ara PSh`E' Q' such that ~ C(s') ~- 1, C(s') -{k}, k~ m if~ lí 1
ma.~{2~ut(l)-ut(k)], u~-~(l- 1)-u~-~(k)} nnd ]i G uk(k)-Ek, iuhere ui(~ra) - uk(m).
Proof:
,1'ecessity: Suppose C(s`) -{k} and Ií ) uk(k) - Ek. Then candidate k strict,ly
improves by withdrawal, since Ek )~uk(k) - Ií.
Suppose 2[ui(l) - u~(k)] 1 ui-~(l - 1) - u~-i(k) and Lí G i[ul(l) -u~(k)]. `I~hen voter l
strictly improves by entry, since 2[~ui(l) f ui(k)] - lí ] ui(k).
Suppose ~~-r(l - 1) - ui.~(k) 1 2[u~(1) - ut(k)] and lí G ui-i(l - 1) - ui-~(k). Then
voter l- 1 strictly improves by entry, since u~-i(l - 1) - K 1 ui-~(k).
Su~ciency: Suppose C(s) -{k}, !í 1 m.ax{z[~u~(l) -~u~(k)], ici-~(l - 1) - ia~-i(k)}
and Ií G uk(k) - Ek. Without loss of generality assume k G ~rc. We will show t,hat s is
an SNE in the subgame of the first stage. According to definition 4.2.2, we have to show
that for all deviating coalitions S C I, at least one individual in .S does not improve
from the deviation. We classify the deviating coalitions S into three t,ypes: (1) S-{k},
(2)SClissuchthatkESand~iEl~{k}: i~ESand(3)SCI~{k}.
Consider (1). Then k does not improve from the deviation, since uk(k) - Ií ~ Ek.
Consider (2). By lemma 4.3.3, ~ W(e'(S ~{k})) ~C 2, where S~{k} is the set of
candidates after S deviates. First,, let ~ W(e'(S~{k})) ~- I and let W(c`(S~{k})) -{i}.
Then, for the deviation to take place, both i and k must be better off; i.e., u,(i) - K]
u;(k) and uk(i) ] uk(k) - Ií . Since u;(i) - u~;(k) and u;(k) - uk(i), a contradict,ion
results. Suppose ~ W(e'(S ~{k})) ~- 2 and W(e`(S ~{k})) - {i, j}. Suppose i G k
or i] l. then, by strict concavity of utility functions, both i. and j are worse off by
deviating. Suppose i E{k ~ 1, .. , l- 1}. We have, u~-~(k) 1 ui-~(l - 1) - Ií, which
implies that for all i E{k f 1, ..., l-1 }: u~(k) 7 u;(i)- Fí, since u~-~ (l -1) - v;(i) and
u~-i(k) G u;(k). This implies t}tat we also have that for all i. E{k-~1, ... , 1-1 }: u;(k) )
z[u;(i) -f u;(j)] - Ií. Consequently, i has no incentive to deviate.
Finally, consider (3). By lemma 4.3.3; ~ W(e`({k} US)) ~G 2, where {k} US is the set
of candidates after S deviates. Suppose ~ W(e'({k}US)) ~- l. If k is the winner, then no
individual in S improves by the deviation. If some i in S wins, then, by proposition 4.3.5',
i E{k-}-1, ..., l-1}. We already showed that for all such i: u;(k-) ) u,(i)-Ií and hence,
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none of t,hem wants t.o deviate. Suppose I YV(e`({k} U S)) ~- 2. Then, by proposition
~.3.6", the undefeated candidates must be in {k. ..., l}. Suppose k and l are undefeated.
We have, 1~ 1 z[ui(l) - u~(k)] and hence, ui(k) ) z[v~(1) ~- u~(k)] - lí. implying that l
has no incentive to deviate. Suppose i, j E {Ir ~ 1, .. ., 1- 1} are undefeated. Then i
is not better off, since ~~e already showed that u,(k) ) i[u;(i) ~ u~(j)] -[ï. 0
The next proposition establishes the condit,ions for an PSNE with two candidates.
Proposition 4.3.13
There erists aa PSNE~" s~uch that ~ C(s`) ~- 2, C(s') -{k, l}, k G l if~iak(rn) - v~(m)
and Ií ) uk}i(k~l)-2[uk~i~k)~ukti~l)] an~dlí G 7nin.{z[uk(k)fuk~l)~-Ek, 2~uk(Ir)-
z~~;(l)]}.
Proof:
.1'eccssity: Suppose C(s') - {k, l} and K G ukt~(k~ 1) - z[ukt~(~) f ukti(l)]. Then
voter k f 1 strictly irnproves by entrance, since vk~~(k ~ 1) -lí ~,z[ukt~(k) f uk~~(l)].
Suppose 2[uk(k) ~ uk(d)] - Ek C 2[u~;(k) - uk(l)~ and !í ] i[uk(k) f uk(l)] - Ek. Then,
both candidates !c and l strictly improve by withdra,wal, since Ey; ~ 2[uk(k)~~uk.(l)]-h' -
z~z~i~l) -f- u~i~)~ - lí.
Suppose 2[uk(k) - v~(l)] C 2[uk(k) f uk(l)] and IC 1 i[uk(k) - uk(l). Then candidate k.
strictly improves by withdrawal. since uk(l) ] 2[uk(k) -}- u~k(l)] -!í .
Suffciency: Follows directly from the proof of proposition 4.3.10. ~
From propositions 4.3.12 and 4.3.13, the conditions for an PS~E in which only the me-
dian voter(s) runs for election, follow immediately.
Corollary 4.3.14
(i~ If n is odd then~ there exists a~i PS.VE ~' such that C(s') -{in} iff Ií G u„~(m) -
E,,, ] .




Next we prove one of our main results. If the entry costs are sufficiently smafl. thPn
there always exists a unique PShF.: if n is odd, then only the median voter runs and if
n is even then only the t.wo n~iiddle ~-oters run. Clearly, if the entry costs are ver~ small,
then ever~- other confi~tira,tion of ca,ndidates i~ threa~ened b~- the entr~- of t,he rnedian
voter (or thE~ two middle voters).
Theorem 4.3.15
If Ií is svf~ciently sniall, Ghen there e~ists a u.niqu~e PS~ti~L': (i) C(s`) -{rra} i,f n zs odd
aiad (ii) C(s') -{m-, nat} i:(rz is ece~i.
Proof:
Suppose n is odd a.rd lí is sufficiently sniall. F3y corollary ~L3.14, thc existence of
an PSI~~E ~' such that~ ('(s') -{ia) is guarant.eed. Suppose tl~iere exist5 another~
PSNE, a. such that C(s) ~{rrz}. First, suppose ~ C(s) ~- 0. This contradicts
proposition A.3.11. Next, suppose ~ C(s) ~1 1. If m E C(s), then, by proposi-
tions 4.3.5' and ~.3.6', 4I'(e(C(s))) - {m}. But then, losing candidates would
improve upon s by a joint withdrawal. Stippose m~ C(s) then, by lemma 4.3.3,
l'V(e(C(s))) - {h}, k ~ n~ or bI-(e(C(s))) - {k, l}, ui;(m) - ttl(nt). ~ow. if rrt
enters, then by propositions 4.3.5' and 4.3.6'. W(e(C(s) U{rra})) -{m}. Since l~
is sufficiently small, v,,,,(m) - Ií 1 u,,,(k) and ii~„(m) - Ií 1 2[~,n(k) ~ u„~(l)] and
iience, rrz improves by entry.
(ii) See ~lppendix. ~
4.4 Example
This section provides an example to demonstrate khe propositions and to show that
PSNEs do not always exist.
Let~ n - 21 and let utility functions be such that b'i E 1: u;(x) --(b; - x)`, where
.TEX.
From propositions 4.3.11-4.3.13 and corollary 4.3.14, the following figure can be derived:
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Figure 4.4.1: Example of PSNEs in a small electorate.
All PSNEs wit,h zero candidates are on and to the right of the vertica-1 line; the horizontal
cont.inuous lines give all PSNEs with one candidate, and t.he horizont.al dotted lines
give all PSNEs with t.wo candidates. Clearly, if !í E(qó . 14), then for all SNE's
{e'(C)}~EC, there is no strategy s' E II;E~s; such that d-(s', {e"(C)}CEC) ~s a
PSNE. The next section will show that non-existence of PSNE is a gene~ral phenomenon.
4.5 Non-existence
This section proves that in sufficiently large societies, PSNEs do not alwavs exist for
all values of the entry costs. According to the next lemma, if lí is so large that single-
candidate PSNEs do not exist, t.hen two-candidate PSNEs do not exist either. Subse-
quently, t.heorem ~.S.Z shows that if the electorate consista of at least t,hree individnals,
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we can alwa~~s find a value of K large enough t.o prevent an~~ PS:~E with one candidate
and small Pnough to pre~.ent an 1'S:~'I~ ~~~ifh zero caudidat.es. I~'irst. thc~ leni~na is sho~~~n.
Lemma 4.5.1
[or any k E I, the upper boiend on lí for a~a PS'NE Q u~iGh C(s) - {k, l} is lower f.han
thF upper Gou~nd on lí for a~~ PS.h~E r~' ~uilh C(s') -{k}.
Proof:
Suppose C(s) -{k} and C(.5') - {k, l} are SNL's. By proposition 4.3.12, thP up-
perbound on !í for C(s) - {k} is lí C u~;(k) - Fk (1). By proposition ~.3.13, the
upper bound on It for C,(s') -{k, l} is lí G 2[~uk.(!~) f uk(I)~ - F,~; (2) and L~ C
2[~zi~;(k) f uk(l)~ -~k(l) (3). ~~~e have to show that the upperbound on ]í induc~d by
condition (1) is larger than that, induced by (2) and (3). Clearly~ t,his is true for (2),
because a shared vict.or}~ is worse than being a winner. To see that this is also true for
(3), note that we have to show that uk(k) - Ek ) i[~uk(k) f a.k(1)] -~iik(l). This condition
can be rewritten as z[uk(k) f uk(l)] ~ Ek. If C(s') - {k. l} exisf,s, then t,his condition
is satisfied. By (2), if Ek 1 2[uk(k:)-f uk(l)~, then for C(s') - {k, l} to exist, li must be
smaller than zero, which contradicts the assumption that lí ] 0. ~
Theorem 4.5.2
If th~e nurrr.ber of indi~viáwals in sociefy is larger~ than or equ~al to dtrFe, tlaen thcre r~ist
values o,f Ií siich t,hat there is no PS~~'L'.
Proof:
Suppose n~ 3 and take lí E(u2(2) - E2, v~~(1) - F~). Note~ that. such a lí exists, since
uz(2) - ui(1) and Ez 1 Ei. Since Ií C u~(1) - E~, by proposition 4.3.11, this implies
that s such that ~ C(s) ~- 0 is not an SNF, in the first stage. Since lí ) u2(2) - E2, we
must have that, for all k E{2, .. .; n- 1} : It 1 uk(h) - Ek, because u2(2) - uk(k) and
E2 C Ek. Hence, by proposition 4.312 and corollary 4.3.14, for a11 k E{2. ..., n-'},
s such that C(s) - {k} is not, an SNE in t,he first, stage. Next, we prove that s such that
C(s) -{k} with k E{1, n} is not an SNE. Suppose s such that C(s) -{1} is an SNE.
Then, by proposition 4.312, we must have [t C ui(1) - E~ and Ií 7 z[u~(n) - u„(1)].
Hence, 2[un(n)-u„(1)] C ui(1)-Ei rnust hold. Since un(n) - ui(1) and u,~(1) - ui(n),
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the last inequality can be rew~ritten as Er C 2[ur(1) f ur(n)]. By the strict concavity of
ut.ility functions, this condition is violat-ed if n) 3. 1~1Pnce, .5 such that C(.ti) -{ 1} is not
an S~'E and, by~ the symmetricity and identical shape of utility functions, this implies
that s such t,hat C(s) -{ra} is not an 5!~~I~ either. Bv lemma ~1.5.1. ihe above implies
that there also does not exist an S~E s~a-ith I C(5) ~- 2. ~.
4.6 Conclusions
F'rom lemmas 4.3.Z-4.3.4 and proposition 4.3.9~ it follows that, if a small cost. of voting
is assumed, all PS~Es induce sincere voting in the second stagc.
From lemma 4.3.4 and proposit.ion 4.3.6, it follows that, without costs of voting, if n
is odd, a voter w~ho is indifferent between the winning ca,ndidates either votes E'or a, less
preferred losing candidate or abstains. Hence. we rnay conclude that the 'sincere voting'
lemma of Feddersen et al. (1990) is only partially true. It has also bee shown that
the existence of an indifferent candidate causes the possible ehistence of equilibria with
losing candidates. With a small cost of voting, however, indifferent voters always abstain
and we showed that in that, case, there cannot be any losing candidates in equilibrium.
Furthermore. some conclusions on l~u~~erger's law can be draw-n. l~rom thc proofs it is
clear that the three forces Duverger holds responsible for a small number of contestants in
equilibrium (see t.he introduction) are indeed at work in the t.heoretical model. But, from
propositions 4.3.9 and 4.3.10, it follow~s that the number of contestants may be larger
than two and in that case, there are losing candidates in equilibrium. This result, is due
to the policy-interestedness of the candidates. Candidates w~ith hopeless perspectives
will not refrain if withdrawal would ]ead to the victory of a competitor that is even
worse. Because Duverger~s law is an empirical result, w~e rnight conclude that in reality,
candidates are less policy-interested t,han t,he model assumes.
Next, the existence and uniqueness of PSNE depends on t:he value of t:he entry costs.
If entry costs would never form a rest.riction to entry, then according to theorem 4.3.15,
Black's (1958) median voter result would hold and existence and uniqueness would be
guaranteed. Hence, polic}~-interestedness not always leads to policy divergence. Proba-
bly, if side-payments with respect to the entry cost.s would be allowed, the rnodel would
only produce median voter results. By strict concavity of utility functions, a majority of
voters would like the victory of the median voter(s) better than any other configuration
of winners and hence, they would be wílling to pa,y the median voter's entry costs.
PSNF probably reduces the number of equilibria. From the proofs of~propositions
4.3.5 and 4.3.6, it is clear that PS:~E reduces the number of eyuilibria in the second
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stage. Coalition formation of vot,ers prevents the victory of a candidate who is more
remote from the median voter than some other candidat.e, while application of Nash
equilibrium would a,llow t,his.
To obt,ain existence results, PSNE could be replaced by coalition-proof :Vash equilib-
rium (CPNE, see Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 19237). The difference bet.ween CPIvE
and PSNE is that CP~iE requires deviating coalitions to be stable against. deviations by
subcoalitions. This implies t,hat t:he :Va.sh equilibria will be t.hreatened by less deviat,ing
coalitions and hence, more equilibria wi11 survive. This implies in turn that application
of CPNE would not have a fa.vourable effect on t,he coordinat.ion problem.
The concept of CP1~E draws att.ention t,o t,he quest.ion of the stability of coalitions.
A conceptual flaw in t,he concept of PSNE is that it simply assumes that coalitions are
st,able. Although CP~rE improves upon PSNE by considering deviations of subcoalitions
of deviating coalitions, it. can be criticised for making usc of a nestedncss assumption,
i.e., for not taking account. of the possibility that some rnembers of a devia.ting coalition
deviate further wiY,h non-members (see also Kalai's remark on page 15 of t,he introductory
chapter of this thesis). Some other non-cooperative solution concepts that take account
of such deviations are: coalitional contingent threat equilibrium (Greenberg, 1989, 1990)
and universal coalition-proof equilibrium (Chakravorti and Kahn, 1993), described in the
introductory chapt,er of this t,hesis (pp. 15-16). CCTE assumes, however, that voters
are short-sighted and only look one deviation ahead. For UCPE, no general existence
theorem is available, which leaves the problem of coalitional stabilit,y undecided. In the
next chapter, we will consider this problem in more detail.
The concept of PSNE could also be improved by allowing for inter-stage coalition
formation, i.e., coalition formation between vot.ers and candidates. Then, however, we
would have to assume that commitment. is possible, since otherwise, the basis for decisions
would be rmclear.
Other interesting extentions of the rnodel would be the generalisation to a multi-
dimensional issue space and to a non-uniform voter distribution. Also the random choice
device; which is invoked when no one runs, could be replaced by a status-quo rule, i.e.,
if no one runs, then the status quo is implemented as a policy. The results of the model
then also depend on the location of the status quo in the issue space. Furthermore,
we could assume that every candidate needs some minimal support before nomination
(we assumed that if only one candidate enters, then this candidate is chosen, possibly
without any support). Finally, the other part, of Duverger's law could be investigated by
assuming proportional representation instead of plurality rule.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 4.3.6(ii):
Assume t~'(e') -{k, l}, while (a), (b) and (c) are all violated. I'irst, suppose not (a).
If ~i(rn-) ] uk(m-), then by lemma 4.3.Z. all i ~ m- vote for l and as a consequence,
k~ W(e`): contradiction. Heuce, if not (a.), then u~(~n-) G uk(m-). By the same line
of reasoning, if not (c), then ii~(mt) ~ uk(mt). Consequentay, not (a) and not (c) impl~~
that all i~ G m- strictly prefer k and all i~ rrat strictly prefer l. By the assumption of
a uniform distribution of vot,ers, this implies that the distance between k and m- must
be equal to the dista,nce between l and mt, i.e., uk(m-) - u~(mt). But this contradicts
the assumption that not (b).
Next, suppose ~c E C. c~ k, l and k c e G l. ~Ve will prove that all i G mt strictly
prefer the victory of c t,o the tie between Ir and l. i.e..
t1i G rnt : uti(c) 1 ~[u~(Ir) f v.;(1)]. (A1)
Suppose ( a), and first. suppose e is such that k G c G m-. By strict concavity of utilit,y
funct ions,
Vi G c: u;(cl 1 u.;(m, ) - u~( Zk f 2l) ~ 2[u;(k) ~ v~(l)~. (~2)
For all i such that c G i c m- : u,(c) - v;(k) 1 0 and u;(c) - u;(l) 1 0 and hence
2[u;(c) - u;(k)] f z[u~(c) - u;(l)] 1 0, which implies
u~(c) ~ 2~w~(~) ~ u~(Z)~. (A3)
So, (A1) holds for all i G m-. To see that ( A1) also holds for mt, note that it, is sufficient
to prove that v.mt (c)) 2[u„~f (k) ~ zi,,~t (l)~, where c' is the voter next to the right of k.
Now, umt (c') - umt (k~l) and by symmetricity of utility functions, v~,t (1) - u~f (k }-2).
By strict. concavity of utilit.y functions, u~,~t (k f 1) 1 2[umf (k) f u„~t ( k f 2)~, and hence
the condition is satisfied.
Suppose c is such that m,- G c G l. Now, we prove that ( A1) holds for all i 7 m-. By
strict concavity of utility functions, ( A2) is satisfied for all i~ c and ( A3) is satisfied for
allis.t. mGiGc.
Suppose ( b) and without loss of generality suppose c is such that k G c G m-. By the
proof of ( a), all i G mt prefer t.he vict,or~~ of c(note that, now, m- in (A2) must be
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replaced by m~ and umf (l) - umt (k -F I) - umt (c').
Case ( c) is symmet.ric to case ( a), and hence a similar proof applies. ~
Proof of propositions 4.3.7(iii) and 4.3.7(iv:)
(iii) Suppose n. is even and uk(~n) 1 i~.,(rra), t1c E C', c~ k,. `I'hen e" such t.hat
bi E I: e; - k is a SNR. This can bc~ shown by the same argument as under (i).
(iv) Suppose n is even. Then in all cases mentioned under (iv), e' such that tli G
m-: e, -k-a.ndb'z~m.}: e'-lisanSNE.
First suppose ~uk(m-) - u~(m-) 1 u~(m.-), flc E C, c~ k, l. 'Then by argument
(ii), where rn is replaced by rrz-: if a~ G m-, then all i) rnt do not want t,o deviate
from e'. Hence, all i 1 rn} vote for l and m- votes for k. The rest of the proof
follows along the same lines as the proof of (ii).
Suppose uk(m-) - uk(m}) ) u~(~m), t1c E C, c~ k, l. Then by the proof of (ii),
where m is replaced by m~-: if x C rn.-, then all i 1 yn} do not want to deviate
from e', that is, all i) mt vote for l. The rest of the proof follows along the same
lines as the proof of (ii).
Suppose uk(m}) - u~(mt) 7 u~(m), flc E C, c~ Ir, l. This case is symmetric to
the first case under (iv) and, hence, a similar proof applies. O
Proof of proposition 4.3.10:
Suppose a.ll conditions in the proposition are satisfied. By proposition 4.3.7, there exists
an SNE e`(C) such that W(e'(C)) -{k, l}.
Next, we show that there exists a s`, such that C(s') - C. According to definition 4.2.2,
we have to show that. for any deviating coalition S C 1, at least. one i E S does not
improve. We classify the deviating coalitions S into three types:
(1) SCC.
(2) S C 1 such that ~i E C, j E 1~ C: i, j E S.
(3) SCI~C.
Consider (1). If S- C, then k does not improve, since z[uk(k) ~- uk(l)] - lí 1 Ek.
If k E S, l~ S, then k- does not improve since, by proposition 4.3.5 and 4.3.6, l wins
and 2[uk(k) ~- uk(I)] -!i ) uk(1). If l E S, k~ S, then l does not improve since, by
the same propositions, k wins and by the identical shape and symmetricity of utility
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functions. uk(k) - u~(l) and uk(ll - u~(k), which implies z[u~(l) f ui(k)] - K? u~(k). If
k, I E S, S~ C'. then I is worse off. since some c~ k, l E C wins and 2[u~(l) -~ ui(k)] -
Ií ] ui(k) ~ u~(c) for all c~ k, l E G. If S- CL C C~, then al] i E S are worse off,
since em(C ~ C) - l, which implies that l is the winner and 2[u;(k) f u,(l)] -[í 1 u,(l).
The last inequality follows from the fact that Ií c i[uk(k) - uk(1)] and ihat, by strict
concavity of utility functions. 2[uk(k) - uk(l)] G 2[u;(k) - u;(l)].
Next. consider (2). Let T-(C U S) ~(C fl S) denote the set of candidates after the
deviat,ion of S, where Cf1 S' is the set of all candidates in C who deviate to withdrawal. Bv
lemma ~.3.3, ~ Yi~ (e'(T)) ~C 2. First, suppose all candidates in C deviate t,o withdrawal.
Then all i E T are also in S. 5uppose ~ W(e'(T)) ~- 1 and W(e'(T)) -{i}. ~ote that.
i ~ C and hence, i E {k f 1. .... l- 1} U CH. If i) l then, clearly. k is worse oíf.
Suppose i E{kT 1, ..., l- 1}. ~~'e }lave 2[uAfr(k) fukfi(l)] ) ukf~(k-~ 1)-lí. This
implies that for all i E {kT 1, .... rn} : ?[ii;(k)T u,(l)] ) u,(i,) - K, since ukt~ - u;(i)
and u~,}i(k) f ukt~(l) C u;(k) f u,(l). Ry the identical shape and symmetricity of
utility functions, the same inequality holds for all i E {m f 1, ..., l- 1}. Hence, if
i E {k -{- L.. , l- 1}, then i does not improve from the deviation. Suppose
~ hV(e"(T)) ~- 2 and i~h'(e`(T)) -{i. j}. Then, by proposition 4.3.6(i), u;(rn) - u~(m).
:Vote that i, j~ C and hence, i, j E{k-{-I, ... , l- I}. We already showed that for all of
these i's: z[u;(k) ~ u;(1)] ? u;(i) - Ií. This implies 2[u;(k) ~- u;(l)] ~ l[u;(i) ~ u~( j)] - lí
and hence, i is worse off by deviating. Next, suppose at least one candidat.e in C does
not deviate. First, suppose some ca-ndidates in C~ C CL aa~e the onlv candidates in
C who do not deviate. Then, if i~V(e~`(T)) - {~i.} and i G k, l is clearly worse off. If
i E {k T l, .. , 1- 1} U CR then, hy the same argument as above i is not better off. If
W(e'(T)) -{i, j} and i G k or i] l then, by strict concavity of utility fiinctions. i is
worse off. If i E{k -~ 1, .. , l- I}, then, by the same argument as above, i does not
profit. Secondly, suppose k is the only candidate in C who does not deviate. ~~~'e already
showed that one of the deviators is worse off if ~ W(e'(T)) ~- 2. If ~ W(e'(T)) I- l then,
by proposition 4.3.5, the winner must be in {k, .. , l- I}. We already showed that all
possible winners in {k ~- 1. ..., 1- I} are not better off by deviating. Clearly, if k is
the winner, then deviating is worse for l. By the satne argument, so long as either k or
l does not deviate, there exists someone in S for whom deviat-ion does not pay.
Finally, consider (3). Now, k, 1 E T and hence, if ~ W(e`(T)) ~- 1, by proposition
4.3.5, the winner must be in {k, ..., l}. if the winner is in {k f 1, ... , l- 1}, then the
same argument as for case ( 2) applies. If k is the winner then, by proposition 4.3.5, all
i E T are in {1, ..., k} U{l, ..., n}. Since S C I~ C, all i E C are not in S. Hence, all
~~ E C must be in CR and all off them are worse off by the deviation. If ~ W(e'(T)) ~- 2
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and W'(e'(T)) -{i. j} then, by proposition 4.3.6(i), u;(rn) - u~(m) 1 uk(~m) and hence,
i E {k f 1, .. , l- 1}. We already showed in case (2) that a11 of these i's are worse off
by deviating. If l is the winner then, by the same argument, all i E S are in CR. But
then, S C CR and hence. e;~(C U S) - k, implying t,hat, all i E 5' are worse off. 0
Proof of Theorem 4.3.15(ii):
Suppose n is even and lí sufliciently small. By corollary 4.3.14, the existence of an
PSNE ~' with C(s') - {m-, ~m}} is guarant.eed. Suppose this PSNE is not unique.
Then there exists a PSNE a such that. C(s) ~{m-, mt}. By the same argument
as for (i), ~ C(s) ~~ 0. Suppose ~ C(s) ~~ 1. If rn-, m} E C(s), then ~ C(s) ~j 3.
By lemma 4.3.3, and propositions 4.3.5' and 4.3.6': W(e(C(s))) - {m-, mt}. Hence,
losing candidates would improve upon s by a joint withdrawal. If rre- E C(s) and.
mt ~ C(s), then by the sarne lemma and propositions, W(e(C(s))) - {nz-}. Now,
if nzt enters, then W(e(C(s) U {m}})) -{rn-, m}}. Since Ií is sufficiently small,
2[v~,~t(mt) t u,~f(rn-)] - lí ) u,,,t(~n-). ' The same argument holds if rnt E C(s)
and m- ~ C(s). Suppose m-, mt ~ C(s). Then W'(e(C(s))) - {k}, k C m- or
k] mf or W'(e(C(s))) -{k, l}. k C m-, l~ mt. If {m-, mt} ent,ers, then
W(e(C(s) U {m-, mt})) -{rn-, mt}. Since Iti is sufFiciently small, the pa.yofF of both,






This chapter deals with the problem of possible coalitional instability, encountered in
chapters 3 and 4. The problem wil be considered from the viewpoint of cooperative game
theory, which explicitly deals with the stability of outcomes of coalitional garnes.
A well-known solution concept in this framework is the core. The core is the set of all
undominated outcomes in the policy space, where an outcome is undominated if there
is no other outcome such that, for the members of some decisive coa-lition of voters this
outcome is at least as good while it is better for some of them (where the decisiveness
of a coalition depends on the choice rule, which det,errnines the outcome for any vector
of voting decisions).
One of the most pervasive problems nagging political theory is the possible emptiness
of the core. 'I'he essential problem was already recognised some two hundred years ago
by Marquis de Condorcet (1785): pairwise voting over policy proposals under majority
rule may generate a cyclic social preference ordering. In other words, there need not
exist a stable majority coalition. Arrow's (1951) impossibility theorern shows that this
result is not due to some particular feature of majority rule; it is impossible to construct
a choice rule with some desirable properties, such as non-dictat.oria.lity, that, yields a
t.ransitive social preference ordering for all possible preference profiles.
Under majority rule, non-emptiness of the core is guaranteed only under very restric-
tive assumptions on preferences. In case of a one-dimensional issue space, preferences
must be single-peaked (Black, 1958) and with more dimensions, the preference distribu-
tion must be symmetric such that a median~ in all directions exists (Plott, 196ï; Davis,
De Groot and Hinich, 1972; Sloss, 1973). Hence~, in many voting games, the core will be
empty.
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Various alternative solution concepts have been proposed. The most well-known are
the stable set (von ~leumann and Morgenstern, 1953), the bargaining set (Aumann and
Maschler, 1964) and the competitive solution (McKelvey. Ordeshook and Winer. 19ï8).
A more recent contribution is the largest consistent set (Chwe, 1992). All of these
concepts are riddled with problems, however: existence problems, too many solutions,
a lack of behavioural justification of the concept. failure to predict which coalitions
will form or they yield implausible predictions. F'urtherrnore, most. concepts assume
that voters are myopic in the sense that they do not anticipate all possible stages in
the process of coalition formatíon. According to Harsanyí (1974), an imputation in
the stable~ set. may be indirectly dominated by another imputation in the stable set.
Tha,t is, although an imputation in the stable set cannot be directly dominated by any
other imputation in the stable set, a deviation from this imputation rnay lead to further
deviations ending up at another irnputat~ion in t,he stable set t.hat is preferred by everyone
involved in t,he deviat.ions. Farsighted voters would anticipate these further deviations,
which throws doubl on the stability of points in t.he stable set. ~I'he same criticism can
be put forward against any concept rela.ted to the stable set, such as t.he bargaining set
and the competitive solut.ion.
Farsighte~dness implies in particular that voters care only for final payoffs. A coalition
of voters may deviate to a strategy t,hat temporarily yields lower utility for its members, if
this induces further deviations that yield higher payoffs. Most authors assume. however,
that a deviation of a, coalition from one strategy to another, will only take place if the
payoffs associated with the latter strategy are higher than those associat,ed with t.he
former. This assumption already got attention in the concluding sect.ion of t~he previous
chapter.
This chapter develops a new solution concept that overcornes all of the mentioned
problems and that, moreover, deals wit,h the nestedness assumption.~ It explicitly consid-
ers deviations of coalition mernbers with outsiders. This new solution concept, coherent
coalitional agree~ments (C,C.A) applies to a wide variety of games, more specifically, to
all strong simple games with non-transferable utility.
Section 5.2 starts with some preliminaries. Thereafter, the rules of the game are ex-
plained and it is shown that, under these rules, the lengt,h of the game is finite. ~ext, the
concept of CCA will be explained and its existence for arbitrary continuous preferences
over any compact policy space~ is shown. Subsequently, CCAs for games with three voters
are characterised. Section 5.3 provides two examples: one with two players and opposed
~ Recall that the nestedness assumption means that only deviations of subcoalitions of coalitions are
consider~~d
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preferences and one with three players and a cyclic social preference ordering. Section
5.4 compares CCA with some oí t,he other solution concepts mentioned. It t.urns out that
CCA does better with respect. to existence and behavioural justificat.ion.~ Furthermore,
it accowits for farsighted pla~~ers. Finally. section 5.5 coucludes.
5.2 Coalition formation under strong simple rules
5.2.1 Preliminaries
Lct I~ -G I. .l. { u, };Et. ao. f. R, e) be a gante in extensiv~~ forni. I-{ 1. ... , rt)
is a set of voters, X C~J2"` is a policy space, ao -(Co, .~o) with Cc C[, .rn E;~ is t.he
initial status quo, u; ~X -~ ~32 is the ut,ility function of voter i, f is a choice rule, R is
a collection of bargaining rules and e-{et. .. , cn} is a vector of individual demands
wit.h respect to utility. We assume that. information about t,he gatne is syrninetric and
cornplete. Furthermore, we assume that ~ I ~) 2, that .K is cotnpact, t.hat ~c, is cont.inuous
(but not necessarily concave) and that aryrrr~arsEXU;(x) is unique.
I3elow, we first elaborate on the choice rulc~, f, and we define sorne of the concept.s
t,ltat. will be used. The bargaining rules, R, and thc, vcctor c will be claborated on in t.he
next subsection.
Let a-(at..... Q„) E r- fI;E~~' be a voting profile, where E' - X is i's set, of
strategies. A choice rule is a function f: ~; ~ rY, i.e., f transfortns any voting profile
into a policy choice. The interpretation is that, if the votes of the indi~-iduals are given
by Q, then the outcome is f(Q). Given f, the coalition C' C 1 is decisive for a E X if its
members can implement ,~ if thev unanimously vote for it. Forrnally,
Definition 5.2.1 (Coalitional desisiveness for a E X)
l,et f Gc n r.hoice rule and let .r E X. C C I is decisive for .r un.der f af F1Q E ~:
diEC: o;-x ~ .Í(o)-.r.
Given f , a coalition C C I is decisive if it is decisive for all .r E:~ :
ZBy 'behavioural justification' we mean the justification of outcomes in terms of a non-cooperative
bargaining process.
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Definition 5.2.2 (Decisive coalition)
Let f bE a choice rvle. C C I is a decisive coalition vmder f if b'a E ~ fl.r E X:
tíiEC: a,-~ ~ fÍa)-.r.
TIIe set of decisive coalrtio~as under f is defil]ed ~~s
D( f)-{C C 1 ~ C~is a decisive coalition under f}.
From this definition it immediately follows that, if some coalition C is decisive under f,
then all larger coalitions that contain C are decisive as well.
Lemma 5.2.3
!f C ís decisive under f an.d C C C', then C' is decisive under f.
Proof:
'1'rivial O
The next lemma confirms a property of choice rules that plays an important role in prov-
ing some of the results. It says that decisi~.e coalitions alw-ays have at least one voter in
COII]IIIOII.
Lemma 5.2.4
(f f is a, ch.oice rule arad C, C' E D(f), t~hen C f1 C' ~(D.
Proof:
Assume C, C' E D( f) and C(1 C' -~. Suppose cr is such that `di E C: a, -.r and
b'i E C' : Q; - y. Then f(Q) - x and f(a) - y. which contra.dicts the assumption that
f is a function. O
The analysis will be confined to strong simple choice rtiles. These choice rules have some
nice properties as will be made clear belotiv. A choice rule f is simple if for any coalition
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C C 1. if G is decisive for at least, one .r E X. then C is decisive for all a. E.~'. A choice
rule is strong if the non-decisiveness of a coalit~ion implies that its complement is decisive.
Definition 5.2.5 (Strong simple choice rule)
A choice ricle f ~~s n si~nple rv~lr- ~f b'C C 1:
~.r E X[C i.ti decisive ,~or :r vnder f] ~ f1:r E X[C is~ deci~siur for a~ u~n.der .(].
A sirrzple ri~le is str~ong tf C' ~ U(,~~) ~ I~ C~ E D( f~.
Hence, a choice rule is simple íf the decisive coalitions under f give a completP description
of f. This propert,y implies that the analysis can be confined to the decisive coalitions
under f. The property of strongness implies tha,t t.here always exists a decisive coalitiou.
A specific simple choice rule that wi11 be used latPr on is the majority rule, m, whic~h
is defined as follows:
Definition 5.2.6 (it~lajority rule: rn)




if. ~ I(z, Q) ~~ -z
T,'p Otli-PT4L12SP.
It is easy to show that. m. is strong simple if the number of voters is odd.
Lemma 5.2.7
~17ajority rule is strong si~nple ~rf n is odd.
Proof:
Trivial. ~
The next definition describes what we will call a coalitional agreement. Given f. a
coalitional agreement, or simply an agreement, is a decisive coalition C' of voters and
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a policy proposal :z which is Pareto efficient with respect. to the coalition. "I'he set of
Pareto efficient proposals for coalition C` is Fqual to:
PE(C) -{~ E X ~ ~~,y E .l [~di E C: u,(~) j u;(.r) iSc ~i E C~' : v.,(,y) ~ ii,(x) ]}.
Definition 5.2.8 (Coalit.ional agreement)
Given a game I' wi~th~ choice rztle f, a. coalition.nl a~yreerrzenl i~s a pair (C. .z ) s2tch that
C' E D( f) and r E PE(C').
Two further not,ions that will be used are the concepts of 'pivot' and of 'minimal decisive
coalition,' evhich are defined below.
Definition 5.2.9 (Pivot)
1 el C, C' C 1 be tmo coaltitio~zs. A t~oter i E 1 is ca~lled a pivot u~~ith respect to C a~n.d C'
ifiECf1C'.
Definition 5.2.10 ( Minimaf decisive coalition)
A coalita~on C is minimal decisivE if C E D( f) a~nd for all C' C G" : C' ~ U(f).
The set of minimal decisive coalitions will be denoted by D'(,f ).
5.2.2 The rules of the game
Given the initial status quo, ao -(Co, ro), voters try to organise a decisive coalition
in support of a cert,a.in policy proposal. Assume that voters can freely communicat.e in
order to form proposals. ~~Ioreover. assume t,hat comrnunication is public, in the sense
that all proposals niade are common knowledge. This section is devoted to the rules, R,
under which bargaining over proposals takes place.
(1) At time t- 0, the initial status quo ao - ( Go, .xo) is announced, where ~o E
PE(Co) and Co E D( f).
(2) At time t, t- 1, 2, ..., every i E I is allowed to put forward one agreement
ati -(G~, xi), where i E C~, .ri E PE(C~ ) and C~ E D( f).
5.2 Coalition formation under strong simple rules 103
(3j If no agreernents are put forward, then the current status quo is implemented and
the game ends, otherwise, the process continues with step (-1).
(4) From the agreements that have been proposed in (2), one a~ is chosen randomly
and all ~oters involved in the coalition (`;, associated with this agreement,, si~nul-
taneously decide whet,her the~ want tu ~iipport the agrc~ement.
If at least one j E C~ ok~jects to a;, then ihe current, sta.tun quo is implc~ment~~d
and the garne ends, otherwise, the process continues wit.h step ((i).
(6) If no j E C~ objects to a~, tben a~ - a', is the new status quo aud the proce~ss
continues by repeating steps ( 2j-(6j.
The problem for voters is to find out which agreements are stable and which of the
stable agreements is the best one to support. 5ince t:he only restriction put on utility
functions is continuity and uniqueness of a voter's bliss poiut, the bargaining process may
re~sult in cycling when utility functions arc not singlc-peaked or when tlie policy space
is multidimensional. In our terminology. therc may be an infiuite subsequence of st.at.us
quos. To obt.ain a definite outcorne in this case, somc additional assurnptions have~ been
proposed, such as a preference for early compromises (tirne-preference) or that voters
face a penalty for cycling. These solutions are rather ad hoc, however, and it would
make the outcome of the game dependent on t,he a~ssumpt,ions made.
There is a more natural way out of cycling. which is covered by the following con-
straint of consistent offers. Let- e-(Ei, ..., en) be a commonly known vector of demands
with respect to utility such t,hat for all z~ E 1: F~ ~ 0 is (very) srnall.
Constraint ( Consist,ent, offers; CC'O)
Let a, - ( C~, xi) a~nd at~i -(Citi, .x~ti), .r~ ~~rti be the statv.s qaos at t~ime t alid
time t f 1, respectively. At~ time t~ -}- k, k ~ I; a~n agreerrtent (C~~k, rrr~k) with C~~k - C~
can only be pvt forward if for all pi~iots í E C~ (1 Ci~~ :
~i(~t~-kj ! 2l{~:r~j ~ Ei.
According to CCO, all voters in Ct who break the status quo o~ by supporting ai}t, can
only join the same coalition C~ at a la,ter stage, t f k, if attk offers them a strictly higher
utility than ai.
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The interpretat~ion of CCO is that by leaving a coalition C,, associated with az, a
voter i E G~ f1 C~~i shows her dissatisfaction with the utility C~ offers to her: shP could
have objected to the agreement a~~~ proposed right after az, which would have resiilted
in t.he implementation of a~, but, she supported ar~i, which led to the new status qtto
ar~~. The ot,her members of the coalition will take t,his as a. signal that t,he voter in
question wi11 o~ly join the same coalition at a lat,er stage if she is offere~d a st:rictly better
proposal.
CCO shows a lot of similarit,ies with the so-called rule of attributed demands (Albers,
l 994 ):
"During a bargainin~g process, by shifting from one coalition with pa~o,fj~.~ lo an.nther
with payoff y).r a player indicates that he r~s not conGent with his old payoff and
wan~ts to get m.ore. The others u~ill concla~de from his a.ction, th,2t h,e will not 6e
coretent wi.th the anzovnt ~ also i~ other coalitz~ons. They will there,Fore not en-ter
a coalition with him ~nless he receii;es more than r. Le., the others aitribvte rz
demand greater thon a to lh~is~ pla~yer."
The differences with CCO are twofold. First, contrary to t.hc rule of attributed demands,
leaving a coalition does not imply that a voter demands a higher utility in all of the sub-
sequent coalitions that she joins. So, the signal is coalit.ion specific; it has no implication
for the utílity demanded in ot.her coalitions. `I'his assumption takes better account. of
the power differences voters face in different groups. Clearly, if a voter is pivotal or if
her preferences for a certain proposal do not differ much from most of the otliers in the
coalition, then she has more power t,han she would in coalitions for which she is not
pivotal or in w~hich her preferences are opposed to those of the others. Furthermore,
farsighted vot.ers may temporarily accept a lower utility if this would lead to a higher
payoff at the end of t~he bargaining process. These arguments also sustain the second
difference with the rule of attributed demands: it~ is assumed t,hat leaving a coalition
alwdys signals that a voter is not satisfied with her ut,ility in this coa,lition, even if she
settles for a lower utilit,y in the subsequent coalition.
By means of experiments, Albers (1994) shows that, in games with transferable utility,
voters indeed behave as stated by the rule of attributed demands. Moreo~~er, it turned
out that experienced voters stop the bargaining process rather soo~er t,han later. It will
be shown that the game with non-transferable utility has a solution, even under our
farsighted and weaker version of this rule.
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Before presenting the solution concept. it will be shown that the bargaining process is
finite and a definition of the endpoint~ of a game will be given.
Lemma 5.2.11
Giver~ the r2~les of tlae ga.rne a~nd the constraint of consistent offers, th,e length of the game
is finite.
Proof:
Suppose the opposite. Then there must be an infinitE~ subsequence of status quos
a,o, a~, a2,.... Since the number of decisive coalitions is finite, at least one decisive
coalition, say C, must be established as a status quo coalition an infinite number of
times. This implies that C is broken up an infinite number of times and, by lemma
5.2.4, each time at least one voter in C, is a member of t.he next coalition. Let S C C
be the subset of voters who at one t,ime or another leave C. Since C is broken up an
infinite number of times, we have to draw an infinite number of t,irnes from S t,o select, a
voter who leaves C. Since S is finite, at least one voter in .S, say i, is selected an infinite
number of times. Applying CCO this implies that the sequence {u;(x~)}~ goes to infinity.
This contradicts the assumptions that u; is cont.inuous and that X is compact. ~
Definition 5.2.12 (Endpoint of a game)
Let h(a~) be a yam.e, ~i~here ao -(Co, xo) is the initial status quo. (C, .r) is an ea.dpoi.nt
of T (ao) ~f
~i) there is a path in I'(a~) that leads to (C, ~), and
(ii~ CCO does not enable any player to put forward an alternative agreeraent after
(~, ~).
5.2.3 Coherent coalitional agreements: definition and exis-
tence
A coherent coalitional agreement is defined as follows.
106 Coherent Coalitional Agreements
Definition 5.2.13 (Coherent coalitional agreement. hencefort:h CCA)
Let a-(C. ~) 6e a statiis qvn ~in a yanxe I' aad let a' -(C'. s') be an alternative
status quo. Get E(a') be the sef of all eiadr~oints of the bargaining Tn~ocess n(ter a~'. The
agreeinent a-(C. .r) is coherent if
da' H(Cvn, T.") E IJ'(a') ~Z E C' : 7li(~) ?~ui(xnl.
So. a status quo a is coherent if for an}~ possible suhsequent st,atus quo a' -(C.". ~')
there exists a vot,er i E C' whose final pa,~,.off. resulting from a move from a to a'. is not
any higher than that associated with the original agreement, a~. The idea is tha.t voters
will object t,o any agreernent that does not make them strictly bett,er off in the end.
The next lemma holds triviall~-.
Lemma 5.2.14
An endpoint of a path in a garrcc T'(a~~) zs coherent.
Proof:
Trivial. 0
From this lemma it immediatel~. follows t,hat CCAs exists for any profile of arbitrary
continuous utility functions, for policy spa.ces of any dimension and for any strong sim-
ple choice rule.
Proposition 5.2.15 (Existence)
There always e.rists a CCA.
Proof:
Trivial. ~
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5.2.4 Characterisation of CCAs in a game with three voters
'I'here is not ~~et a constructive proof of existence. Proposition 5.2.15 shows only that
CCAs exist. but it gives no clou to find them. This subsection charact.erises CCAs for a
game wit.h thrc~e voters and majorit}~ rule. L'nfortuna.tely. characterisation for n-person
games and for arbitrary strong simpl~~ rules is not. straight,forward. The first four result,s.
however. hold for an arbitrary number of voters and for all strong sirnple choice rules.
The next lenuna states that the Pareto set of a coalition contains the bliss points of all
of its mernbers.
Lemma 5.2.16
For all i~ E C: .r, - nrgma.,r,Eh-iy(.r) E PE(C).
Proof:
5uppose there is a i. E C and r, ~!'F(C). Then, hy ihe definition of PF(C), at least
one j E C must st,rictly improve by tnoving from a; t,o some .r ~;z~; E I'F,(C) while all
other voters in C, must be at least as well off. Contradíction: i is strictl~ worse off since
.r, is unique. 0
Next, it will be shown that if a proposal .r is an elernent of the core, t.hen the grand
coalition I with proposal a is a CCA. The core of t.he game I'. C(I'), is defined as
C(I') -{.r E X ~,~,y E X3C E D(f) [di E C: u;(y) ? u;(~) kz ~i E C: u;(y) ~ u;(x) ]}.
First, a lemma will be shown, which states that t.he core can be ident.ified with the in-




First, it will be shown that C(I') C f1~EO.t~~PE(C). Suppose ~ E C(I') and ~ ~ PE(C)
for some C E D'(f). The last assurnption implies that ~y E X such that for all
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i E C: u;(y) ) u;(a) and ~i E C: u;(y) ~ u;(a). But then. .x ~ C(I'): a contra-
diction. ~ext we pro~.e that C(I') ~ f1~EV.~~~PF,(C). Suppose .r E ncEn.~~JPF-(C)
and x~ C(1,). The last assumption implies that ~C E D( f) such that, .z ~ PE(C').
Hence, by lemma 5.2.3. ~C C C' and C E I)'(,~) such that x~ PF(C). Conseyuently,
r~ f1~Ep.~~iPE(C), which establishes a contradiction. ~
Proposition 5.2.18
If r E C(I'). thFn (I, .r~) i: a C(.',-~.
Proof:
Suppose .r E C.(T) and ( 1. ~~) is not a CCA. "I'hc last assumption irnplie~s tha1- (a) x~
PE(I) or (6) ~a' -(C', s') and ~(C", .x") E E(a~') such that tíi E C' : u;(.r) C u;(.z~").
From the definition of C(I'), (b) implies that .r ~ C(I'): a contradiction. I{ence. suppose
(a). Then ~y E .~[ di E 1 : u;(y) 1 u;(.r) ~~Z ~i E I : u;(y) 1 u;(,r)]. Rut then.
~C E D`( f) :.r, ~ PE(C) so that by lemma ~.2.1 ï. .r ~ C(1'): contradiction. O
The following lemma claims that if the core of a game is ernpty there must be at least
two different CCAs in the game.
Lemma 5.2.19
If C(I') -~. thera thrrr are at lPast tu~o di.fferent CC.As, (G, 5) n~nd (C. .r'), ~cilh .r ~.r'.
Proof:
Suppose C(T) - ~ and suppose t,here is oul~~ one point. in the policy space, sa~- y,
associated with a CCr1. 5ince y~ C(I') we rnust. have that ~z E X~C E D(f)[ fli E
C: u;(z) 1 u;(y) 8c ~i E C: u;(z) ~ u;(,y)] (~). Since y is the onl~~ point in the policy
space associated with a CCA, we have that all (C, z) with z~ y are not coherent. Hence,
b'(C, z) ~(C', z') ~(C", z") E E((C', z'))[ F1i E C' : u;(z") 1 u;(z)]. Since the game
can only end with y, we must have z" -,y. Hence, di E C' : u;(y) 1 u;(z). Ry lemma
5.2.4, ~i E C n C' and consequently, d(C, z) ~i E C: u;(y) ) u.;(z): cont~radiction with
(~). o
We now turn to the situation of ~roting under majority rule with three vot.ers only. Recall
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that majority rule was denoted by ~m and t.hat with an odd number of vot.ers, majority
rule is strong símple. Hence, to analyse the game we rnay confine ourselves to the decisive
coalitions under rn.
According to the next proposition. with three voters, either the pivot.s of two coalí-
tions associated with a CCA or at lcast. one of the non-pivot.al voters must be indifferent
between the proposals of these coalitions. The proof of this proposition proceeds as
follows. If norte of the voters is indifferent between two proposals :r and x' associated
with coherent coalitions, then there rnust be two voters, say i and j, with a strict pref-
erence for one of t.he proposals, say for a. Hence, ({i, j}, .z) must not be a CCr1, since
else, there is no CCA with ~'. So, by definition 5.2.13, (a) ;r ~ fF({i, j}) or (b) the
bargaining process aftcr ({i. j}, a~) ends up with a proposal, say y, that some majority
coalition of voters, say C, strictly prefers to x. Suppose (a). "Then there is a proposal
y E PE({i, j}) which both i and j strict.ly prefer t.o r. Again, this proposal must not be
coherent, since else, r cannot be associated with a CCA, and so on. Suppose (b). Then
(C, y) must not be a CCA and so on. Hence, time and again we must be able to find
proposals such that sorne majority coalition of voters improves. Since the set of players
is finite, CCO implies that this is impossible.
Proposition 5.2.20
Let I ! ~- 3, f- rra and let a-(C, z~) and a' -(C', ~') be CCAs, uwhere C~ C' and
z~ ~ a~'. Then for all pivots i E C(1 C' : u;(:r) - u;(.r') or dj ~ C fl C' : u~(x) - u~(~').
Proof:
5ee Appendix. ~
"The following proposition states that if a decisive coalition has a CCA then íts proposal
is unique up to the possibility where all members of the coalition are indifferent between
this proposal and some other proposal or where the voter outside the coalition is indif-
ferent. (Note that if the grand coalition has a C'CA, then there are no voters outside the
coalition).
Proposition 5.2.21
l,et ~ l ~- 3, let f- na a~nd let a-(C. ~) and a' -(C, .~'), ~~~x' 6e CCAs. Then
~d2 E C: u;(~) - u,(a') or ~k E 1~ C` : v,k(.~) - uk(a').
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Proof:
This proposition can be shown in a similar wa~~ as proposition ~.220. ~
According to the following lemma, if the grand coalition 1 has a CCA for some proposal,
then all other decisivP coalitions with the same proposal have a CCA as well.
Lemma 5.2.22
Let ~ l ~- 3. If (I, x) is a CCA. then. for n~ll C E D(.j~) :(C, x) is a CCA.
Proof:
Suppose (1, x) is a CCA, i.e., b'a' - (C', x') tl(C", x") E E(a') ~i~ E C' : u,(x) 1
u;(x") (~). Suppose ~C E D(f) and (C, x) is not a CCA. Then (a) x~ PE(C) or (b)
da' -(C', x') ~(C", x") E E(a')( t1i E C' : u,(x) C u~(:r")]. Obviously, (b) contradicts
(~). Hence, suppose ( a) and, without, loss of generality, assume C- {1, 2}. Then
dx' E PF,({1, 2}) such that u~(:r') 1 u~(:r,), uz(x.') ~ u2(x) and u3(x) 1 u3(:r'), where
the last inequality is due to the fact that x E PF,(I). Hence, ( {1, 2}, x') must, not, be
a CCA, because else, ( I, x) is not a CC~1. 5ince the inequalities are sirnilar to those in
(A1) in the proof of proposit,ion 5.2.20, by a similar argument it. can be shown ihat t.he
assurnption that ( {1, 2}.. x') is not a CCA leads to a contradictiou. ~
Next, it will be shown that, in lhe case of t,hree voters, the grand coalition has a CCA
if and only if the proposal associat,ed with t.his CCA is an element of the core.
Proposition 5.2.23
Get ~ 1 ~- 3. (I, x) is a CC~ ifjx E C([').
Proof:
Necessity: Assume (I, x) is a CCA. Then, by lernma 5.2.22, (C, x) is a C('A for all
C E D'(f). Hence, for all C E D'( f): .x E P1;(C). By lemma 5.2.1 i this implies t,hat
x E C(I').
Sufficiency: See proposition 5.2.18. ~
The final proposition states t.hat at ]east. one of t.he CC.1s in the game offers some voters'
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bliss point or the core exists and all voters are indifferent between all proposals of all
CC.~s.
Proposition 5.2.24
Let ~ 1 ~- 3 alad f- m. There exists a CC.9 a-(C, x) a.nd n voter i E C svch that
x; - argrnaayEXU~(y) or C(I') ~ Q1 and Hi E I d.~, ~' E X, ij s a~nd x' are associated
with a CCA, then u;(x) - u;(:r').
Proof:
See Appendix.
Note that this last proposition does not imply that there is a dictator in t,he game. It
only predicts t,he bliss point of at least one of the voters as a possible outcome. Frorn
the proof of the proposition it. is clear that such a bliss point will only be chosen with
certainty if it figures as a proposal in the agreement of a coherent grand coalition. This
result bears similarities with the median voter theorem, which holds that the bliss point
of the median voter is sustained by a coherent grand coalition.
By now, the eharacterisation of CCAs is sufficient t.o find all the CCAs in a majority
rule game with three voters. We only have to check which voter's bliss point. would
be sustainable as a CCA. The remaining CCAs can be ea,sily derived from this, since
we know that at least. one of the voters must be indifferent, between two CCAs. We
demonstrate this search procedure in t,he next section.
5.3 Examples
Example 1: Two players with opposed preferences
Suppose there is one buyer, b, one seller. s and one good. Suppose the buyer is willing to
pay at most one unit for the good so that the price of the good p E[0, I]. Let the initial
status quo be one of 'no trade,' in which case ub - us - 0. This situation is depict.ed in
figure 5.3.1.
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0 P
Figure 5.3.1: Two players with opposed preferences.
1
The question is, for which price the good is sold, if it ís sold at all.
Application of CCA suggests the following answer: the price depends on whether
the agreement proposed by the buyer or the seller is the one selected in step (4) of the
bargaining process. First of all, all agreements are coherent, except for the agreement on
the status quo of no trade. To see this, note that all p E[0, 1] are in the core. Hence, by
proposition 5.2.18, all agreements ({b, s}, p) are coherent,. The status quo of no trade
is not coherent, since this proposal is not in PE({b, s}). Note also that all coherent
agreements are endpoints: as soon as a coherent agreement is advanced, the game will
stop, since further play would imply that one of the players is strictly worse off. The
number of CCAs can be reduced by requiring that the endpoints are subgame perfect.
Then, at time t- 1, the seller will propose ({b, s}, 1- c) and t.he buyer proposes
({b, s}, 0 ~ e) (if the seller would propose a price of 1, then the buyer objects since this
price is not any better for her than the initial status quo of no trade). By bargaining
rule (4), the price is either 0~ e or 1- e.
Clearly, if the initial status quo would be different, say ~ E(0, 1), then again, neither
the buyer nor the seller would be able to get a more favourable price than p, since every
price proposed after p would be objected to by the other player. Hence, the game would
end at time t- 0. We could interpret the initial status quo in this case as the prevailing
market price of the good. Then, bilateral negot.iations over the price will not result in a
different price, since the buyer can buy the good from someone else at the market price if
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the seller asks a higher price than p and similarly, the seller can sell the good to someone
else if the buyer proposes a lower price than p.
Example 2: Three voters and a cyclic social preference ordering
Let 1-{1, 2, 3} and -assume that
u~ (~) - 5x - 9S(~ - 6) ~ 5b(.r - 10),
uz(x) - 2a - 4b(.~ - 12),
us(~) - ,r.
where




These utility functions are depicted in figure 5.3.2.
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PE({1,3}): ~l
PE({2,3}): r
Figure ~.32: Three voters and a cyclic social preference ordering.
Let the majority rule be the choice rule. First, it will be shown that the social preference
ordering is cyclic. Recall from lemma 5.2.17 that C(I') - f1~EO.~ f~PE(C). In the
example, PE({1,2}) -[6, 83]U[12, 153], PE({1. 3}) -[6, 62]U{24} and PE({2, 3}) -
[12, 24]. Hence C(1') -~, w-hich implies that the social preference ordering is cyclic.
Be1ow; it will be demonstrat.ed, however, that there a,re two CCAs in t.he game:
({1, 2}, 6z) and ({1, 3}, 24). From the non-existence of the core, by proposition 5.2.23
it follows t,hat the grand coalition, 1-{1; 2, 3} has no coherent agreement and, by
lemma 5.2.19, there must be at least two different CCAs. By proposition ~.2.24, at.
least one voter must reach her bliss point in one of the CCAs. First consider the bliss
point of voter 1 at x- 6. Suppose r- 6 is associated with a CCA. There must be
at least two different CCAs, and for every other CCA at least one voter, say i, must
have u;(6) - u;(x). From figure 5.3.2 it is clear t,hat only ({2, 3}.18) satisfies this.
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Hence, thcre are only CCAs at 6 or at. 18 and all games end up with either onc of
these proposals. "I'ake ( {1, 3}, 6z). It will be shown that this is a CCA. Suppose not,
then there nmst exist an a' -(C', a') such that for all i E C' : u,(6) ~ u;(62) or
u;(6) 1 u;(6z. From figure 5.3.2 it follows that u2(6z) ~ u2(6) and u2(6z) 1~a2(18) and
hence, 2~ C'. Similar inequalities hold for both, voters 1 and :3. IIence, ( {1, 3}, 62) is
a CCA, which contradict,s the fact t.hat there are only CCAs at 6 and 18. "I'his implies
that there cannot. be a CCA associated wit.h voter 1's bliss point.
Next. consider voter 2's bliss point at .r - 12. Recall that there must be at least two
CCAs and that there must be at least one vot,er indifferent bet,ween every pair of CCAs.
Now, voter 2 cannot, be made indifferent., voter 3 is never indi(ferent, and from figure
5.3.2 we sec that the proposal for ~~hich voter 1 can be made indifferent lies in none of
the Parcto set.s. Hence. if voter 2's bliss point is a('(',A, then it is the only one, which
implies that all garnes must, end at ~- 12. "I'ake ({ I, 3}, 29) a.nd suppose t,his is not a
CCA. Then there must exist. an a~' -(C', :c') such that for all ? E C" : ~i~,(ll) ~ v.,(24).
For bot,h, voters 1 and '3, this inequality canuot be satisfied and hence, ( {I, 3}, 24) rnust
be a CCA: contradict.ion. So, neither 1's bliss point., nor 2's bliss point is associated with
a CCA. Elence, by propositions 52.I5 and 5.2.14, there rnust be a CCA at voter 3's bliss
point. Since there must be at. least two CC~1s, by proposition ,5.2.20, there also must be
a CC.A at fi2.
5.4 CCA and other solution concepts: a compari-
son
This section compares the concept of CCA with the stable set, the bargaining set and the
competitive solution. This cotnparison is made by means of example 2 given in section
5.3. Recall that we applied the majorily rule in this exarnple. I`irsL the core will be
discussed.
It has already been shown that in exa.mple 2, the core is empt,y, while the set, of CCAs
is not empty. Hence, with respect to existence, CCA performs better than the core.
Secondlv, the stable set ~~~ill be studíed.
Definition 5.4.1 (Stable set)
~c E X dorninates y E X if there exists a coalitioa C E D( f) such. that u;(a) ~ u~(y) for
alliEC.
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A.aab1F .SFt V of a gamF rs any set L~ C-k~ satrsfying
(i~ internal stability: iJ a E V an~d y E V, then x does not dominale y and ,y does nof
dominatc x.
(ii~ external stability: for all y E X~ V, there exists at least one .~ E V sucla that .~
do~tirtiates y.
(Ordeshook, 1987, pp.390)
Clearly, the stable set, is not explicit about which coalitions will íorrn and the concept
does not explain the underlying behaviour of t.he players in terms of a bargaining process.
Furthermore, t,he stable set may be empty or, on t,he contrary. it might generate too many
outcomes.
These problerns have lead to the definition of main-simple stable sets. This definition is
interesting for political theory, because it applies to voting garnes under strong simple
choice rules and it. associates outcomes with coalitions. Hence. we will use this definition
and compare it to the concept of CC:~.
Definition 5.4.2 (J:Iain-simple stable set, henceforth ~15S)
.A sta~ble set V is main-simple iff for each minimal decisive coalition C, there e~ists
x E V, svch that for all y E V, y~:c : v,(x) ) u;(y) for all i E C.
(Ordeshook, 198i, pp.397)
an
Consider the proposals ,x - 62 and y - 24, for which the game in example 2 has a
CCA. Now, for the voters in the minimal decisive coalition {2, 3} : u2(62) ~ uz(24)
and u3(62) ~ n3(24). Hence, {6i, 24} is not a MSS.
Next, all MSS's in the example will be derived. Let x, y and z be the proposals of;
respectively. the minimal decisive coalitions {1, 2}, {L 3} and {2, 3}. The ~ISS's in
t,he example are all {.~, y, z} such that ~ E[6, 6z], y- 5 and a- 12 f(12 -~). To see
this, note that the~ definition of the VISS implies
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ul(x) ~ ul(y)~ utlT) ! ut(z), v.2lx) ! u2(y), u2(T) i u2(`'),
ui(y) ? ui(x), ui(y) ~ ut(z), u3(yl ] u3(~T), 21s(y) ? u.s(t),
2ll(~) i il2(T), iL2(y) i 7I2~y~, iLl~4) ~ u3(T), u3(`~ ! a3~.y~.
In turn, this implies,
(1) u-i~x) - ui(y) ~ ui(z),
(2) ?iz(x) - uz(ti) ~ uz~y),
(3) ~3(y) - u3(-~) ~ u3(T)-
Take any y E PE({1, 3}). First assume y- 24. `1'hen by (1) and (2), x - 62 and
hence by (2) a- 17z. But then, by (3): y- 17~, which contradicts the supposition that
y- 24. So, 24 is not an element of any MSS.
Next, assiime y E [6, 6z]. Then by (1) and (2), x- y E[6, 62], since voter I is
worse off with all proposals r E PE({1, 2}) such that x E (6z, 8~] U[12, 1.~3]. By (2)
and (3), z - 12 ~- (12 - r).
To conclude, unlike the set of CCAs, t,he main-stable set in example 2 is not unique
and it, excludes the very plausible agreement ({l, 3}, 24). NToreover, in games with
non-transferable utility, there may also be problems with the existence of t6e MSS.
Next, we discuss some version of the bargaining set (see Ordeshook, 1987). Again, we
restrict t,he definition of the bargaining set to strong sitnple games.
Definition 5.4.3 (Proposal, objectiotis and counter-objections)
A proposal is a pair (.r, S), where T E PE(S) and S is a decisive coalition.
Let i, j E S and let S' 6e another decisive coalition.
An objection of i against j with respect to C-(x, S) is an alternati,ve C' -(x', S'),
such that x' E PE(S') and
izi ES'andj~S',
~ZZ~ uk(x') J uk(x) for all k E S',
(iii~ u,(x') 1 u;(.r).
A counter-objection by j against i is a C" -(x". S") such that
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(i) jES"andr~S",
(Z~~ ,~k~.~rr~ ~ 21k~.T'~ f01' (ll~ {ï E S' Íi S",
(ZZZ~ ZLk~2r'1 i llk~~~ fOT (I~Í i'
E~"'
(Ordeshlook, 198ï, pp.399-400)
Definition 5.4.4 (Bargaining set)
The barga,ining set of n~ stron..q sin~.ple game is the set of all proposals (.r. S), such~ that
for ei,'ery o6jectíon of any uoter i E S agai~ntit a~aotá.er voter j E,S, there is a covnter-
objectiott of j agai~ist i.
(Ordeshook. 198ï. pp.400)
So, the ba,rgaining set gives a beha,vioura] justificat.ion for outcomes. Of course, the givén
formulatiort of the bargaining set can be genera,lised by assuming that sets of voters can
object to other sets of voters and by reyuiring that counter-objections must, be credible,
i.e., they must be a,n elen~ent. of the bargaining set. This version of the bargaining set
is due to Wilson (1971). ln short,, the most important problems with bargaining set,s
are that they need not exist, they make no coa,lition predictions (except for thP strong
ba,rgaining set) and that sometimes, they y'ield i~7iplausible predictions.
Next we compare t,he bargaining set with the set of CCAs in example 2. Suppose vot,er
1 objects to C-(24, {1, 3}) wit.h C' - (6z - E, {1, 2}). Then u~(6z - c) 1~u~(24)
and uz(62 - e) ~ wz(24). Voter 3 has no counter-objection against C', namely, suppose
3 counter-objects with C" -(172, {2, 3}), t.hen uz(1 ïi) ]~i.2(6z - c) and 2z2(17z) ]
u2(24), but u3(17z) G u3(24). Hence, C-(24; {1, 3}) is not in the bargaining set,
while the example in the foregoing section shows that C is a plausíble outcoine.
Fi~ally, the competitive solution will be analysed. The basic principle of the competit,ive
solut.ion is that coalitions have to compet.e with other coalitions and therefore, they have
to make a sufficient offer t.o their pivotal members to prevent, them from joining another
coalition. Again, we confine the analysis to strong simple games.
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Definition 5.4.5 (Viability of a proposal)
1 et (' -(a~. ti) and C.' - (x', S') be proposals, where r is a~ polic~ proPosal and S is a
coa.lition. C is via~blE o,gain.st C'. zf ,~or nt least onr o.( the pi~rots i E C fl C' : u;(a) )
u,(.r'). C' ~i s strictly z~i~able against G', if for all pi~t~ots i E C f1 C' : ii.,(:r) ) v,(~').
(Ordeshook, 19L~ï. pp.~119)
Definition 5.4.6 ((~ompetitive soliition) Let C be a sei qf prn~osals. C is a competitir~e
solution if the ~ollowi~ag co~raditio~as o,re satisfied:
(i) l~n~ternal st~a.bzlity: No propo.~al ia C ~~s .~trictly v~r~ablr o~ya.i~a.~t ~any nther proposal in
C.
(iij External staliilít,y: !f nn~ propn.tial C F~ C i.v .~t~-ictly r~ia,blr ~iyni~rz.ti~1 rz pro~osal i~1 C,
then thF~re is sorn.c olher proJio.ti~al ~n C th,at i.~ strirf.ly ~~inólr reyuirr~,tit x.
(iii) No coalition is associated ~mith rraorr than on.e proposal in C.
(Ordeshook, 1987, pp.420) ~
A favourable feature of the competiti~~e solution, co~7lpared to the stable set and the
bargaining set, is that the competitive solution is explicit in predictions about coalitíons.
However. Laing and Olmst~ead (197~) show t,hat~ t,he ~ompet,it~ive solut,ion need not exist.
Consider the~ CCAs ({1, 2}. 62) and ({1, 3}, 24) in example 2. The pivot in this
case is voter 1 and u~(6z) - ui(24). Hence, the set. of CCAs is int,ernally stable. IL
is, however, not externally stable: ({1, 2}, r) such that a E[6, 62) is strictl,y viable
against ({1, 3}, 24) while ({1, 2}, 62) is not strictly viable against ({1, 2}, a).
Note that if ({1, 3}, 24) is in a competitive solution, then the coalition {2, 3} has
no proposal in the competitive solution, sincE ({1, 3}, 24) is strictly viable against all
({2, 3}, ~) such that x E PE({2, 3}) -[12, 24] and all possible proposals ({1, 2}, y)
such that y E [6, 62) E PE({1, 2} are strictly viable against ({2, 3}, 24) while
({1, 3}, 24) is not strictly viable~ against ({1, 2}, y).
Finally, it will be shown that in this example, the competitive solution does not exist.
We have that ({1, 2}, .~) such that x E[6, 62) is strictly viable against ({l, 3}, 24)
and the last is st,rictly viable against ({2, 3}, z) for all z E[12, 24). Furthermore, for
120 Coherent Coalitional Agreements
all z E[12, 18). ({2, 3}, z) is strictl,y viable against all ({1, 2}, r) s.i,. ~ E [fi,fiz],
and ({1, 3}, 24) is strictly viable against all ({I. 2}. .r) such that .r E(6z] U[]2. 1S.'-i].
Hence, everything is strictly viable against something else.
5.5 Conclusions
The concept of CCA seems to have attractive propert.ies. It is behaviourally .justifiable,
it accounts for farsighted players, and the number of CCAs in a garne is limited to
one per minimal decisive coalition, unless t,he players in t,his coalition are indifferent,.
Moreover, the se~t of CCAs always exists and with two or three voters. CCAs are easy to
identify. Clearly, the derivation of addit,ional properties of CCAs, would simplify further
the search process for CCAs in a game. In particular, it would be useful t,o have a better
ide~a of which of the voters is the one at her bliss point in some of the CCAs. The analysis
of example 2 shows that the other CC,As easily follow after this bliss point is known.
Wit,h respect to the bargaining process modelled in this chapter, three possible al-
ternatives came up. First, the random choice in rule (4) can be replaced by assuming
a network structure with respect to the relations between voters and assuming that the
coalition formed first (in the sense that all members agree t,o support, it,s policy proposal)
is the new status quo. This. however, may cause the following problem. A decisive coali-
tion of voters may prefer to change the current status quo, but it may be internally
divided with respect t,o alternatives. This happens when the pivots of two coalitions
prefer both of the policy proposals of these coalitions to that of the current, status quo,
but some of the pivots prefer the one proposal and others prefer the other. We can also
change rule (5), which assumes that the current, status quo get,s implemented if someone
involved in an agreement objects to it. We may assume alternatively that if someone
objects to the agreement put, forward, othe~rs have the opportunity to put. forward an
alternative proposal. Furtherrnore, under the assumption that agreements are advanced
in public, a plausible assumption would be that the act of putting forward an agreement
(bargaining rule (2)) already signals that a voter wants to have a better proposal than
that of the current status quo coalition.
The definition of CCA can be improved by requiring that endpoints mnst be subgame
perfect. This would add more strategic considerations to the game. Then it can possibly
be shown that the length of the game is short and that, presumably. it, will not last longer
than one round. Vot.ers will have preferences over all possible endpoints and hence, it
seems to make sense to put forward one's best endpoint immediately after the first status
quo.
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It would afso be interesting to apply CCA to games with transferable utility and
to study the relationship between CCA and other solution concepts rnore intensively.
Furthermore, the game can be studied under asymmetric information. The paper of
Chakravorti and Kahn (1993) would be a good starting point for this research, since
they assume that informat,ion on (what we called) the new stat.us quo, only is available
to the players involved. The others do not know whether a new status quo is established
and the,y rely on signals from the informed players. Finally, experiments can be drawn
on CCA, to see whether the outcornes predicted would be sustained by actual play.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 5.2.20:
Suppose a-(C, ~) and a' -(C', ~'), C~ C', x~:x' are CCAs and suppose ~i E
C f1 C' : u;(.r) ~ u;(:x') and flj ~ C fl C' : u~(.r~ ~ u~(a').
First, assume ~ C ~, ~ C' ~- 2. Without loss of generality, assume C-{1, 2},
C' -{1, 3} and u~(~) ) u~(x'). Then u3(x) C u3(.x'), since else, :r' ~ PE({1, 3}). There
are two possibilities: (1) uz(~) ) v.z(.r') or (2) u2(~) C i~z(;r'). (Not:e that uz(5) - uz(.~')
is not possible by an assumption made earlier). Suppose (1). Then ({1, 3}, ~') is not a
CCA, because after ({1, 3}, .~'), voters 1 and 2 can move to ~ and thereafter, the game
ends. Hence, we must have (2), so that
ui~~) ~ ~i~x~),
u2(x') 1 u2(x), (A1)
us(.~~) ~ u3(.r).
Now, ({2, 3}, x') must not be, a CCA, since else, ({L 2}, x) would not be a CCA. This
implies that (a) x' ~ PE({2, 3}) or (b) ~(V, y) ~(T, z) E E((V, y))[ F1i E V: u~(z) )
u;(x')]. Suppose (a). Then ~y E PE({2, 3}) such that
~z~y) ) uz(x~), (A2)
u3~y) ) u3(~').
From (A1) and (A2) it follows that ({2, 3}, y) must not be a CCA, since else, ({ l, 2}, x)
is not a CCA. Gonsequently, ~(V, y') ~(T, z~ E E((V, y'~)[ t1i E V: u;(z) ] u;(y)].
Observe that y E PE({2, 3}) implies that V~{2, 3} and V~{1, 2, 3}.
Suppose V - {1, 2},then,
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Ui~~) ) ui~1l),
~~z(~) ~ uz(y). ~.131
U3l') C usÍ?1),
where the last inequality is due to the fact that y E PE({2, 3}). Frorn (A1), (A2) and
(A3) it follows that
uz~~) ~ uz~~) ~ vz~~T),
u3~y~ 1~3~~~, u3~y~ i 2L.3~~~, ~A4~
11-~~1;~ i 217~Z~ ~ 711~7~~,
where the last inequality holds since iiz(z) 1 u2(x) and s E PF({1, 2}) imply ~~(z) G
ui(.~). Hence, we must have eit,her
~3~.y~ i llg~,T~ ] 113~z) ~`~'~~
OI
7Lg~y~ i tL312'~ i 2L3~~T~. ~Ah~
Suppose (.A5). Then, ({1, 3}, r) must not be a CCA. since else, (T, z) is not a CCA.
Assume ({1, 3}, .~) is not a CC,~ because ~~ PG'({1, 3}). Then ~y' E PE({l. 3})
such that
ui~y~) 1 z~l~~), ~~7)
u3~y~~ ~ u3~~).
Hence, ({1, 3}, y') must not, be a CCA, since else, ({1, 2}, :c) is not a CCA. Con-
sequently, ~(V, y") ~(T, Z') E E((j~', y"))[ t1i E V: zi;(z~) 1 u;(y")]. Observe that,
y' E PE({1, 3}) implies that V~{1, 3} and V~{1, 2, 3}.
Stel V - {1, 2}.then.
u~~z~Í ~ v,iy~Í,
uz~z') ~ u2~y~)~ ~~g~
u3~J~~ ~ tlg~: ~~.
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where the last inequality is due to the fact that y' E PG({l. 3}). Frorn ( Aï) and (A8)
it follows r.hat.
u~(z') ~ u~(y') ) u~(s).
u3(y~) ~ u3~',), U.3(y') i (171~2~), ( ~~9)
uz(:r) ) uz(z~), uz(~r) 1 uz(?l~),
where the inequalit,ies concerning voter 2 follow from t.he fact that u~(z') 1 ui(x),
u1(x) and ;r E PE({1, 2}). Suppose that in (A9),
uz(x) 1 2lz(y') 1 uz(z'),
~3(Jr) i u3(Z') i iL3(.L).
Then ( {1, 3}, z') must not be a CCA, since else, PE({1, 2}, x) is not a CCA. Suppose
({1. 3}.z') is not a, CCA because z' ~ PF({1, 3}). Then ~y" E PF({1, 3}) such that
ui(y~~) ) ui(z'),
U~3(y~~) i t(3(Z').
Hence, ({I, 3}, y") must not be a CCA, since else, ({1, 2}. x) is not a CCA. So,
~(V; y"') ~(T, z") E E((V, y"'))[ fli E V: u;(z") ) u,(y")~. By repeating the argurnent
above, we find that if V-{l, 2}, then ui(z") ~ u~(y") 1 u~(z') ) ui(y') ) ui(x).
Hence, for t.he cases considered, voter 1's utility must be improved repeatedly. By CCO,
voter 1 must finally reach her global maximum and then, the argument, with V-{1, 2}
cannot be repeated anymore. A similar argument holds for all the other cases. 4~'e must,
however, be able to find infinitely many utility improvements. Since the set of players is
finite, CCO implies that this is impossible. For the case ~ C ~- 2 and ~ C' ~- 3 a similar
proof applies. O.
Proof of proposition 5.2.24:
Suppose first that there are only t.wo CCAs in I': a-(C, x) and a' - (C', x'),
where C ~ C', x~ x'. Then, by lemma 5.2.22, C, C' ~ 1. Hence, C, C' C I and
~ C ~, ~ C' ~] 2. Suppose for all i E C U C' : x, x' ~ x; - argmaxyEX u;(y) and
C(I') - 0. Take C-{l, 2} and C' -{1, 3}. By proposition 5.2.20, ui(x) - ui(x') or
uz(x) - uz(x') or u3(x) - u3(x'). This holds in only 19 of the 27 possible combinations
of preferences of voters over x and x'. The set of relevant combinations of preferences
can be reduced further by eliminating those combinations for which x~ PE({l, 2}) or
x' ~ PE({1, 3}). The remaining combinations of preferences are the following:






1lr~T) - Zl~(5'), 2L2~.T) - 2l2(.Z''). ZL3(~1 - T~3(~~~,
7ll~,Z') - TL1~~'), Z(2~~1') - 21z~.7''), t13~.2~ C 713~T.'),
1l1(,x) - 7L~(.2'). ill~.t:) i U211''). 2L3~Z) ~?lg(.x'),
lli(~) i 7I.~(~'). 7l2(T) - 7í2(T,'), ilg(~) ~ 2l3(:2').
~1(~) C ul(~')~ w2(~) ~ U.z(~'), 7I3(5) - 2Lg(.Z'').
Consider ( 1) and (2). Then ( {1, 2}, x') is a CCA too, which contradicts the assurnpt.ion
that there are only two CCAs. To see this, suppose ( {1, 2}, ~') is not a CCA. Then (a)
~' ~ PE({1, 2}) or (b) ~(V, y) ~(T, z) E E((V, y))[ fli E V: u;(z) 1 u~(.r')]. Suppose
(a). Then ~y E X[ b'i. E {1, 2} : ~rl;(y) ~ ~u2(.z') ~. ~i E {], 2} : u.;(y) J v.;(a')]. This
implies :r ~ PE({1. 2}), since fli E{1. 2} : u;(x) - v~;(~'): a contradiction. There is no
V such tha,t ( b) holds, because all bargaining processes end up with ~ or a'. Consider




Now, ({1, 2}, y) must not be a CCA, since else, ({1, 3}, a') is not a CCA. This implies
that ~(V, y') ~(T, z) E E((V, y'))[ ~di E V: v~(z) 7 u;(y)]. Since (T, z) is an endpoint,
it must be a CCA. IIence, z- x or z- a'. If z-~, then 1, 3~ 4' which would imply
that. ({1, 2},y) is a CCA. So, z-~' and consequentl,y, 1~ V. Hence, V-{2, 3} and
t.herefore, uz(z) - v2(.~') 1 u2(y) and u3(z) - u3(.r') 1 u.3(y). But we already established
that u2(y) 1 u.2(.~'): contradiction. For the cases (4) and (5), a similar argument as for
(3) applies.
In case of three CCAs, the proof follows along the same. lines as the proof for two
CCAs. Note that in the cases (1) and (2), ({2, 3}, .~') is a CCA and hence, for all
C E D'(f): (C, ~') is a CCA. By propositions 5.2.17 and 5.2.23, this implies that
(1, ~') is a CCA as well.
In case of more than three CCAs, with all different proposals and different coalitions, t,he
grand coalition must have a CCA, say (I, .~). Hence, by proposition 5.2.23. x E C(r).
For every pair of proposals .~ and .~' associated with a CCA, with .~ associated with
the CCA (I, ,~), we can derive a similar system of preferences as (1)-(5) above. By
eliminating those preference combinations for which there is no indifferent voter and
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which are not in the Pareto sets of the coalitions involved, we find that di E 1 b'.x, ~'





This chapter discusses the integrat,ion of an economic and a political system. The need for
political-economic models is clear. The econonuc and political sect.or mutually influence
each other and neglecting this relationship may lead t,o wrong conclusions on outcomes
(see Blinder and Solow, 1973; Lucas, 1976; Frey and Schne~ider, 1978; Alesina, 1987;
Hibbs, 1987; Rogoff, 1990; Drissen and van Winden, 1991).
Studies in t.his area can be distinguished according to the assumption made on the na-
ture of public policy making (Mueller, 1989: Drissen and van Winden, 1991). :~ormative
public choice theory assumes public policy making to be directed towards the maximisa-
tion of social welfare, whereas positive public choice theory takes public decision making
as the outcome of individual rnaximising behaviour.
This chapter follows the last approach, since, as Drissen and van Winden argue, the
normative assumption of the unselfish behaviour of public sector agents is opposed to the
assumption of selfish behaviour in the private sector. On the other hand, the scope of
positive approaches is hitherto limited, due to the restrictive assumptions on preferences
that must be made to secure the existence of a voting equilibrium.
For this t.echnical reason, the political system is usually described by a median voter
model (i.e., under majority rule, the preferences of the median voter determinc the
policy pursued by the government), or the problern is moulded such that the median
voter theorem can be applied (:Vleltzer and Richard, 1981). Another way out of the
disequilibrium problem is to assume probabilistic voting instead of deterministic voting
(Becker, 1983; Coughlin, 1986; Coughlin, Vlueller and Murrell, 1988; Herings, 1995).
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Deterministic voting assumes that the probability t,hat a voter vot.es for t.he political
party closest to her own ideal point is one. Probabilistic voting, however, assumes that
only the probability that a voter votes for a certain party increases the closer the party
moves to this voter's ideaL L-nder certain conditions (see below), probabilistic voting
avoids the disequilibrium resulting from a discontinuity in voting functions.
Both the median voter model and the probabilistic voting model are not satisfactory.
The median voter model applies only to situations characterised by a uni-dimensional
policy space over which voters have single-peaked preferences, and t.o situations in which
the policy space is multi-dimensional and where the distribution of the ideal points of
the voters shows a certain symmetry (Kramer, 1973; McKelvey, 1976). The probabilistic
voting model is indeed applicable to policy spaces of any dimension and t.o any distri-
bution of voters ideals, yet equilibrium is guaranteed only for specific functions relating
voter preferences to probabilities of voting (Ordeshook, 1987). The trick is to mould the
problem into a concave game in normal form, for which an equilibrium is known t,o exist.
Therefore, the expected payoff function of a party must, be concave in her own strategies
and convex in her opponent's strategies and the probability that a voter vot.es for some
party must be a concave function of the utility a voter associates with the strategy of this
party (See Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981; Coughlin, 1986; Ordeshook, 1987, pp. 154-155;
177-179, and Feldman and Lee, 1988).
The political-economic model demonstrates the limited scope of the model above.
The economic system in this model (section 6.2) is described by the Arrow-Debreu (AD-
model), and the political system (section 6.3) assume~s a model of coalition formation
over political issues under majority rule. The coalitiop model can be interpreted as the
formation of political parties. For simplicity, the~re is only one political issue at stake:
voters have to decide on the maxirnum length of t,he working-day.
A simple example (section 6.4) shows that even in case of a one-dimensional policy
space, political preferences may be mult.i-peaked, contrary to what is assumed in the
literature (Ordeshook; 1987, pp. 165 and Mueller, 1989, pp. 67). Consequently, neither
the median voter model, nor the probabilistic voting model is applicable. IVloreover, it
will be shown that, for the parameters given, every policy position is dominated. To
solve this problem, the concept of CC.A developed in chapter 5 will be applied.
The model can be easily generalised to accounl, for non-selfish behaviour of agents.
This is done in a second example (section 6.4). Here, the concept of other-directedness
(van Winden, 1983). In Drissen and van Winden (1991), other-directedness is, however,
limited to the political system. This causes a consistency problem with respect to the
assumption of self-directed behaviour of agents in the economic sphere. In the example
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of section 6.9, consurners also have economic actions to inf~uence the wellbeing of others.
In effect, this model is an attempt to bridge the gap bet,ween normative and positive
t.heories; instead of having one agent (the state) who maximises a social welfare function,
we have different agents maximising a welfare function in which t,he utility of all the
others is taken into account. The model can also be seen as an alternative to existing
models of interest groups, which assume that interest. groups consist of agents having
identical utility functions (See for instance Coughlin, Mueller and Murrell, 1988).
6.2 The economic subsystem
Consider an Arrow-Debreu econotny with G goods, G-{1, 2, .. , G} where good G
represents leisure, 1 consumers, I-{ 1, '2, ..., I} and J producers, J-{ 1, Z, .. , J}.
Prices, p-(p~, ..., p~) lie in the unit simplex, SG-r of ~c': p E Sr'-'.
In the pulitical subsystem, voters form coalitions on political issue5. The issue at
stake is a law governing the maximum length of the working-day, which states that
no one is allowed to work more than rt hours a day. Politics rnay affect, the econornic
equilibrium. Therefore, equilibrium prices are considered to depend on proposals wit,h
respect to the length of the working day. The price pG(rt) is the equilibrium price of
leisure when the proposal rt is implemented.
6.2.1 Producers
Producers maximise profits, given market prices.
A production plan of j is denoted as y~ -(yi, .. , y'~). By convention, inputs
(including good G) have a negative sign. The technological restrictions faced by pro-
ducers are represented by the constraint y' E Y~ C J2~. 'I'he production set, Y~, is
supposed to be independent of rt. Furthermore, for all j: Y"' is closed and convex,
0 E Y', Y' fl (-Y') -{0}, Y' ~(-~2~). Total production will be referred to as Y,
Y - (y', ..., y~).
The profit maximisation problem of j, given prices p can be written as:
maxr'(p) - py', s.t. y' E Y'. (6.2.1)
The solution of j's optimization problem will be denoted by:
m'(p1-{y'EY'~dy'EY~: py'?py'}. (6.2.2)
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6.2.2 Consumers~voters
('onswners choosc a preferred constunption plan and forrn coalitions to further thcir
political interest. The economic and political decisions made by consumers are closely
intert.wined. Loosely speaking, each consumer first of all considers the economic impact
of any restriction on working hours. That is to say, a consumer reflects on the possible
AD-equilibria that may result if a certain restriction is imposed. This yieLds optimal
consumptions, given ~7. Political preferences with respect to the maximal length of the
working-day become explicit when conditional equilibria are valuated in terms of ut,ility.
As usual, consumer i is restricted to a consumption set, X' C~20, representing habit.s,
psychological constraints, et cetera. In particular I-~ C a~; C I, where the upper bound
is a consumer~s tot,al disposable time a day (which is norrr~alised t,o 1) and t.he lower bound
represents the outcome of the political subsystem. Consequently, the consumption set
depends on r7 and will be denoted by .~'(~). For all ~i, the set X'(~i) is (i) closed, (ii)
convex and (iii) bounded below. Planned consumption of good g by i is denoted as .z'g.
A consu~n~tion plan. of i. given ~7, is ~` -(x„ ..., ~;.) E X'(~). Consumers are able to
order all possible consumptions in their consumption sets according t,o their preferences.
The latter are represented by a utility function, u'. This is a(i) monotonously increasing
in each component, (ii) ttivice different.iable and (iii) strict quasi-concave mapping of
X'(~) to ~2.
The i~itial endownaents of consumers. w` -(zai, .. , ~i~~;) E X'(ri) are indepe~~ndent
of ~t7. By assumption, (w~, ldots. w~-i) E intX`(p). Consumers also have shares in the
profits of production. Let B`'O 0) represent i's share in the revenues of j's production.
For all j, ~; B" - 1.
In planning their consumption, consumers solve thc problem:
max u`(x' ~ ~~
J
s.t. T~~' G T~w` -F ~ ~'~~r~~P~
~-i
x' E X'~~7). (6.2.3)
Let. ~'(p ~~) be the set of most preferred consumptions for consumer i, given prices
p conditional on ~~:
~'(P ~ ~]) - {x' E X'~rl) b'~` E X'~~]) : u'~~' I ~]) ? u`~~~ ~ rl).
~(w` - x' ~ ~ B''y') 1 0}. (6.2.4)
~
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Let ~-~;-~ ~` bP aggrPgat,e cíemancí and lc~t, w-~,-~ w`. F'or simplicity. suppose
that the excess demand function, ~- w, satisfies t.he property of gross substitut,ion,
which ensures the uniqueness of economic equilibriurn.
6.2.3 Conditional economic equilibrium
An admissible allocatio~z is a distribut,ion of goods that exhaust,s the econorny's resources,
and is denotecí ba X. X-( x', .. ,~~), that is,
1 I J
~x' -~w' f~y~, di : x' E:k'('l), dj : y' E Y'. ( 6.'l.~)
~-~ ~-i ~-i
Let t.he set of conditional equilibria, givcn r~, in t,he associated ~lrrow-L)ebreu economy,
bc
All(~) - {p(r1), X(rl). Y('q)}, with
`di : ~' E E`(~(~~]) ~ ~) (6.2.6)
dJ : ~J' E ó'(T~(n))
Proposition 6.2.1
Gz~ven aiay r~, AD(~) i..~ not empti~.
Proof:
Given any ~, consurner ~i's consumption set may be redefined as .t' -{x' ~ x' E X', :x`c ~
1- r~}. Ob~~iously, .l' is compact and convex and hence, for ~ E(0, 1], the economic
subsystem reduces to the standard Arrow-Debreu model for which equilibria are known
to exist (see Debreu, 1959). If ~~ - 0. then i~ - 1 and hence, the consumption of
leisure, good G, is fixed to its irtitial endowment. Consequently, we can omit, good G
from the economy. The resulting economic subsy-stem is a pure exchange economy and
the standard assumptions made guarantee the existence of equilibrium. ~
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6.3 The political subsystem: coalition formation
under majority rule
As voters. consumers have to decide on the value of r~ E [0, 1~. The political prefer-
ences of consumer i follow frorn her valuation of the conditional economic equilibria in
terms of utility. Recall that the excess demand function satisfies the property of gross
substitution. Hence, polit,ical preferences can be represented by a continuous function,
u'(x" ~ r)) :[0, 1~ -~ ~2. where x" is i's optimal consumption plan. The examples in the
next section show that u`(x" ~~) might not, be concave nor differentiable.
Assume that the decision over r~ is takc:n by rnajority rule. Voters are allowed to corn-
municate and to form coalitions to further their interests. This can be interpreted as
the formation of political parties. The problem for voters is to find the best coalition t,o
join.
A well-known solution concept for this kind of problem is the core (for a definition of
the core, see chapt.er 5 of this thesis). u'(x" ~ r~) is not necessarily concave, however, and
then it is possible that the core is empty. To avoid this problem, the solution concept of
CC.A will be invoked ( see chapter 5 for the definition and the proof of non-emptiness of
cca ).
Coalitional agreements are of the form (C, r~), such t.hat C C I, ~ C ~1 2 and
~ E PE(C), where PE(C) is the set of pareto efiicient proposals of coalition C(see
chapter 5).
The next section deals with an exarnple in which the political preferences u'(~'~ ~ r~)
of one of the voters are not single-peaked. The parameters in the example are chosen
such that the core of the polit.ical system does not exist. The example demonstrates
t,hat well-behaved utility functions in the economic system and the assumption of a one-




Suppose there are two goods (good 1 is a consumption good and good 2 represents
leísure), three consumers and one producer. tiormalise a consumer's total disposable
time to 1. Suppose all three consumers maxirnise a log linear utilit,y function:
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maxrr'(x') - cr` In(ai) ~- ( 1 - a`) In(.~z) (6.4.ï)
s.t. Pisi f Pz.r2 G pr~rri -F pzru2 ~(1`~(P)
1-.x2C~
rzCl.
"I'he producer solve~s the following problcm:
rtrax n`(p) - Pl?JI - Pzya
s.t. yt G -c J2
:Iz ~ 0.
Let the parameters of the economic system have the following ~.aluc~s:
ar - 2~3, u,r -(1, 1), B' - 7~23, r- 4;
az - 1~2, u; z -(1, 1), ~z - 0;
a3 - I ~3, u~3 -( g, I), ~~ - 1 ~ó.
and normalise the price of the consumption good, p~, to 1.
(s.a.~)
By solving the problem of the producer, for the total dernand for labour, the supply of
t.he consumption good and the profits we obtain, respecti~ely,
~ ~.z
l`~ - -Jz - ~P .
~ ~z
yr - ~P2 ~1 ~2
n(áfl) - i-Pz '
A consumer's demand for consumpt,ion, x„ and leisure, a:2 and a consumer's supply of
labour, l`, depends on whether the consumer works and on whether her labour supply- is
restricted. From the solution of the problem of the consurner, it follows that
(1) if consumer i does not work, then
iQ~cz
:r; - u~; f a . ( 6. 4.9 )
Pz




(2) if consumer i works iuirestricicd. then
i ~,r.z
r~ - a'(zr~i -1- pz rt `~ ).
pz
; i~'i ~~~czx2-(1-a)(I-F-f Z)..
pz (pz)
; i,ztu f1 ~~
('-a'-(1-a')(-' f ~ ).
~ pz (pz)z
(3) if consunier i works restrictc~d. then
t B, ~,z






r2 - 1 - r~ (6.4.16)
l' - r). (6A.1 ï )
For the parameters given. it will be first determined which consumers work in an un-
restricted eyuilibrium. From (6..~.14) it follows that thc labour supply of consurners 1
and 2 is positive if pz ~ 1.6 and pz 1 0.9 respectively, while consumer 3 wants to work
only if pz 1 2.6. Hence. for the relative high values of rl in an unrestricted r~quilibrium
(i.e., for a relatively lo~~. wa~ge), only consumers 1 and 2 want to work. Equating labour
demand, ld and labour supply, li t 1~~. result,s in the equilihriurn wage for the unrestricted
equilibria (pz - 2.63). I3~- substituting this wagc into (6.4.14), we see that consumer 1
gets restricted first (for r~ - 0.345). From this, the political preferences of the voters in
the unrestricted area (~ ~ 0.345) easily follow. Similarly, we find four other areas if rl
becomes more tight. In figure 6.4.1 below, these areas are rnarked by A-E. To summarise:
6.4 Examples 135
(E) l and 2 work unrestrict~d (3 does oot work):
r7 ) 0.3-15.
Pz - Z.6:3.
i~' l Tl ) - 0.648,
uz(rl) - 0.101.
u3(r)) - O.OS)4.
where, for sirnplicity, u'(r)) is written for zi'(x" ~~7). ProE~osals whicli put q 1 0.:3-1:i
do not affect the cconomic ec{uilibrium, that is to say, none of the consiirnc,rs feels
restricic~d b~~ such proposals.
(D) 1 ~~aorks restricted (2 works unrestricle~d. 3 does not work):
0.305 G 77 c 0.:34J,
zt gtih(~it~)
iz - z(nf z) '
u'(']) - jln[(1 ~-pzrl f ?pZ)z(I - r7)]
uz(A) - zln[z ~ qPz ~ .~n~]
u`i(rl) - ~In[~ ~ svz].
So, in area D, politics begins to interfere, as consumer 1 now is restricted.
(C) 2 works restricted (1 works restricted, 3 does not w-ork):
0289 G p G 0.30.5,-z
Pz - ~,
u'(rl) - `-iln[(1 ~~ n~ 2 i)z(1 - r))]
uz(rl) - zln[(1 -F r7 ~)(1 - r7)]
u3(r1) - 3ln[8 f 2 J2]
(B) 3 works unrestricted ( 1 and 2 work restricted):
0.101 G~c0.2t~9,




ur(rl) - 31n[(1 f pzr7 f 2n~)z(1 - rl)]
u~(n) - 21n[(i ~- pz~)(1 - o)]
u`r(rl) - 31n[(; ~ aPZ ~ s(~:)Z)z(8 f 3Pz
Consumer 3 only starts to supply labour in area B.
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v~Írl) - 31n[(1 ~ iZ 3i1)z(1 - rI)~
ti2(rl) - 21n[(1 t 2 3)(1 - p)~
u'3Í~) - 31n[(8 ~- 12~)~1 - r1)2~
Finally, in area :~, all consumers arc. restricted, i.e., t,hey havc~ a full-tirne job and







Figure 6.~1.1: Political preferences over ~eorking-hours.
Figure 6.4.1, shows that vot,ers 2 and 3 favour quite a tight restriction on working-
hours. This seems surprising. Would it not be more natura] for consumers t,o dislike
any effective constraint on their utility optimization problem' To answer t,his question,
consider the derivative of the indirect utility- function with respect to ~, which explains
how multi-peakc~d politica] preference funetions come about.
If consurnc~r ~ does not want to work t hcu
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dv.' ~B'c~p~ a' dp
x -
d~ ~ pu ~ f á~`r~p~ p dr) ~
(6.~.18)
where p- p. Observe that p' - dp~d~ 1 0: t.his derivative is equal to zero if ~ is too
large to be effective, otherwise it is positive. The numerator of t.he first term in (6.4.1 S)
represents income from a share in t,he profit,s. This rnav either be equal to rero or else
positíve~, depending on B`. If dv.'~d~ 1 0 then h is opposed to lowering rI because it would
lower her incorne from wealth.
If consumer t works but is unconstrained b~. r~ then
du' '-B`czpz - [a` -(1 - a')(Pu'i f i9 c1P2)~ I~P4 x --. (6.4.19)
dr1 1 ~-p~w; ~ ,'-iB'c~p~ Ydrl
If income from labour (the term in brackets) exceeds income from profits. then dv'~d~ C 0
and h would favour a smaller value for rI.
Finall~-, if i works T~ hours a day (i.e. is restricted) then
du` a' -( 1 - a')(A~i ~ á~ c~P~)~ - r~-I-
d~ - (1 - rl)Ír) f Pwi f q~`c~P~)
á~~c2~'2 - ~ a~ dpx -
r1 f pi~i f~~`7~~ P d~7
(s.~I.20)
where the first t,erm represents the cost of being rest,ricted (or put differently, the cost
of government interference with the private utility optimizat,ion programrne). This terrn
is always positive. The second term is like (6.4.19) and compares income from profits to
income from labour (which now is equal to r~). If r~ steadilv decreases, du'`~d~ at some
point will become positive.
From the above, it is clear that a relativel~. strong reliance on labour income furthers
an interest in a shorter working day. The explanation for this is that a tight restrict.ion
on working-hours induces wages to go up sufficientl~~ fast to compensate fcn~ a volume-loss
in working-hours.
Next; we turn to the determination of political equilibrium. We will first confirm that
the core is empty. Recall from lemma 5.2.1ï in chapter 5 that t.he core is equivalent with
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the intersection of the pareto sets of the minimal decisive coalit.ions. For our example,
we find the following pareto sets. PE(C), for th~~ coalitions with a srnallest ma,jority:
PE({1, Z}) - [0.'l; 1],
PE~{i, s}) -[o.osi; o.os2~ u[0.3~~; i].
;,E;({z. s}) - [o.osl; o.oyz] u [o.z; o.ss5]
Hence, corc - f1ecI,~c~-z~E(~) - ~.
Finally. we determine the CCAs. From the resemblence of the political preferences
in example 2 of chapter :i and the examplc~ at hand. it easily follows that
({1, 3}, i~), i~ E [0.345; 1] and
({2, 3}. 0.092)
are all t,he CCAs in this example.
6.4.2 Example 2: other directedness
Example 1 conforms conipletely to an :1ll-model. Each consurner maxirnises her o~an
ut,ility function without paying attention to the wellbeing of others. Alternatively, one
may assume that consumers are 'other-directed,' i.e. they may have positive or negat.ive
sentiments concerning others, that. are incorporated in their utility functions. llrissen
and Van Winden (1991) limit ot.her-direct,edness to the political sphere only. However,
consumers in reality may also have other (economic) actions to affect the wellbeing of
others. If so, this would cause a consistency problem in the sense that on the market
place other-directed agents behave in a self-directed manner. while in politics they are
more broad-minded.
This problent ca,n be avoided by allowing consurners to buy each other presents. This
exchange of consumption goods takes place after the markets close. tirote that leisure
can only be given away indirectly by granting someone consumption goods.
Just as in Drissen and Van Winden (1991), the consumer maximises the following
welfare function:
~
w~(.2'') - ~ ~kL'k~k)
k-1
(6.4.21)
where uk is the (well-behaved) utility function of consumer k and the 3k E ~i express
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sentiments: 3k is the appreciation of consumer z for consumer k. legativP values of the
.3~s indicate envy and .j~ ) 0 expresses positive sentiments. If .ik - 0 for all k: ~ i, the
welfare funetion of á coincides with that consumer's utility fuuction.
Consumption will be distinguished according to its sourccr. xgk is the quantity of good g
purchased by consumer z on behalf of consumer k. In their market. behaviour consumers
anticipate on t.he exchange of presents thereafter. A necessary condition for equilibrium
is that no one is surprised by the presents received. This is not to imply that preferences
with respect to goods and agents are common knowledge. this being a sufficient but not
a necessary conditiort for absence of surprise. Nevertheless, suppose everything to be
common kno~aedge for the present.
linder these assuniptions the (well-behaved) welfare funct,ion of consumer i~ adapted
for exchange possibilitics reads:
3
W`~X ~rJ)) - ~ 3k ~aklog(x~k - 1- x~k -f- x~k) f (I - 3k)lvgx2~ , (6.4.22)
k-1
where (x~k f x~k f~ik) is k's consumption of good 1, consisting of own purchases a,nd
presents received.
The problem of consurner i is then to inaximise (6.4.22). taking account of t.he political
constraint on working-hours, and the Z~k-hours constraint. on leisure, and the following
budget constraint:
P~~i~ f x~~ f x~3) -~ x2 C Pu''~t ~- wz ~ 0'~r~P) ~6.423)
where (x~' ~ xiz f~~3) represents z's demand for good I, consisting of purchases for her
own sake and presents bought for others.'
1This consumer problem indeed is a generalisation of the AD-model. The demand and supply
functions will be continuous. If the problem of the producer also conforms to the AD-model, the
existence of equilibrium is guaranteed. However, there might be a problem. Hecause consutners are
share holders and are assurned to be other-directed, profit maximization may be opposed to the interest
of some of them. IL seems necessarv to examine in which mauner other-directedness affects decision
making in the production sector. For now. we leave this question undecided and assume that share
holders are self directed so that producer behaviour is featured by profit maxunization.
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Let:
~3' -(1 0 0), a~ -'~~3, w' - (17, Z~S), 0~ - 7~8;
~~~ -(3~4 1 0). ~~ - 1~2. w~ -(16~. 24). H'~ - 0:
~3.' -(0 ~ 1), C73 - 1~3. zv3 - l~l'~f)~~, '24). ~~ - 1~~;
Once again, political prefcrences are coinplex (figlu~e 6.4.2). The sequ~~nce of events is
now as follows. For ~) 8, consumer 1 is t he onlt' one want iug t,o ~a~ork. "I'hen consumer
1 gets restricted and after t.hat, both consumers 2 and 3 st,art t,o work. Consumer 2 is
the first to become constrained and fiuall~-. for sufliciently small r~'s, all consutners are~
restricted. Furtkierrnore, consiun~r 2 starts to give presents in area, C aud continues t,o
do so in areas F3 and :1. Th~~ recipient, cousum~r l, cl~~arly appreciates this as is reflected
by a rise in utility for values of i~ in area (:. I1 is easily secn that iu tliis case t.here is a
majority for a rather srnall value~ of r~, irnplying that we have established th~ existence
of equilibrium in which presents are exchanged.
~
PEf{1.2}): H
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I~igure 6.1.2: Political preferences with other-directedness.
The Pareto set.s of the mininmm winning coalit,ions indicated in figure 6.4.2 have a
common intersection a,t policy proposal r. By Ic:mrna 5.2.1 ï of chapter 5, this implies
that the core is equal to ~. Ilence, according to lernrnas ."7.2.23 and 5.2.22 of chapt.er 5,
for all roalitions C E U(m~) :(C. .r) is coherent.
6.5 Conclusions
Although the policy issue selected is quite specific, the model can be easily adapted to
include other or more policy issues such as taxation, price restrictions, public goods (its
level of supply and it.s methods of finance), and so on.
The model warrants some cautious conclusions. First, the rnodel results indicat.e
that the role of politics cannot be neglected. From t.he exarnples, it is clear that the
results of the political-economic model in this chapter need not match the results of the
unrestricted AD-model in the E- and F-areas of figures 6.4.1 and 6.4.2. Hence, we may
conclude that by excluding politics from the analysis, we may run the risk of coming up
with wrong results.
In addition, the examples show Lhat multi-peaked political preferences may appear,
particularly in models where political issues affect, prices. Whether this conclusion holds
in general for general equilibrium models needs further investigation. In the rnodel at
hand, complex political preference can be easily constructed by rneans of the eyuations
for the derivative of the indirect utility functions ((6.'1.18-6.~~.20)). From the analysis
in section 6.4, we found that the relative importance of incorne from labour to incorne
frorn profits inf}uences the shape of political prc~ferences. Hence, rnulti-peaked political
preferences may be induced by the assumption on the scale of production. The question
is whether multi-peakedness disappears when profits are zero, i.e., when const.ant. returns
to scale are assumed.
Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift handelt over verschillende politieke beslissingsproblemen: de ka.ndidaat-
stelling, de keuze van een partij programma, de keuze op welke partij t,e stemmen en
coalitievorrniug. Deze problemen worden beschou~a-d vanuit een econornisch en spelthe-
oretisch perspectief.
Politieke en economische besluitvorming hebben veel met elkaar gemeen. D~~ b~~-
trokkenen hebben va,a.k verschillende belangen. Hnn beslissingen zijn af~hankelijk van dc
beslissingen van de andere betrokkenen. I3o~-endien is er sprake van keuieheperkende
restricties (institutionele beperkingen, beperkingen wat, betreft de alt,ernatieven waaruit
gekozen kan worden, budgetrestricties etc.). Vlet andere woorden, zowef economische als
politieke besluitvorrning vindt plaats in een strategische context.
De micro-economie en de speltheorie bestuderen het strategisch keuzegedrag. De vraag
is wat de optimale beslissing is met. betrekking tot bijvoorbeeld consurnptie en productie,
gegeven de keuzebeperkende restricties en de beslissingen van de anderen. Verondersteld
wordt daa,rbij dat individuen 'rationeel' zijn, in de zin da.t zij hun eigenbelang nastreven.
De rationele politieke keuzetheorie hanteert de econornische en spelt,heoretische be-
nadering om politieke beslissingsproblemen te analyseren. Dit proefschrift staat, in de
traditie van de rationele keuzetheorie.
De economische bertadering zal echter in een ruime zin geïnterpret.eerd worden, zoals
in Becker (1993): als een methode van onderzoek, niet als de veronderstelling van
zelfzuchtig gedrag zoals deze binnen de economie gehanteerd wordt. Het rationalit,eit-
spostulaat waar vanuit zal worden gegaan kan dan gedefinieerd worden als de veronder-
stelling dat "individuen hun welvaart maximaliseren zoals zij deze opvatten, ongeacht
of zij zelfzuchtig, altruistisch, loyaal, wraakzuchtig of masochistisch zijn" (Becker, 1993,
blz. 386).
In het proefschrift worden drie onderwerpen behandeld: (1) ruimtelijke electorale com-
petitie, (2) de stabiliteit van coalities en (3) de interactie t,ussen economische en poli-
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t,ieke besluitvorming. Daarnaast worden bestaande speltheoretische oplossingsconcept,en
geëvalueerd en wordt een nieuw oplossingsconcept gelanceerd. Deze ondenverpen zijn
verspreid o~-er twee delen. Deel I kan gezien ~rorden als een toepassing van de niet-
coiiperatieve speltheorie op enkele onderwerpPn op hct gebied van electorale competitie.
Het doel is hier om de optimale strategieën van de betrokken actoren te bepalen. Deel H
is theoretischer van aard en handelt over de stabiliteit van uitkonrsten van coalitiespelen.
Dit deel sluit meer aan bij de codperatieve ,peltheorie.
Het. doel van Deel I is om enkele bezwaren tegen bestaande modellen op het ge-
bied van de ruimt,elijke electorale competitie te ondervangen. Het uitgangspunt van deze
modellen is dat er een compacte beleidsruimte bestaat die een beschrijving geeft van
alle beleidsposities die een partij of kandidaat in kan nemen. Kiezers hebben (conca,ve)
nutsfuncties we~lke gedefinieerd zijn op de beleidsruimte. Sornmige modc~llen beperken
zich tot het geven van de verdeling van de ideaalpuntFn van de kiezers over de beleid-
sruimte. De vraag is welke beleidsposities ingenomen zullen worden, gegeve~~n het kies-
mechanisme dat de verkiezingsuitslag bepaalt. Het belangrijkste punt. vau kritiek dat in
deel I tegen deze modellen naar voren wordt gebracht is dat de verzameling van personen
die zich kandidaat kunnen stellen exogeen is en losstaat van het electoraat en dat veron-
dersteld wordt dat kandidaten zich committeren aan liun verkiezingsprogramma. Kiezers
hebben dus geen actief kiesrecht en deze modellen zijn derhalve niet van toepassing op
democratieën.
Het model in hoofdstuk 2 ondervangt deze kritiek. In dit model heeft iedere kiezer
de keuze om zich kandidaat te stellen. Dit impliceert dat kandidaten beleidspref'erenties
hebben, hetgeen tevens hun gebondenheid aan een bepaalde beleidsposit,ie aerklaart.
De gecolgen can deze generalisatie worden eerst bestudeerd onder de ~~eronderstelling
dat kiezers op de kandidaat van hun eerste voorkeur stemmen. llit wordt ook wel eerlijk
kiesgedrag genoemd. Later wordt de rnogelijkheid van strategisch st,emgedrag toegelaten.
De centrale probleemstelling is de bepaling van het aantal personen dat zich kandi-
daat. wenst te stellen en de bepaling van hun verkiezingsprogranrma. Als kiesmechanisrne
wordt de pluraliteit.sregel gehanteerd, waarvolgens de kandidaat met de meeste stemmen
als winnaar wordt aangemerkt. ~~~anneer meerdere kandidaten het hoogst.e aantal stem-
men behalen wordt ieder van hen met gelijke kans als winnaar aangewezen. Om het
probleem hanteerbaar te maken wordt het getransformeerd naar een twee-fasenspel. De
eerste fase betreft de keuze van kandidaatstelling en in de tweede fase wordt er gestemd.
Ter oplossing van het probleem wordt, gebruik gemaakt van enige oplossingsconcepten uit
de non-codperatieve speltheorie. Op het probleem met eerlijk kiesgedrag wordt. het. even-
wichtsconcept van Nash losgelat.en en het spel wordt opgelost via achterwaartse induc-
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tie. Een verzameling kandidaten is een :~ash-evemvicht tnet eerlijk sterngedrag wanneer,
gegeven de eerlijke beslissingen van de kiezers, geen cnkelc~ kandidaat in de verzameling
zich terug wil trekken en geen enkele potentiële kandicíaat buiten dc~ verzameling zich
kandidaat wenst te stellen.
Volgens bovenstaand model zullen ten hoogst.e twee personen zich kandidaat st,ellen
en kiezen alle kandidaten hrm eigen idea-alpunt als v~~rkiezingsprogramma. Verder is er
sprake van een oneindig aantal evenwichten met e~én en met twee kandidaten, die door
de kiezers niet allemaal even goed worden bevonden in termen van uut. Er best.aat
dus een co~rdinatieprobleem: wanneer de kandidaatstellingsbeslissingen niet op elkaar
afgestemd worden zal slechts bij toeval sprake zijn van een evenwicht,ssituatie. Een ander
probleem is dat in gevai va,n st:rategisch stemgedrag het spel onoplosbaar is. Doordat het
model een continuiim aan kiezers veronderstelt heeft de individuele kiezc~r geen invloed
op de stemuitslag (iedere kiezer heeft maat nul). Derhalve zijn alle stemprofielen in de
tweede fase van het spel een Nash-evenwicht: ongeacht de verkiezingsuit sla.g wil niemand
anders stemrnen. Het model geeft. cíus geen uit.sluit,sel over de stemuitslag die verwacht
kan worden, zodat de kandidaatstellingsbeslissing nergens op gebaseerd kan worden. In
tegenstelling met dit resultaat voor het geval van een groot electoraat (met een continuiim
aan kiezers), is het stemgedrag in geval van een klein electoraat (met een eindig aantal
kiezers) wel bepaald. Iedereen stemt. dan eerlijk.
In de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 van deel I wordt een verfijning van het evenwichtsconcept
van ~ash toegepast, om deze prohlemen op te lossen, te weten: perfect sterk Nash-
evenwicht (PSNE; Hubinstein, 1980: Aumarm, 1989). Een stemprofiel is een sterk Nash-
evemvicht (S:~F.,) als geen enkele coalitie~ ~.an kiezers zich kan verbeteren door gezamenli,jk
een verandering in de stembeslissing van alle leden door te voeren. Een strategiecombi-
nat,ie van stembeslissingen en kandidaat,stellingsbeslissingen is een PS:~E als zij een S:~E
is en als geen enkele coalitie van kiezers zich kan verbeteren door gezamenlijk een ve-
randering in de kandidaatstellingsbeslissing van alle leden door te voeren. Omdat PSNE
een extra restrictie op de Nash-evenwichten legt mag worden verwacht dat het aantal
Nash-evenwichten zal afnemen. Idealiter blijft er slechts één evemvicht over, hetgeen de
oplossing van het codrdinatieprobleem zou betekenen. Verder maakt PS`E een analyse
van strategisch kiesgedrag in een spel met een continuiim aan kiezers mogelijk, om-
dat kiezerscoalities een positieve maat kunnen hebben zodat zij de stemuitslag kunnen
beinvloeden. De communicatie- en coiirdinatiekenmerken van PSNE rnaken het boven-
dien mogelijk om een deel van Duverger's empirische wet. te best.uderen, welke beweert
dat er onder de pluraliteitsregel twee part,ijen deel zullen nemen aan de verkiezingen.
Het andere deel van de wet. beweert, dat er in geval van proportionele representatie meer
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dan twee partijen mee zullen doen (Duverger 195:3). NS`F, incorporeert alle krachten die
volgens Duverger verant~a~oordeli.jk zijn ~-oor het klcine aantal partijen dat zich nomineert
onder de pluraliteitsregel: (I) ~iemand za] zich vc,rkiesbaar stellen ~ranncer er geen kans
bestaat op overwinning, ('?) individuen zullen hun krachten bundelen om hun perspec-
tieven t.e verbeteren en (3) kiezers zul}en niet stemmen op kandidaten die bij voorbaat
kansloos zijn.
Het model wordt zowel bestudeerd onder de veronderstelling van een groot clectoraat
(met een continuiim aau kiezers: hoofdstnk :3) als onder de veronderstelling van een
klein electoraat (met een eindig aantal kiezers: hoofdstuk ~}). Dit onderscheid ~aordt
gernaakt eanwege een mogc~lijk verschil in de modclresultaten dat zou kunnen optreden.
zoals het onderzoek in I~ioofdstuk 2 suggcreert. Ue belangrijkste resultatcn van het
model met een groot elect.oraat zijn als volgt: (1 ) I;r zijn rnaximaa] twee kandidaten. (2)
bijna alle kiezers st.emnien eerlijk, (3) als de kosten van kandidaatstelling klein genoeg
zijn bestaat er een nnick I'511; waarbij alleen de medianc kiezer zich kandidaat stelt.
(-1) ieder even~~.icht met twee kandidaten is nniek in de zin dat er gcen ander t.wee-
kandidatenevenwicht bestaat eu (~) PS~E's bc~staan niet altijd. ~~~at Dnvc,rger's ~ti~et
betreft kan de volgende conclusie getrokken ~~~ordc~n. Iírachtenbnndeling reduceert, het
aantal deelnemers aan dc vcrkiezingen niet sterker dan individuele actics. In hoofdstuk 2
was van krachtenbundeling geen sprake en het aantal deelnemers was daar al niet~ groter
dan twee. Het kleine aantal deelnemers blijkt eerder veroorzaakt te worden door een
andere factor die Duverger noemt: dat ka,nslozen zich niet kandidaat zullen stellen.
De resultaten van het model met een klein electoraat zijn min of rneer gelijk aan
die van het model met een groot electoraat. F;r zijn echter t~~-ee verschillen: wanneer
het aantal kiezers oneven is en er in het even~~-ichi twee kandidaten zijn. dan stemt een
indifferente kiezer of~~el niet. ofwel niet eerlijk. Daarnaast bestaat er onder bepaalde voor-
waarden een evenwichf inet verliezende kandidaten. [n feite kan het, aantal verliezende
kandidaten zelfs vrij groot zijn, een resultaat dat ingaat. tegen Drrverger's wet.
Concluderend: PS~rF, lost het codrdinatieprobleem alleen op wanneer de kosten van
kandidaatstelling klein zijn, ~~ant dan is het evenwicht uniek. Daarnaast bestaat, er een
conceptueel probleem met betrekking tot PS~~E. Het concept veronderstelt impliciet
dat coalities stabiel zijn terti-ijl een deviatie door een coalitie van eeu ~iash-evemti~icht
mogelijkerwijze gevolgd wordt door cerdere deviaties van subcoalities of van alternatieve
coalities (zie ook Bernheirn, Pekeg and ~Vhinston, 19i~ï).
Dit probleem van een mogelijke instabiliteit van coalit.ies vormt één van de hoofdthema's
van deel II van het proefschrift. De beleidsrnirrite wordt hier weer compact veronder-
Samenvatting 147
steld, conform de analyse in deel I. Om het problF~c~m eenvoudig te houdc~n wordt alleen
de sternbeslissing onderzocht. I~iezers kiezen nu een punt in de beleidsruimte in plaats
van een kandidaat- Het is wederom toegestaan om coalities te vormen. De vraag is welke
van deze coalities stabiel zijn. in de zin dat niemand zo'u coalitie wil verlaten voor een
ancle~rc~.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt dit probleem benaderd ntet, behulp van de cuiiperatieve spelthe-
orie. ~'erschillende cobperatieve oplossingsconcc~picn passeren dc, revue: de 'core', de
'stable set' (von leumann and ~'lorgenstern. 19:ï3). de 'hargaining set~ (,lumann and
~laschler,196~), de 'competitive solution~ (~~1cKt~lvc~~-, Ordeshook and ~~t'iner. 197t3) en de
'largest consistent set' (Chwe, 1992). Het blijkt echter dat aau elk vau dcze concepten
bc~zwaren kleven: existentieproblemen (dc~ verzamcling st.abielc~ coalities is mogelijk leeg),
een teveel aan oplossingen, de oplossingen kunnen nict worden ondersteund door een
non-ro~peratief onderhandelingsproces (zodat de uikomst alleen gc~ldt wanneer veron-
dersteld wordt~ dat alle individuen zich codperatief gedragen), de voorspellingen zijn niet
plausibel of er wordt geen voorspelling gedaan ovcr welke coalitics zich zullen vormen.
Veel van deze concepten veronderstellen ook da~ kiezers 'bijziend' zijn, in de zin dat zij
niet anticiperen op latere fasen in het coalitievormingsproces. Een voorbeeld hiervan is
het accepteren van een gunstig aanbod op korte t.ertuijn, terwijl dit op langere termijn
ongunstige gevolgen kan hebben. Genoemd existentie~probleern ontst.aat al snel wanneer
de preferenties van kiezers niet ééntoppig zijn. De essent ie van dit probleem werd reeds
twee eeuwen terug aangegeven door :~Iarquis de Condorcet (178Fi): paarsgewijs stemmen
over alt,ernatieven onder de meerderheidregel leidt mogelijkerwijze tot een cyclus in de
besluitvorming. Om een voorbeeld t,e geven: st.el dat er drie kiezers zijn die uit drie
alternatieven, a, b en c, kunnen kiezen. ~'eronderstel dat de preferenties van kiezers over
deze alternatieven als volgt zijn: a r~ 6~-t c, 6~2 c ~2 a en c~;3 a Y-3 b, waarbij
a r; b betekent dat kiezer i alternatief a strict prefereert boven alternat.ief 6. Dan pref-
ereert een meerderheid van de kiezers a boven b, terwijl een andere meerderheid 6 boven
a prefereert en weer een andere meerderheid c boven a prefereert. Er bestaat dan een
cyclus in de besluitvorming van a naar b. van b naar c en van c weer terug naar a. Arrow
(1951) bewijst dat er, behoudens een dicatuur, geen c~nkel kicesrnechanisrne best,aat dat
een detgelijke cyclus uit.sluit.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een nieuw oplossingsconcept geïntroduceerd: coherente coali-
tionele afspraken (CCA). Dit concept is toepasbaar op een breed scala coalitiespelen en
ondervangt bovengenoemde problemen. Een coalitionele afspraak is gedefinieerd als een
paar (C, ~), waarbij C een kiezerscoalitie en ~ een voorstel in de beleidsruimte is. Kie-
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zers kunnen vrijuit communiceren en alle voorstellen die gedaan zijn worden algemeen
bekend gemaakt. Dit geeft aanleiding tot een onderhandclingsproces waarbij kiezers
coalities proberen te organiseren die, gegeven het kiesmechanisme, beslissend zijn. Dit
onderhandelingsproces wordt, gemodelleerd door middel van een spel in uitgebreide vorm,
dat alle mogelijke acties van alle spelers in alle fasen van het spel beschríjft. Voor elke
speler zijn de belangrijkste vragen: welke a-fspraken zijn stabiel en welk va-n de stabiele
afspraken kan het best ondersteund worden'.
Omdat aan de vorm van de nut,sfuncties van kiezers slechts weinig beperkingen worden
opgelegd (continuiteit en een uniek globaal maximum), treedt mogelijk een cyclus in de
besluitvorming op, zodat het onderhandelingsproces oneindig lang kan zijn. Er zal echter
worden aangetoond dat het onderhandelingsproces eindig is wanneer aan de volgende,
plausibele, veronderstelling wordt voldaan: a,ls een kiezer een coalitie verlaat door in t,e
gaan op een voorstel van een andere coalitie.. dan kan deze kiezer slechts terugkeren naar
de oorspronkelijke coalitie wanneer deze aan de kiezer een beter voorstel doet dan haar
eerdere voorstel. Deze assumptie kan als volgt geïnterpreteerd worden. Door een coalitie
te ve~rlat:en geeft een kiezer het, signaal af dat zij ont,evreden is met }iet voorstel van die
coalitie. Alle andere kiezers zullen uit dit signaal concluderen dat, de coalit,ie in kwestie
slechts herenigd kan worden wanneer zij de weggelopen kiezer een beter bod doet.
Een coherente coalitionele afspraak (CCA) kan dan gedefinieerd worden als een coali-
tionele afspraak a-(C, ~), zodanig dat alle andere afspraken a' - (C', z~') ~ a die
mogelijk zijn na a aanleiding geven tot een onderhandelingsproces dat uit,mondt in een
afspraak die voor tenminste één kiezer in C' niet beter is dan a.
In hoofstuk 5 worden twee voorbeelden van CC.A behandeld: één met twee kiezers
die tegengestelde preferenties hebben en één met drie kiezers en een legc: 'core'. Door
middel van deze voorbeelden worden de verdiensten van CCA veigeleken met die van
andere oplossingsconcepten, waarbij CCA er positief uitspringt.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt CCA t,oegepast op een model waarin de economische en politieke
beslissingen van de actoren elkaar wederzijds beïnvloeden. lle ontwikkeling van politiek-
economische modellen is van recente datum, maar hét besef dat het negeren van deze
wederzijdse invloed tot verkeerde conclusies en voorspellingen kan leiden klinkt steeds
meer door in de economische wetenschap (Blinder and Solow, 1973; Lucas I976; Frey and
Schneider, 1978; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Alesina 1987; Hibbs, 1987; Rogoff, 1990;
Drissen an van Winden, 1991; Herings, 1995). De reikwijdte van veel van deze studies is
echter beperkt vanwege de restrictieve veronderstellingen die gemaakt dienen t.e worden
met betrekking tot de vorm van de nutsfuncties om het bestaan van evenwicht in de
politieke sector te garanderen.
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Het belangrijkste doel van hoofdstuk 6 is om een consistente integratie tussen de
economische en polit.ieke sector t,e modelleren. in de zin dat de economische en politiPke
beslissingen van de individuele actoren gebaseerd zijn op dezelfde informatieverzameling.
Voor het economisch subsysteem is gekozen voor het Arrow-Debreu-model en het poli-
tieke subsysteem wordt gekarakteriseerd door coalitievorming onder de meerderheids-
regel. Dit politieke systeem kan geïnterpreteerd worden als de vormirtg van politieke
partijen. In een kader van perfecte informatie zijn individuen in staat om alle mogelijke
uitkomsten van het politieke proces te evalueren op basis van de economische conse-
quenties daarvan. iVlet andere woorden. voor elk beleidsvoorstel kan een conditioneel
economisch evenwicht worden afgeleid. De polit.ieke preferenties van de kiezers volgen
dan uit de waardering van de conditionele economische evenwichten in termen van nut.
Het beleidspunt waarover gestemd wordt is een wet die de maximale lengte van de ar-
beidsdag vastlegt.
Het gegeven model is interessant, omdat, het aantoont dat zelfs een ééndimensionaal
beleidspunt. kan leiden tot meertoppige politieke preferenties. Dit gaat in tegen de veron-
derstelling in de literatuur dat preferenties in geval van een ééndimensionaa] beleidspunt
ééntoppig zullen zijn (zie Ordeshook, 1987, pp. 165; Mueller 1989, pp. 67). Modellen die
uitgaan van ééntoppige preferenties zijn dus van beperkte toepassing. Het model toont
ook aan dat de resultaten van een politiek-economisch model kunnen verschillen van
die van een zuiver economisch model, hetgeen impliceert dat het negeren van politieke
factoren mogelijkerwijze tot, onjuiste conclusies leidt.
Dit, proefschrift is bedoeld om een bijdrage te leveren aan zowel toegepast onderzoek
op het gebied van de politiek als wel aan de methoden voor het oplossen van politieke
spelen. De vernieuwingen op het vlak van het toegepast onderzoek in deel I zijn dat
rekening gehouden wordt met de rnogelijkheid van actief kiesrecht, van kandidaten met
beleidspreferenties, van strategisch kiesgedrag en van coalitievorming. Bovendien draagt
het concept. 'perfect. sterk Nash-evenwicht', dat in hoofstuk 3 wordt toegepast, bij aan
de methoden voor het oplossen van oneindige spelen (oorspronkelijk werd dit concept
ontwikkeld voor spelen met een eindige spelersverzameling). Verder lost het concept van
CCA, dat ontwikkeld wordt in hoofdstuk 5, het probleem varr coalitionele instabiliteit
in een groot aantal coalitiespelen op. Bovendien biedt CCA een goede basis voor verder
onderzoek. Hoofdstuk 6 draagt bij aan de theorie van het algemeen evenwicht door de
koppeling van een politiek systeem aan een economisch systeem.
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